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Director, Office of Nuclear and
Facility Safety
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U.S. Department of
Energy
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Washington, DC
20585
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DOE/EH-0541
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Issue No. 96-06
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December 1996
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Underground Utilities
Detection and Excavation
Contents
Notice Summary
Events involving the unexpected discovery of underground
utilities during excavation or trenching operations continue
to occur at Department of Energy(DOE) facilities. Several of
these events have resulted in electrical shock. At least one
of them caused a serious injury, and many others have been
near misses. These events are of concern to DOE because of
the upcoming increase in decontamination and decommissioning
(D&D)activities, which can include extensive digging and
excavation, throughout the DOE complex.
This notice provides the following information related to
excavation events at DOE facilities.
- Descriptions of recent events, including causes,
lessons learned, and corrective actions.
- Analysis of excavation events at DOE facilities
reported to the Occurrence
- Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) database.
- An overview of current technology for underground
utility detection.
- Specific recommendations for improving site utilities
detection and excavation programs.
- Requirements, guidelines, and standards related to
excavation and underground utility detection.
- Information on innovative practices being implemented
at DOE facilities.
Applicability
This notice applies to all DOE facilities where
underground utilities detection and excavation are
performed. The notice should be processed as an external
source of lessons learned information as described in DOE
STD 7501 95, Development of DOE Lessons Learned Programs.2
The Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety encourages DOE and
facility managers to examine their underground utilities
detection and excavation programs in view of this
information.
Description
The unexpected discovery of an unmarked, undetected
underground utility line is one of the more dangerous
aspects of the construction industry. These "phantom" pipes,
wires, or conduits are frequently missing from as-built or
other record drawings and often elude detection via
"traditional craft" surface geophysical methods, such as
pipe and cable locators and ground penetrating radar.
Underground lines are often energized, pressurized, or
contain radioactive or other hazardous substances. If they
are accidentally damaged they can inflict serious injury on
workers in the vicinity of the site. Utility service to
facilities in the general area can also be disrupted for
significant lengths of time. Facility and nuclear safety may
also be adversely affected because of power loss to safety
related systems.
Operating Experience Analysis and Feedback (OEAF)
engineers searched the ORPS database and identified
approximately 150 excavation incidents that occurred at DOE
facilities since 1991. Fourteen events occurred during the
first quarter of 1995; one, in early 1996, left a worker in
a coma. These incidents involved various types of equipment
(hand tools, jackhammers, backhoes) and the full range of
utility lines and pipes (natural gas, electric, water,
industrial waste). It is also probable that, in addition to
the 150 reported incidents, there were substantial
additional costs and project delays incurred as a result of
last minute construction "discoveries" of unknown or
misrepresented underground utilities.
A review of the related occurrences in the ORPS database
shows that improper planning and carelessness caused the
majority of these incidents. In many cases, workers did not
maintain adequate safety margins during excavation
activities and did not fully understand excavation
procedures and potential hazards. Finally, people involved
in these events often over relied on facility as built or
other record drawings and did not properly use, or interpret
the data from, surface geophysical equipment used for
utility detection and location of other hidden hazards.
Several DOE sites are taking significant actions to
improve their programs in response to excavation events.
However, a strong commitment by upper management is
necessary to ensure the success of these programs. Actions
being taken at the Hanford site to aggressively improve its
excavation program will be discussed later in the notice.
Events Summary
OEAF engineers reviewed occurrence descriptions of 150
ORPS reports involving underground utilities detection and
excavation events. The following four incidents are
representative of the majority of these events.
Worker Seriously Injured When
Jackhammer Hits Underground 13,200-Volt Line
On January 17, 1996, a mason tender working on a project
at Los Alamos National Laboratory was severely injured when
he hit a buried 13,200-volt electrical power line with a
jackhammer. The worker received serious burns, was rendered
unconscious, and at this writing is still in a coma.
