




Department of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

June 14, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

FROM: John D. Evans 
Facility Representative Program Manager
Office of the Departmental Representative to the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DR-1)

SUBJECT: Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report,
January – March 2006

Attached is the Facility Representative (FR) Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report covering the period from January to March 2006. Data for these indicators are gathered by Field elements quarterly per DOE-STD-1063-2006, *Facility Representatives*, and reported to Headquarters program offices for evaluation and feedback to improve the FR Program.

As of March 31, 2006, 81% of all FRs were fully qualified, up from 78% the previous quarter, and just above the DOE goal of 80%. To assist site offices in continuing to meet the qualification goal, there will be two focused training sessions for FR candidates in the coming months. These sessions will involve qualified FRs giving checkouts and exams to FR candidates with the goal of reducing the overall time needed to complete qualifications. Approximately 13 FR candidates from several sites are scheduled to attend.

Overall FR staffing is at 86% of the levels needed, up from 85% and 81% during the previous two quarters.

Current FR information and past quarterly performance indicator reports are accessible at the Facility Representative web site at <http://www.facrep.org/>. Should you have any questions or comments on this report, please contact me at 202-586-3887.

Attachment



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Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators Quarterly Report
June 14, 2006

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ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2006)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
CBFO	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	60	65
ID (ICP)	12	12	10	83	0	100	83	43	81
OH/FCP	3	3	3	100	1	100	100	45	70
OH/MCP	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	52	64
OH/WVDP	3	3	3	100	0	100	67	40	55
OR (EM)	19	19	19	100	0	74	74	41	62
ORP	14	14	12	86	1	100	100	47	76
PPPO	4	4	4	100	0	100	75	27	56
RL	18	18	17	94	0	100	100	42	66
SR	30	30	28	93	0	100	97	48	75
EM Totals	106	106	99	93	2	95	90	44	70
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

EM Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Idaho, several FRs served as team members for the DOE-ID Self-Assessment of Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2004-1, Oversight of Complex, High-Hazard Nuclear Operations, Commitment #23, Work Planning and Control, and Commitment #25, Feedback and Improvement. The team used the review criteria defined in Under Secretary Garman's memoranda.
- At Miamisburg, an FR identified the improper layout of a temporary electrical cord supplying power for grit blasting operations in T West Head-House, leading the contractor to take immediate corrective action.
- At Oak Ridge, a new staffing analysis showed a need for 19 FRs, up from 14 in the previous analysis. Five FRs were recently hired and are completing qualifications. Also, the oversight program is being revised as part of the ETPP Type B accident investigation corrective action plan.
- At Portsmouth/Paducah, two FRs completed requalification and a FR candidate passed a written examination, needing only the oral board to complete initial qualification.
- At Richland, an FR identified that 234-5Z HEPA Filter Rooms were not being adequately tested because dampers were not correctly positioned. Contractor follow-up also identified other configuration problems that resulted in a Potential Inadequacy in the Documented Safety Analysis and Unreviewed Safety Question. Also, an FR Program Self-Assessment was conducted by the Operations Oversight Division.
- At River Protection, an FR determined that a nitrogen purging activity was not in compliance with the task specific job safety analysis. Workers were exposed to a potential asphyxiation hazard. Immediate corrective actions included stopping the work activity, reconfiguring the nitrogen work enclosure, and modifying the job hazard analysis. Long term corrective actions are in progress. Also, an FR identified numerous electrical safety issues during walkthroughs of the Tank Farm facilities. One issue was an imminent fire hazard because a large collection of tumbleweeds were found in close proximity to energized inferred heaters. The issues were promptly corrected.
- At Savannah River, during start-up testing for Actinide Removal Process, an FR identified a valve out of position for the test. The FR raised the issue to the contractor and the work was stopped. Subsequent investigation identified issues with the methods used to ensure system alignments during procedure development. Also, an FR identified inadequate receipt inspections as a result of finding an improper fire extinguisher which would not have met Authorization Basis Requirements for a new nuclear activity.
- At West Valley, FRs supported and conducted public site tours related to the WVDP Request For Proposal (RFP), in addition to oversight of contractor activities to ensure safe and compliant work practices.

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2006)

