




Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

August 19, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM:


MARK B. WHITAKER, JR.

DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF HEALTH, SAFETY AND SECURITY

SUBJECT:

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly
Report, April – June (2nd Quarter CY2008)

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from April to June 2008. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per Department of Energy (DOE) STD-1063-2006, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. A summary of this quarter's data concluded:

- 87% Fully Qualified (last Quarter was 85%)
- 86% Staffing Level (last Quarter was 88%)
- 44% Time Spent in the Field (DOE goal is >40%)
- 74% Time Spent in Oversight Activities (DOE Goal is > 65%)

Percentages are based on FR staffing analyses at 207 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) and 179 FTEs actual staffing. Fully qualified FR totals for this period broken down by program were as follows: Environmental Management (EM) had 92% fully qualified, Nuclear Energy (NE) had 100% fully qualified, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had 79% fully qualified, and Science (SC) had 86% fully qualified. The DOE goal for fully qualified FRs is greater than 80%.

FR Staffing for EM was 78%, which is largely attributed to the Savannah River Operations Office where 11 FR vacancies exist. Recent improvements with FR incentives have been implemented at this site to assist with filling these vacancies. Personnel actions are nearing completion to fill approximately two-thirds of the vacancies. Other recruiting activities continue for the remaining vacancies. FR staffing was at 93% for NNSA, 100% for NE, and 100% for SC. The DOE goal for FR staffing is 100%.

FR attrition for this period was six, four coming from EM. These included one FR promotion to a Division Director position at the Savannah River Operations Office, one transfer to an FR position at the Pacific Northwest Site Office, one lateral transfer to a non-FR position at the Idaho Operations Office, and one retirement from the Oak Ridge EM FR Program. NNSA attrition for this reporting period was two, and included one resignation at the Pantex Site Office and one lateral transfer to a non-FR position at the Sandia Site Office. There was no SC or NE FR attrition during this reporting period.



Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the FR web site at <https://www.hss.energy.gov/deprep/facrep/>. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me or the DOE FR Program Manager, James Heffner at 202-586-3690.

Attachment

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report

Distribution:

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Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2008)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
CBFO	2	2	2	100	0	100	50	66	86
ID (EM)	13	12	10	77	1	90	90	44	83
OR (EM)	19	17	14	74	1	93	93	46	66
ORP	14	14	11	79	1	100	100	47	81
PPPO	4	4	4	100	0	100	100	44	76
RL	19	19	19	100	0	100	100	44	70
SPRU	1	1	1	100	0	100	0	40	80
SR	32	32	21	66	1	86	86	50	74
WVDP	2	1	1	50	0	100	100	40	90
EM Totals	106	102	83	78	4	94	92	47	74
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ID (EM): An Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) Waste Disposition (WDP) FR performed a surveillance on contractor occurrence reporting that identified less than adequate performance in event categorization in a timely matter. The FR determined the contractor had a negative trend in categorizing events over an 18 month period.
- ID (EM): An ICP WDP FR performed a review of hoisting and rigging training that identified weaknesses with DOE-STD-1090 training documentation. Documentation could not be provided to demonstrate: (1) Qualification on having knowledge of equipment operating characteristics, capabilities, limitations, effects of variables, safety features, and operating procedures; (2) Training was conducted under the direction of a qualified crane operator or instructor who was designated by management; and (3) The mobile crane operator qualification included an understanding of the equipment characteristics elements.
- ID (EM): During a surveillance by an ICP Facility and Material Disposition Project (FMDP) FR, a repeat issue with temporary power configurations was discovered. More specifically, a daisy-chained circuit with power taps, extension cords and splitters exceeded the permanent branch circuit capacity containing five separate National Electric Code violations. This issue was similar to 2007 findings in which power strips were daisy-chained with extension cords, power strips, and surge suppressors. Due to the repeat nature of these events, this issue was elevated as a concern.
- ID (EM): During the tour of a worksite, an ICP WDP FR noted a subcontractor installing a security fence across a drainage canal. The subcontractor was using a step ladder at the top of the canal to reach the top of the fence to insert a metal rod to connect a new section of fence. The step ladder was not tied off and was improperly being used as an extension ladder.
- ID (EM): Idaho is in the process of hiring two new ICP FRs to replace those who transferred to lateral positions within ICP.
- OR (EM): An FR observed numerous activities in the K-25 facility during this reporting period. Activities observed include: Nets and barrier installation; Modular Work Platform installation on the Operations Floor; Material movement inside the K-25 Controlled Limited Area; Vent, Purge and Drain and Foaming activities; non-destructive assay activities; and Duct Removal activities. Significant time this reporting period was applied to an independent Bechtel Jacobs Company (BJC) investigation team that was assembled to investigate the inadvertent access to the K-25 Operations Floor. Activities involved participating in the interview process with various personnel as well as data