Electrical power was disrupted in the facility and in the
surrounding buildings.3,4,5,6
The excavation project required workers to cut a
3-foot-deep hole in the basement of a building for a sump
pump project. A foreman and mason tender were assigned to
the project. They alternated use of a shovel with the use of
a jackhammer to remove soil and tuff rock. Both wore
standard protective clothing, including leather gloves,
safety shoes, hard hats, and eye and ear protection.
However, their protective clothing was not designed for
high-voltage work.
After the event, facility managers determined that safety
engineers had not performed a review to identify health and
safety hazards before work began. The workers were not aware
that an excavation permit and an environment, safety, and
health review were required for concrete cutting and
sub-slab excavation inside a building.
The Office of Environment, Safety and Health completed a
Type A Accident Investigation in April 1996.7 Investigators
identified the following contributing factors in the report.
- Tighter project controls and engineering reviews
could have identified the hazards before the start of the
work.
- The support organization assigned to manage the
project was ill-equipped to perform this type of complex
facility modification work.
- The use of a Standing Work Order to guide the work
did not provide an adequate description of the facility
or the work hazards. Standing Work Orders are neither
designed nor intended to be used for large maintenance
tasks, complex facility modifications, or major
construction activities.
- Schedule pressures and commitments allowed the work
to proceed without sufficient detail and supervision.
- Misinterpretation of local excavation permit
procedures resulted in requests for permits only for
areas located outside buildings. Because of this,
appropriate measures were not taken to determine the
location of dangerous underground utilities and prevent
exposure of employees to potential hazards inside
buildings.
- The use of an electromagnetic detection device would
have located the buried electrical conduit. This was
shown during the accident investigation by using a
detection device at the scene of the accident.
Using personal protective equipment designed for high
voltage work also could have minimized the injuries. The
accident victim was not wearing the proper gloves at the
time of the accident, and there was no evidence that the
victim had ever been trained or certified in the use and
care of personal protective equipment.
A review of the original construction plans and
specifications indicated that the conduit encasing the
electrical cable should have been made of rigid steel. The
actual installation was an asphalt-impregnated, fiber-based
conduit. A steel conduit would have provided another barrier
of protection against contact with the energized cable.
Finally, the compressive strength of the concrete
surrounding the conduit was relatively low. Because of this
low compressive strength, the difference between the tuff
rock and the concrete could easily have been overlooked by
the workers, allowing them to penetrate the concrete with
the jackhammer without realizing it.
Natural Gas Pipe Hit by Backhoe
Site Area Evacuated
On April 5, 1995, a construction contractor hit and
ruptured a 3-inch polyethylene plastic natural gas pipe at
the Sandia National Laboratory site. Three construction
employees were using both hand and backhoe excavating
methods when they hit the natural gas pipe approximately 20
inches below grade. The backhoe cut into the pipe, causing a
discharge of natural gas. The immediate area and one
adjacent building were evacuated. The natural gas release
created the potential for a serious explosion.8,9
Planners provided composite drawings to the contractor
along with the digging permit. These utility drawings
included a composite of all known buried utilities within
the proposed excavation site. Because of the number of
utilities in the area, the drawings were complex and
cluttered, making them very difficult to interpret. The
contractor did not note the location of the natural gas pipe
on the utility drawing; therefore, the location was not
verified before excavation began.
Electromagnetic detection was not used before beginning
excavation. Using it could have prevented the incident
because an electrically conductive tracer wire was properly
installed above the pipe. Finally, the gas pipe was not
properly marked with caution tape as the final warning
barrier.
Corrective actions included the following.
- Managers modified the digging permit process to more
closely reflect the requirements of the local public
utility company. Modifications included incorporating a
new requirement to physically mark the surface of the
excavation area to designate buried utilities. Additional
new requirements included conducting on-site meetings to
review the utilities in the area, use of hand-digging,
and other appropriate requirements.
- Managers initiated steps to ensure that only
personnel trained in the proper techniques and equipment
will be used to locate underground utilities. They also
ensured that the proper detection equipment was obtained.