<u>Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
LASO	19	15	12	63	0	50	42	19	30
LSO	11	10	10	91	0	60	60	37	64
NSO	10	10	7	70	0	57	29	33	56
PXSO	10	8	7	70	0	100	86	33	72
SRSO	4	4	4	100	0	100	50	41	68
SSO	15	11	10	67	0	80	80	34	66
YSO	12	10	10	83	0	80	80	43	74
NNSA Totals	81	68	60	74	0	72	62	33	59
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NNSA Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Livermore, two FRs performed verification of corrective actions to TSR Administrative Control Program recovery plans. During this effort, an LSO FR identified that the system developed by the contractor to include tracking expiration dates of all procedures did not perform this function, resulting in a number of procedures that were already expired including one that performed the operability test for a safety significant component.
- At Los Alamos, the “Strategic Pause for Transition” was completed in late February 2006. The Pause started in mid-November 2005 and removed several FRs from the field to concentrate on organizational issues vital to proper contractor oversight under the provisions of the new contract. Also, an FR served as a board member for the Sigma/Am-241 Type B accident investigation.
- At Nevada, all but one FR were recently re-assigned to new facilities to expand their knowledge and experience. Also, FRs participated in the Readiness Assessment for the Krakatau Subcritical Experiment and provided oversight during the experiment.
- At Nevada, FRs performed an assessment on Conduct of Operations Chapter 1, Operations Organization and Administration, for all NSO organizations. The FRs participated in several other assessments on Work Control and Conduct of Operations.
- At Pantex, an FR and a DOE Subject Matter Expert were observing maintenance of a building boiler. The instrument technicians doing the work violated the work package requirements for personal protective equipment and the lockout/tagout procedure for the contractor. This observation resulted in a reportable event and required the contractor to perform a critique and causal analysis on the event.
- At Sandia, an FR completed the SSO Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility (SPRF) Physics Testing Oversight Plan and the SPRF returned to programmatic operations during the quarter. Also, the FRs have established a regular program of maintenance work observations. With a goal of three observations per month, 11 observations were completed during the first quarter. One significant finding related to the adequacy of lockout/tagout procedures is still undergoing resolution with the contractor.
- At Savannah River, an FR participated on the Y-12 Uranium Processing Facility Independent Project Review for Critical Decision 1. Also, a FR completed core qualification.
- At Y-12, an FR identified significant operational restrictions for future operations at HEUMF related to criticality safety evaluations and a lack of floor drains. As a result, building modifications were effected and safety assumptions reanalyzed to ensure the facility would not be unduly restricted in its ability to handle fissile material.
- At Y-12, an FR observed a damaged filter inside a hazardous material glove box before the filter was scheduled to be used in the Purification Building. The contractor replaced the filter before placing the filter in service.

OFFICE OF SCIENCE SITES

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2006)

<u>Area/Site Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
AMES	1	1	1	100	0	100	100	30	85
ASO	5	5	5	100	0	100	100	30	82
BHSO	6	6	4	67	2	100	100	33	83
FSO	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	40	92
OR (SC)	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	67	80
PNSO	2	2	2	100	0	100	100	43	76
PSO	0.5	0.5	0.5	100	0	100	100	41	68
SC Totals	18.5	18.5	16.5	89	2	100	100	38	82
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

SC Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Brookhaven, FRs were involved in the following issues:
 - Identification and investigation of a potential inadequate safety analysis (PISA) unreviewed safety question (USQ) concerning corrosion of ventilation stacks at the Waste Management Facility
 - The investigation of a noise overexposure and standard threshold shift (STS) at the Superconducting Magnet Facility

- At Fermi, FRs were involved in numerous safety activities and initiatives this quarter. The following is a list of those activities:
 - Coordination of the DOE SC ISMS Assessments at the Fermi Site Office and Laboratory
 - Oversight of Accelerator Shutdown activities
 - Coordination of Site Office Participation in DOE ISM Program Activities
 - Participation in the Energized Electrical Safety Review Action Plan
 - Coordination of the 10CFR 851 Rule Implementation
 - Conducting field verification of NFPA 70E implementation amongst subcontractors

- At Oak Ridge, an FR that previously covered NE facilities (Building 3019) will now be assigned to various SC facilities as part of a realignment of FR duties.

- At Pacific Northwest, an FR completed a surveillance report on the incorporation of Lessons Learned into work planning. The review identified that procedures were deficient in not requiring that a review of relevant lessons be performed when planning work. Also, an FR completed a surveillance report on Notifications. Specifically, the report identified that the contractor did not consistently meet the timeliness requirements for event categorizations. The cause for this inconsistency was determined to be due to decision makers not all being adequately prepared to make timely, conservative decisions.

- At Pacific Northwest, an FR was chosen to participate as the PNSO representative on the Source Evaluation Board working the rebid of the PNNL contract. The detail is estimated to last 18 months and amount to approximately 0.5 FTE of time. No backfill is currently planned. Next quarter's FR staffing will show a reduction of 0.5 FTE.

NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY

Facility Representative Program Performance Indicators (1QCY2006)

<u>Field or Ops Office</u>	<u>Staffing Analysis</u>	<u>FTEs</u>	<u>Actual Staffing</u>	<u>% Staffing</u>	<u>Attrition</u>	<u>% Core Qualified</u>	<u>% Fully Qualified</u>	<u>% Field Time *</u>	<u>% Oversight Time **</u>
ID (NE)	10	10	10	100	0	100	67	40	77
OR (NE)	4	4	4	100	1	75	75	67	80
NE Totals	14	14	14	100	1	93	69	48	78
DOE GOALS	-	-	-	100	-	-	>80	>40	>65

* % Field Time is the number of hours spent in the plant/field divided by the number of available work hours in the quarter.

** % Oversight Time includes % Field Time

NE Facility Representative (FR) Highlights:

- At Idaho, a Reactor Technology Complex (RTC) FR witnessed a contractor employee reaching into idle auger blades of a snow-blower without first turning-off the engine. As a part of the follow-up for this event, the FR reviewed all existing snow removal Job-Safety Analyses (JSAs). None of the existing JSA's addressed the hazards associated with clearing obstructions from snow removal equipment.
- At Idaho, while performing a walkdown of an in-town laboratory, a Site Technology Complex (STC) FR observed a hydrogen production experiment that was producing hydrogen in excess (25% above) of the authorized throughput discussed in the Independent Hazard Review (IHR). This finding prompted an additional review of laboratory research activities and implementation of approved IHRs and Job Safety Analyses (JSAs). This review included several buildings and Laboratories. Three other examples of work being performed outside the bounds specified in IHRs or JSAs were identified.
- At Oak Ridge, oversight coverage for Building 3019 was transferred from NE responsibility to EM. The FR previously assigned to Building 3019 was assigned oversight responsibilities for other facilities at ORNL.