analysis activities associated with facts gathered by the team.

- OR (EM): FRs observed and participated in remote handled (RH) start-up operations in accordance with the DOE-ORO Oversight Plan for RH Debris Operations at Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC). The activities for RH processing are conducted primarily in the hot-cell area of the process building, and are adjacent to the glovebox and box breakdown areas which are primarily used for contact handled debris. The TWPC received its first shipment of RH waste, since officially receiving official Start-up Approval for RH operations (May 19, 2008). Hot cell operations are continuing in preparation for several repackaged drums (6-12 drums) for a planned EPA waste certification audit scheduled for June 30, 2008.
- OR (EM): FRs participated in the review of revision 1 to WP-08-DD0434, Air Gap K-27/K-413/K-25 Tie Line, to allow IES to resume work at Poplar Creek. FRs observed the implementation by BJC of the revised work plan and the mobilization of IES and observed the segregation of the HF Tank Farm debris for disposal at Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF). At K-1401 backfilling of the pits continue and removal of the barricades around filled pits commenced. At the BOS Labs project, the containers that were previously filled were moved to the K-1417 yard for repackaging.
- OR (EM): FRs provided oversight of activities at the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) project which included the final removal of UF₆ from the cold traps to the sodium fluoride (NaF) traps, removal of NaF traps, loading traps into carrier table, and loading on to the truck and shipping to Building 3019. This operation included radcon surveys, hoisting and rigging, performance of critical lifts, and adherence to conduct of operations and strict work control. An FR also observed the development of work package WP-2008-015, Rev. 0, for manipulating probe sliding seal to remove buildup, free-up and retract probe, and collect sample. All work was performed without incident and tasks were completed. An FR also participated in planning meetings for transition of MSRE from an active project to surveillance and maintenance status and met with the EM Federal Project director responsibility for surveillance and maintenance (S&M) for EM facilities at ORNL.
- OR (EM): Notable Statistics of OR EM FRs included: (1) Executed 134 walkthroughs and/or assessments; (2) Reviewed in excess of 712 contractor documents; and (3) Attended in excess of 652 meetings, briefings, Plan of the Days (PODs), and Plan of the Weeks (POWs) in support of contractor activities.
- ORP: An FR found a worker grinding concrete without proper respiratory protection. Dust in the workers breathing zone was significant. The worker stated that the vacuum attachment on the grinder was not effective due to the method of grinding. The worker understood the health hazard when the FR pointed it out and agreed to obtain necessary respiratory protection. The FR verified that worker was using the correct respiratory protection 30 minutes later.
- ORP: An FR found that during a waste transfer, due to skipping a required procedure step, a 1500 gallon water flush was not correctly accounted for. As a result, the contractor revised the procedure to minimize the possibility of missing a step.
- ORP: An FR found workers cutting sheet steel with a plasma torch with a large amount of combustible material around and under the cutting table. When the issue was brought to their attention they stated that they had noticed that the material was there, but believed it was okay because they had a hot work permit including a fire watch. After discussion they agreed to clean up the area. The FR verified that combustibles were removed before they returned to work.
- ORP: An FR identified discrepancies in the corrective actions completed for the S-102 clean-up. The contractor reworked the items and provided more thorough documentation of their completion.
- ORP: An FR identified, and ensured correction of, ambiguous procedural language that could have resulted in a waste transfer misroute. The revised wording in the procedure significantly reduces the possibility of this error.