- Managers initiated a study to determine the
feasibility of adding penalty clauses to construction
contracts and pursuing actual damages to recover all
costs associated with damaged utility lines. They also
directed examining existing contractor evaluation clauses
to limit an offending contractor's ability to bid on
future work.
Underground Waste Transfer Pipe
Incorrectly Described as an Electrical Conduit
On February 7, 1995, a worker uncovered an abandoned
underground radioactive waste transfer pipe at the Hanford
Site. The work package incorrectly described the pipe as an
electrical conduit. The worker, who was hand-digging a
trench at the time, received an estimated dose of 5 to 7
mrem before the pipe was identified as radioactive and
posted.10,11
While preparing the work package, a planner mistakenly
read the drawing as showing an underground electrical
conduit instead of an underground waste transfer pipe.
Because of this error, planners did not include the
requirement for radiological controls with the excavation
permit. Fortunately, a Health Physics (HP) supervisor
decided to include continuous health physics monitoring
because of past history with contaminated soil in the area.
He assigned a Health Physics Technician (HPT) to the site.
While the HPT was at lunch, the worker continued to dig, in
violation of the excavation permit, and uncovered the waste
pipe. Upon his return, the HPT determined that the radiation
level was 40 mrem at contact with the pipe. The HPT
immediately stopped the work and secured the area.
The waste transfer pipe was shown on the project drawings
and had previously been located using ground penetrating
radar. However, because the excavators were mistakenly
expecting to find an electrical conduit rather than the
waste transfer pipe, previous location of the line did not
help prevent the event.
Corrective actions included the following.
- Management tasked on-site construction managers with
reviewing and segregating their excavation work into
separate permits by location or system.
- Management determined that inadequate posting for
radioactive and contaminated areas (including buried
radioactive pipelines) was a sitewide issue, and changes
to postings are being implemented.
- Management distributed lessons learned conveying the
meaning of, and requirements for, continuous HPT coverage
to construction personnel and managers.
Hanford site management has made significant improvements
in the site excavation program. They developed a new
site-wide excavation procedure and established an excavation
coordinator as the single point-of-contact for the
excavation process. In an article entitled "The Engineer's
View" from the November/December 1995 issue of Underground
Focus, James H. Anspach, Senior Geophysicist, at So-Deep,
Inc. describes the Hanford program as follows:
- . . . the Excavation Coordinator (EC) now functions
much as a one-call center, although with many additional
duties. Not only does the EC take calls for construction,
but also for design. The EC makes certain:
- Appropriate utility records are investigated and
reviewed.
- Appropriate surface geophysical methods are employed
to identify active, abandoned, metallic, non-metallic,
recorded, and non recorded utilities.
- Utilities are depicted on design plans.
- Utilities are marked on the ground surface prior to
construction.
- Utilities discovered during construction that slipped
through the surface geophysics and records review are
investigated and as-built [Revise as-built drawings to
reflect physical configuration].
- Changes or additions to the utility system during
construction are as-built and retained in a retrievable
database.
In short, the EC is a utility czar for sitewide
excavation.12
It is important at sites such as Hanford for all
contractors involved in excavation to participate in a
centrally controlled excavation process. If they fail to do
so, the effectiveness of preventing underground utility
damage can be seriously jeopardized.
Electrical Conduit Punctured
During Concrete Floor Excavation
On September 21, 1995, a shift technical engineer
discovered a punctured electrical conduit at the Savannah
River Site. Construction workers damaged the conduit when
they removed a section of a concrete floor with a jackhammer
in preparation for hand excavation of a trench. The workers
were not aware that they had damaged the conduit.13,14
Construction personnel used ground-penetrating radar to
locate buried pipes and conduits before the excavation was
started between September 18 and September 20. They detected
an interference (metallic object) 16 inches below the floor
slab. Trenching procedures dictated that a 1-foot clearance
zone be established around each interference to identify
areas that must be hand excavated, and from which power
equipment must be excluded, to minimize the risk of
personnel injury and damage to underground services during
excavation. However, excavators misinterpreted the
requirements for interference point clearance zones. They
were also unaware that the 1- foot requirement applied to
the vertical as well as the horizontal direction. This meant
that the conduit could have been as shallow as 4 inches or
as deep as 28 inches.
