



Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

September 29, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: Joanne D. Lorence 
Facility Representative Program Manager
Office of the Departmental Representative to the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (HS-1.1)

SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report,
April – June 2006

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from April to June 2006. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD-1063-2006, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program. A summary of this quarter's data concluded:

79% Fully Qualified
85% Staffing Level
46% Time Spent in the Field
68% Time Spent in Oversight Activities

Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the Facility Representative web site at <http://www.facrep.org/>. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me at 202-586-7631.

Attachment



Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report
September 29, 2006

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cc:

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ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2006)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
CBFO	***								
ID (ICP)	12	12	9	75	2	100	100	44	81
OH/WVDP	3	3	3	100	0	100	67	52	81
OR (EM)	19	19	19	100	0	74	74	42	67
ORP	14	14	12	86	0	100	100	46	72
PPPO	***								
RL	18	18	17	94	0	100	100	44	70
SR	30	30	27	90	0	100	98	68	43
EM Totals	96	96	87	91	2	96	90	49	69
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

*** Did not provide report.

EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Idaho, FRs reviewed authorization basis (AB) implementation by the contractor at INTEC nuclear facilities. They identified a continuing concern with implementing AB documents in accordance with the contractor's procedures. Weaknesses were identified in the content of the implementation "evidence file" and deviations from the contractor procedures for safety basis implementation regarding how to complete required forms. FRs concluded that the safety basis implementation process does not provide a consistent product across INTEC.
- FRs provided pre-bid tours and safety oversight of the Ashtabula Closure Project on a scheduled and as-requested basis to ensure safe and compliant work practices. FRs conducted lessons learned oversight and participated in the Drum Cell readiness surveillance.
- At Oak Ridge, programmatic issues were identified with the Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC critique program. Additional work continued with the contractor at K-25 to improve upon work control.
- At the Office of River Protection, an FR identified that a maintenance procedure checklist did not implement a requirement for performing a worksite job hazard analysis.
- At the Waste Treatment Plant, an FR participated in three incident reviews. The incidents were failure to de-energize prior to repairs, subcontractor failure to follow procedures, and a worker was struck with a piece of rebar. The FR verified all corrective actions were completed and adequate.
- At Richland, an FR brought contractor management attention to elevated dose rates in a work area that is becoming more frequently occupied as new equipment is prepared for startup. Facility management created a facility modification permit and improved the shielding in the area.
- At Richland, an FR identified a PISA (upgraded to a USQ in the reporting period) related to the replacement of filters in 234-5Z HEPA Filter Rooms. An unfiltered release path existed between the room corridor and exhaust stack.
- At Savannah River, an FR identified field conditions of valve stem locking devices that are not in compliance with design requirements as specified on the associated equipment drawings.
- At Savannah River, an FR identified vulnerability in contractor's scaffold program while overseeing and assessing work activities involving the movement of four slurry pumps from Tank 11 to Tank 12.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2006)

<u>Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
LASO	19	15	12	63	1	75	25	20	36
LSO	11	11	10	100	0	55	55	49	76
NSO	10	10	7	70	0	86	29	48	67
PXSO	10	8	8	80	0	88	75	48	82
SRSO	4	4	4	100	0	100	75	39	77
SSO	15	11	10	67	0	80	50	35	71
YSO	***								
NNSA Totals	69	59	51	80	1	81	52	40	68
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

*** Did not provide report.

NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Livermore, during review of a TSR document, a FR identified to the contractor that a specific administrative control was deleted. Removal of this administrative control was not approved by LSO. This resulted in the contractor filing an occurrence report as a TSR violation.
- At Los Alamos, an FR investigated TA-18 beryllium contamination and exposure issues and then briefed staff as requested by LASO Manager. Actions to address issues resulting from the investigation have improved the institutional LANL beryllium safety program.
- The Nevada Site Office Facility Representatives observed the Contractor Readiness Assessment for the UNICORN Subcritical Experiment. In addition, the Facility Representatives provided oversight of field activities in preparation for the experiment.
- At Pantex, a new hire joined the PXSO FR staff in April. During this quarter the FR staff supported four NNSA Readiness Assessments.
- At Sandia, a FR led the Certification & Verification Team which performed a comprehensive line management review of the MESA MicroFab Contractor Readiness Assessment resulting in the decision by SSO Management to not perform an independent NNSA/SC Readiness Assessment. SSO FRs ensured adequate verification of closure of all findings associated with the SNL Management Self-Assessment and Readiness Assessment.
- At Savannah River, facility representatives provided continuous coverage of Tritium Extraction Facility activities for a week long period in May to assess operator proficiency.

OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2006)

<u>Area/Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
AMES	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	30	85
ASO	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	26	81
BHSO	6	6	3	50	1	100	100	36	91
FSO	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	33	93
OR (SC)	***								
PNSO	2	2	1.5	75	0	100	100	48	83
PSO	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0	100	100	42	69
SC Totals	16.5	16.5	13	88	1	100	100	36	84
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

*** Did not provide report.

SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Brookhaven, FRs were involved in the following issues:
 - An FR was assigned as a team member for the Type B Arc Flash Accident Investigation that occurred at the BNL STAR Detector associated with the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC). One BNL employee suffered minor burns as a result of the arc flash.
 - FRs performed extensive oversight activities for the construction of the new BNL Research Support Building and BNL Center for Functional Nanomaterials.
- At Fermi, FRs were involved in numerous safety activities and initiatives this quarter. The following is a list of those activities:
 - Participation in ORNL Spallation Neutron Source Target Readiness Review
 - Coordination of DOE-Wide Accelerator Safety Workshop
 - Coordination of Site Office Operational Awareness Activities to include QA and Conduct of Operations
- At Pacific Northwest, a FR completed a surveillance report on Emergency Preparedness. The surveillance report documented that the facility map contained errors in the evacuation route and staging area location.
- At Pacific Northwest, a FR discovered a lockout/tagout non-conformance and monitored the contractor's response and corrective actions.
- At Pacific Northwest, a FR monitored the contractor's investigation and corrective actions for an arc flash event that occurred during work on 480-volt electrical equipment. The FR prepared a presentation on the arc flash event and gave the presentation to the RL facility representatives during their monthly meeting in June.

NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (2QCY2006)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ID (NE)	10	10	10	100	0	100	80	41	77
OR (NE)	4	4	4	100	0	100	100	85	50
NE Totals	14	14	14	100	0	100	90	63	64
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

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** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Idaho, both the Reactor Technology Complex (RTC) and Material & Fuel Complex (MFC) FRs identified two programmatic significant areas of concern that were addressed with DOE-ID management and presented to contractor management for resolution. (1) Inadequate corrective actions being taken for identified radiological controls deficiencies. Collectively, the identified deficiencies indicated a lack of sensitivity to the importance of resolving radiological controls deficiencies in INL nuclear facilities. (2) Several examples of work control deficiencies with regard to work order use and review, procedural use and review, control of work boundaries, and a repeated issue of the lack of foreign material control.
- At Idaho, during operational awareness walk-downs at MFC, an FR noted several fixed oxygen monitors located throughout the Hot Fuel Examination Facility were found to be out of calibration. While touring Fuel Conditioning Facility, the Facility Representative discovered an energized 480 volt panel door propped open to allow for the collection of water, from snowmelt and rain, to drain from a conduit that enters the panel.
- At Oak Ridge, oversight coverage for Building 3019 was transferred from NE responsibility to EM. The FR previously assigned to Building 3019 was assigned oversight responsibilities for other facilities at ORNL.