- ORP: An FR issued Finding Regarding Non-Compliant High Radiation Area Boundary Controls. The contractor has corrected the immediate deficiencies and is addressing clarifications in the governing procedure.
- PPPO: A Paducah FR identified that DUF6 construction workers had established a fall protection harness anchor point using a nylon web strap with a "D" ring wrapped around a four inch fire suppression system piping supply header. Although the web strap with "D" ring is suitable for this purpose the use of the fire suppression piping as an anchor point conflicts with NFPA-13 section 9.1.1.7 which states that sprinkler piping or hangers shall not be used to support non-system components. Alternative anchor locations are readily available and the condition was corrected.
- PPPO: A Paducah FR identified that flange connection fastener engagement for depleted uranium hexafluoride system piping did not meet ASME B31.3, Process Piping requirements. This system is an ASME B31.3 fluid service category M system. ASME B31.3, section 335.2 addresses flanged joints and states that bolts should extend completely through their nuts; any which fail to do so are considered acceptably engaged if the lack of complete engagement is not more than one thread. More than half of the fasteners did not meet this requirement. This condition was also identified at the Portsmouth DUF6 plant and is being evaluated by Uranium Disposition Services, LLC. (UDS).
- PPPO: A Portsmouth FR participated in the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) / Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) discussions for the DUF6 Conversion Facility.
- RL: An FR identified inadequate work control documents for erection of scaffolding above ten feet and for tapping/draining of deactivated chemical process lines to verify no residual chemical hazards remained.
- RL: An FR identified weakness in Contractor's compliance with DC voltage as it related to the NFPA standard. As a result the contractor was required to include training related to DC shock hazards and improve Personnel Protective Equipment used while working near energized electrical that is of DC potential. This was specific to Uninterruptible Power Supply systems which is a common DC voltage system found on the Hanford site.
- RL: An FR identified weaknesses in the work management processes such as released work packages were not in agreement with the Job Control System, additional work outside of a work package was performed, and electrical safety controls were not adequately identified and/or implemented.
- RL: An FR volunteered to provide FR coverage to Las Alamos as was requested by EM headquarters earlier in the quarter.
- RL: FRs identified numerous inadequate items including: Reviewed work document used for retrieval of Materials Open Test Assembly (MOTA) samples at 324 facility, and found minor weakness in document used to control shipping the packaged MOTA samples and discussed with the Work Supervisor; Identified clean dirt was being shipped from 100 N to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF); Identified opportunities for recycling significant amounts of metals; Work practice and documentation deficiencies during maintenance activities on the Groundwater Project and Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF); A Facility Modification Package at Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP) did not accurately reflect electrical system modifications that were to be made by the work package; and, Unacceptable practice involving photo-copying of torque data sheets.
- RL: FRs provided oversight for numerous actions including: CSB Readiness to receive spent nuclear fuel; 327 Decontamination & Decommissioning activities (D&D); MOTA sample sorting, packaging and shipping from B324 to B326; B308 glovebox removal; De-inventory of Special Nuclear Material; Draining of make-up feed chemical lines; and Plutonium Reclamation Facility column hood process equipment removal.
- SPRU: The FR has been reviewing the Contractors' procedures, preparing for a SPRU Field Office self assessment and a Readiness Surveillance for the Land Remediation project. SPRU projects are in the planning / work

preparation phase.