Facility investigators later determined that the conduit
was 5 inches below the top of the slab. The planners and
workers did not recognize that the 1-foot clearance
requirement was applicable in this case, and did not
consider it necessary to positively identify the
interference or take measures to ensure that the work site
was safe. This occurred because they thought the
interference was located with a high degree of accuracy at a
depth of 16 inches, and because they only planned to cut and
remove a section of the concrete slab that they thought was
well above the interference.
Corrective actions included the following:
- Management reinforced lockout/tagout requirements for
digging operations.
- Management directed more thorough engineering reviews
of work control packages to identify buried conduits and
pipes.
- Management revised trenching procedures to clearly
state the clearance zone requirements when using ground
penetrating radar.
- Trainers instructed excavators on the limitations of
ground-penetrating radar.
Analysis
Although difficult to accurately quantify, the cost of
excavation events to DOE is significant and can be
approximated. From a safety standpoint, these events are
safety-significant. One recent event left a worker in a
coma, many others have caused electrical shock, and there
have been 28 near-miss excavation-related occurrences since
1991.
The economic cost associated with these events is also
significant. Mr. Anspach of So-Deep, Inc., performed an
in-depth review of existing site excavation procedures.
Based on information supplied to him by top-level Hanford
personnel, he states in an article in Underground Focus
magazine that "when a damage to a utility occurs during
construction, the costs of investigating that damage. . .
average about $50,000. The damaged item could be just a
4-foot piece of scrap wire or an abandoned clay drainage
pipe. All that matters is that something has been damaged.
All activity ceases until the investigation to identify the
damaged item is complete."12
Using Mr. Anspach's figure, the cost to DOE to
investigate and respond to the 150 incidents since 1991 can
be approximated at roughly $7.5 million. Other information
sources also show that the cost of excavation events is
high. An article in the May 1996 edition of Civil
Engineering states that a "federal study showed that between
1988 and 1993, 1,456 reported gas-pipeline excavation
incidents resulted in 35 deaths, 151 personal injuries and
more than $42.5 million in property damage."15
OEAF engineers reviewed event descriptions from
excavation-related occurrences the ORPS database and found
that a large number of these events had similar causes.
- Personnel error was the direct cause of 52 percent of
the excavation incidents. This category was divided
nearly equally between inattention to detail and
procedures not used or used incorrectly. Design problem
was the direct cause in over 20 percent of the incidents.
- The root cause of the majority of these events was
either management problem, personnel error, or design
problem. Management problem was the root cause of 47
percent of the excavation incidents, with inadequate
administrative control accounting for the largest portion
of the category. Personnel error and design problem each
accounted for the root cause of 17 percent of the
incidents.
- Nearly 65 percent of the excavation incidents
occurred during operations related to balance-of-plant
systems. The next highest category was environmental
restoration operations at approximately 14 percent.
OEAF engineers identified three primary contributors to
excavation-related events.
- Inability to detect underground utilities because of
over reliance on as-built drawings. This was particularly
evident in the incident involving the natural gas line at
Sandia National Laboratory. A recent article in Pacific
Builder and Engineer magazine describes the difficulty in
relying on as-builts at the Hanford site:
. . . during the war, the reactors and process
facilities at Hanford were constructed with utmost
secrecy. The site was divided into various, distinct
processing areas each with its own separate survey
coordinate system to confuse an invading enemy.
Various government agencies, contractors, and their
policies have come and gone since the war. As federal
budgets rose and fell, so did the accuracy of as-built
documentation. At one point, jobs below $150,000 in
value were not documented as they were built, since it
wasn't considered cost effective. Many utilities were
field-routed, leaving no dependable as-built drawings.