- SPRU: The FR identified less than adequate subcontractor control related to Trailer Maintenance work without lockout/tagout (LO/TO) and unauthorized work scope. This resulted in corrective actions being developed for control of subcontractor work.
- SR: Assistant Manager for Waste Disposition Project (AMWDP) FRs performed a validation of the facility's readiness to support Tank 5 and Tank 6 Chemical Sludge Removal Operations. The review provided evidence of the readiness of the contractor to safely conduct the transfer of acid to and from the waste tanks for the purpose of sludge removal.
- SR: AMWDP FRs performed oversight activities during the contractor Facility Self Assessment of the Tank 18/19 Mechanical Waste Removal operation in preparation for a Contractor and DOE Readiness Assessment (RA).
- SR: An Assistant Manager for Nuclear Material Stabilization Project (AMNMSP) FR identified deficiencies in Special Nuclear Material receipt procedures. Procedures were revised.
- SR: An AMNMSP FR identified improper storage of excess hazardous chemicals and ensured proper disposition.
- SR: An AMNMSP FR identified inconsistencies in DSA and Modified Security Plan requirements relative to helicopter flights near and over a nuclear facility.
- SR: An AMWDP FR provided specific oversight of implementing the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF) DSA Upgrade.
- SR: Two Assistant Manager for Closure Project (AMCP) FRs re-qualified on their facilities and cross qualified on an additional facility. One FR was promoted to Division Director. Personnel actions are nearing completion to fill about two-thirds of the vacancies. Other recruiting activities continue for the remaining vacancies.
- WVDP: The FR initiated reviews of the electrical extension cord program and practices and the respiratory protection program and practices resulting in revisions to both.
- WVDP: The FR mentored an EM-sponsored Professional Development Corps employee during a developmental assignment at the WVDP.
- WVDP: The FR supported an EM-62 visit and an independent hoisting and rigging review.

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2008)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ID (NE)	11	11	11	100	0	100	100	46	78
NE Totals	11	11	11	100	0	100	100	46	78
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- ID (NE): All NE FRs participated in an assessment of the Contractor's corrective action performance relating to all Significance Category OE, 1, 2, R, and 3 Occurrence Reports issued in 2007. The FRs identified weaknesses in the timeliness of completing these corrective actions and managing changes to corrective actions as required by DOE M 231.1-2.
- ID (NE): An FR at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex observed workers exiting radiologically controlled areas and entering adjacent clean areas on two occasions without performing appropriate contamination surveys. The FR communicated the issues to the Radiological Control Supervisor who initiated surveys to verify there was no spread of contamination. Additional training was provided to ensure workers are performing surveys as required.
- ID (NE): An FR at the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) identified a work control issue that resulted in a failure to control hazardous electrical energy during a routine preventive maintenance activity. Follow-on investigation by the Contractor resulted in the categorization of the event as a reportable occurrence.
- ID (NE): An FR discovered that Site Wide Complex (SWC) laboratory personnel were not properly trained in the use of laboratory emergency response plans and the associated emergency response actions required in the event of a dangerous hazardous gas accumulation.
- ID (NE): An FR for SWC facilities discovered flaws in forklift inspection, labeling, and operator training that would allow forklifts to remain in service beyond their periodic load test due dates.
- ID (NE): An FR noted that a section of the firewater loop at the ATR Complex was isolated without proper documentation and informed the contractor Fire Protection Engineer (FPE) who was not aware of the isolation. A critique of the event resulted in corrective actions that will ensure more effective control of life safety systems.
- ID (NE): An FR recognized the significance of a non-conforming condition identified during performance of a TSR surveillance test at MFC, and encouraged Contractor management to not consider the component operational until the issue could be resolved. The FR and DOE Facility Engineer worked with several levels of Contractor management before the issue was understood, accepted and corrected by the Contractor.
- ID (NE): The ATR Complex FRs noted that zero energy verification was not being effectively implemented for LO/TO. During one spot check of a LO/TO, an FR discovered and informed the area supervisor that no zero energy for pressure was conducted. Upon notification, the supervisor corrected the zero energy check and had it verified. On another spot check, an FR identified that rotational energy was not listed as a hazard and that there were no start up checks associated with zero energy checks. At the time this was identified, the pump had already been replaced and the motor was removed. The only zero energy checks completed were electrical and pressure.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2008)

<u>Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
LASO	14	14	11	79	0	91	73	41	69
LSO	10	10	10	100	0	100	70	44	75
NSO	8	8	9	112	0	100	78	60	76
PXSO	10	10	9	90	1	90	80	43	68
SRSO	4	4	4	100	0	100	75	40	73
SSO	11	11	10	91	1	100	100	30	67
YSO	12	11	11	92	0	91	73	45	71
NNSA Totals	69	68	64	93	2	96	79	43	71
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- LASO: An FR completed the FR Conduct of Operations (CONOPS) assessment on Operator Aids resulting in the identification of a finding against the programmatic organization for lack of implementation of the requirements of CONOPS, as identified at the institutional level. As a result, the programmatic organization has agreed to provide an implementation plan/gap analysis for CONOPS.
- LASO: An FR performed numerous Criticality Safety Limit Approval (CSLA) walkdowns verifying mass location criticality safety postings matched associated location CSLAs in support of the TA-55 Augmented Limit Review process.
- LASO: Serving as an assessment team lead, an FR compiled Operator Aid Posting assessment reports prepared by other FRs into a single comprehensive report. The report was successfully submitted to management for review and transmitted to the Management and Operations (M&O) Contractor for corrective action development in a timely manner.
- LASO: Three FRs attended the Radioactive Waste Management course and Safety System Oversight course.
- LASO: Two FRs attended FR Workshop in Las Vegas. One of the FRs gave presentation on the Natural Gas Deflagration event at TA-55.
- LASO: Two FRs supported the NNSA RA for Startup of Interim Radiography Operations in PF-4.
- LSO: AN FR identified a tritium stack monitor inlet hose that was disconnected. This observation resulted in a critique being held by the contractor to determine the causes and corrective actions.
- LSO: During a CONOPS surveillance, FRs identified a number of issues relating to inadequate contractor implementation of a required reading program at the nuclear facilities.
- LSO: During a review of the contractor's implementation of Specific Administrative Controls (SACs), a FR identified inadequate implementation of a SAC for combustible/flammable liquids that resulted in the contractor exceeding the combustible liquid limit.
- LSO: Four FRs completed a CONOPS management self assessment that resulted in identification of three contractor

issues.

- LSO: FRs identified a number of issues relating to inadequate or missing information on explosives, radiological control, and hazards postings/labels, and fire or RMA exit doors being left open or not working properly.
- LSO: FRs provided support to review the contractor's submittals of the CONOPS applicability matrices.
- LSO: LSO completed its three-year FR program self assessment and Corrective Action Plan.
- LSO: One FR completed his Interim Qualification on the Nuclear Materials Technology Program (NMTP) Category 3 Nuclear Facilities.
- LSO: Two FRs provided oversight of a contractor RA of the Tritium Science Station.
- NSO: An FR continued monitoring construction activities for the relocation of the Critical Experiment Facilities (CEF) machines from Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Device Assembly Facility (DAF).
- NSO: Several FRs and the FR Group Lead participated in the successful annual Nevada Test Site (NTS) Site wide Emergency Management Full Participation Exercise, Roadrunner '08, which included off-site resources and positively evaluated by headquarters personnel.
- NSO: The FR Group (FRG) continued to support NSO Line Management in achieving the NA-1 directive to transition National Weapons Laboratory managed facilities to the NTS M&O Contractor.
- NSO: The FRs continued their contractor oversight inline with Line Organization Contractor Assurance Surveillances in function areas such as CONOPS; Work Control Attributes; and Environmental, Safety and Health.
- NSO: Two FRs and the FR Group Lead participated in the NNSA/NSO Joint Actinide Shock Physics Research Facility (JASPER) Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) assessment for the startup of facility as a Hazard Category 3 Nuclear Facility. FRG positions on the assessment team consisted of the Deputy Team Lead and evaluator for the functions areas of CONOPS and Start-up.
- NSO: Two FRs completed their Core Qualification to become Interim Qualified.
- NSO: Two FRs noted a negative trend in work control issues during the 3rd quarter. The negative trend was communicated as a concern to the NTS M&O Contractor which resulted in the contractor performing an analysis, identification of corrective actions, and briefed employees on the incidents and lessons learned.
- PXSO: One FR transferred to NASA. His vacant position has been posted and the posting will close August 11, 2008.
- PXSO: Two FRs completed their qualifications, including their oral board in late May.
- SRSO: A Senior FR was on detail to the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility Project (NA-10).
- SRSO: An FR was on detail to the Highly Enriched Uranium Manufacturing Facility to provide technical expertise on Programmable Logic Controllers used in Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems.
- SRSO: Two FRs conducted lessons learned presentations at the 2008 FR Workshop in Las Vegas.
- SSO: An FR began his involvement with preparations for restart of the Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility Critical

Experiments. This includes attending weekly restart meetings, review and comment on the Plan-of-Action, attending some operator training classes, and keeping SSO Management informed of progress and problems. He also observed verification activities of the 2199 fuel elements that will be used for these critical experiments.

- SSO: An FR conducted a surveillance on the completed TSR annual Surveillance Requirements for a reactor facility. A weakness was identified with the yearly power determination test procedure regarding LO/TO of a pump and heat exchanger, and completed documentation of results. Four Observations were also provided regarding issues with other annual surveillance procedures.
- SSO: An FR was involved in the review and resolution of two Potential Inadequate Safety Analysis for a reactor facility. This involved a thorough review of associated documents resulting in several comments to the contractor and verifying proper resolution of those comments.
- SSO: An SSO FR reviewed over 20 Unreviewed Safety Question Determinations (USQD) and associated page changes for the contractor DSA and TSR annual update for a reactor facility. Numerous comments involving storage pool level monitoring and some USQD issues were resolved with the contractor.
- SSO: Two SSO FRs participated in a Site Office initiative lasting six weeks to re-write office procedures in the areas of risk determination and manage corrective action plan processes.
- YSO: An FR noted that a Standing Order had been identified as a compensatory measure as part of the JCO related to the SNM Vehicle. The FR's questioning led to the discovery that the current revision had expired and also had not been distributed to facility personnel.
- YSO: An FR participated in the CDNS biennial review of NSO reviewing the Startup of Nuclear Facilities CRAD.

OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2008)

<u>Area/Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ASO	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	23	82
BHSO	5	5	5	100	0	100	80	45	87
FSO	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	46	94
OR (SC)	5	5	5	100	0	80	80	37	65
PNSO	4	4	4	100	0	75	75	45	77
SC Totals	21	21	21	100	0	90	86	38	79
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is defined as the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter. The number of available work hours is the actual number of hours a Facility Representative works in a calendar quarter, including overtime hours. It does not include leave time (sick, annual, or other) or holidays, nor does it include special assignments greater than 1 week assigned by the Field Element Manager.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- BHSO: FRs determined several Accelerator Safety Envelopes were not consistent with current guidance.
- BHSO: FRs participated in the CD-3 mini review for the National Synchrotron Light Source-II.
- FSO: FRs participated in the development of a Technical Qualification Program.
- FSO: FRs participated in the Site Office internal procedure development and revision.
- OR(SC): FR field time was lower than the DOE goal of 40% due to: qualification activities by the FR recently assigned to Radiochemical Engineering Development Center, safety basis document review activities at the High Flux Isotope Reactor, and participation in an EM incident investigation by the FR assigned to Spallation Neutron Source.
- PNSO: An FR assisted in reviewing an updated version of the Capability Replacement Lab Project Hazards Analysis Report for the Radiochemical Processing Lab (RPL) DSA upgrade.
- PNSO: An FR issued surveillance report S-08-PNSO-PNNL-003, Procedure Content and Use, documenting an event in which a forklift was overloaded and the contractor was not pursuing remedies to prevent recurrence.
- PNSO: FRs continued monitoring construction and transition activities including the erection of steel for one building and the pouring of concrete footings for four of the five buildings comprising the Physical Science Facility; the assembly of the quarter scale model of the Hanford Vitrification Plant pretreatment system in the Process Development Lab – West (PDL-W); and the completion of the Environmental Molecular Science Lab office addition.
- PNSO: FRs monitored contractor performance during a site-wide emergency preparedness drill at the RPL involving a fire that resulted in personnel being injured and radiologically contaminated and in radioactive material being released into the environment.
- PNSO: FRs monitored contractor response to events involving radioactive materials in a non-radiological area; a radiation generating device (X-ray machine) being inadvertently sent for excess; degraded fire protection system valves; an electrical shock to a researcher in the Applied Process Engineering Lab; suspect/counterfeit strobe lights; tritium contamination in the RPL; uncontrolled hazardous energy at PDL-W; and cobalt-60 contamination

discovered in the High Exposure Facility in Building 318.

- PNSO: PNSO increased FR staffing from two to four FRs beginning this fiscal year. The third FR was hired on March 16, 2008 and a fourth FR was hired on June 22, 2008 (included in this report).