To cut costs, adjacent construction projects often
shared a common excavation, both adding their
underground lines to the same trench. This led to
mixed confidence levels in the accuracy of the
as-built drawings. Adding to the problem is the fact
that utilities were not confined to standard utility
corridors. Every imaginable system was buried,
including radioactive and non-radioactive chemical
pipelines, steam and water utilities, tanks of various
sizes up to a million gallons, security systems and
cables for signal, power, fiber-optics, telephone and
computer applications, as well as the monitoring of
process facilities and radioactive tank farms. The
more critical lines and tanks were documented with
some level of accuracy, but the locations and depths
of typical utilities and secondary systems were
approximate.16
- Schedule pressures leading to lack of use of
hand-digging where appropriate. This problem was evident
in the serious injury incident at Los Alamos National
Laboratory described in the Events Summary. A variety of
factors can affect the progress of construction projects.
The pressure to stay on schedule can lead to shortcuts in
safety enforcement, including a temptation to substitute
hand- digging with speedier but less safe excavation
methods. An article in the May 1996 edition of Civil
Engineering describes an innovative excavation technique
in use at the Hanford site that complements hand-digging
and makes excavation work safer. According to the
article, "A truck-mounted vacuum, drawing 17,000 cu. ft.
per minute of air and dirt through an 8-inch diameter
suction tube bores down to utilities that cross a planned
excavation. The vacuum's suction tube is made of
polyvinyl chloride so the operator is protected from
electrical shock from buried power lines. Once the
pothole is vacuumed, a pipe is placed down the hole until
after the construction is complete, to positively locate
the find."15
- Inability to detect underground utilities caused
primarily by ineffective or lack of use of
electromagnetic and other detection devices. This problem
contributed to incidents at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, and Savannah
River.
The current family of surface geophysical methods
available to DOE sites for utility and other near-surface
structure or hazard detection is extensive. Some of their
capabilities are illustrated as follows.
- The latest electromagnetic pipe and cable locators
feature microprocessor-controlled transmitters and
receivers capable of detecting power lines, telephone
cables, and metal piping at depths up to 15 to 20 feet.
These detection devices operate with multiple discrete
and broad-band frequencies, antenna configurations, and
grounding capabilities.
- Ground penetrating radar can locate plastic, ceramic,
metallic objects, and even voids. Closely spaced objects
are easily resolved, and the systems are suitable for use
around buildings, power lines, and vehicles.
Terrain conductivity, magnetics, and acoustic wave
propagation equipment are also available. These systems are
somewhat more expensive, but they may be useful on a
project-by-project basis.
- New data processing techniques are available that use
algorithms developed by the geophysical community.
Examples include Geophysical Diffraction Tomography and
optical and acoustical hologram imaging. These techniques
provide a high cost but viable alternative to traditional
methods in select situations. The use of bore hole
geophysics for near surface characterization also has
merit and is increasingly being developed for utility
detection and mapping.
Proper selection of available techniques and the use and
interpretation of the data produced by this sophisticated
equipment is essential to accurate and comprehensive
underground utility detection. Each equipment operator
should be properly trained in its use and its limitations. A
regular system of calibration and maintenance should be
developed. Without proper equipment calibration and
maintenance, technique selection, and operator training,
data may be misinterpreted or unavailable, resulting
in undetected or mismapped utilities.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are based on the above
analysis.
- A comprehensive underground utility detection and
marking program should be implemented at each DOE
facility. Program developers should strongly consider
creating a central excavation coordinator who would be a
single point- of-contact for the excavation process. In
addition, the program should ensure that data supplied by
subsurface utility engineers is utilized during
construction projects. Procedures should be developed,
validated, and used in all situations involving
excavation activities.
- A March 1995 report developed for the Hanford site by
So-Deep, Inc., "Review of and Recommendations for
Engineering and Construction Practices Relative to
Utility Damage and Prevention at the Hanford Site,"19
includes an outline for a comprehensive system for
utility damage prevention. In response to the report,
Hanford is making significant improvements to their
excavation program. The report also includes good
practices, areas for improvement, analysis, 14 specific
recommendations, and reference sources for cost savings.
- Each DOE site should consider implementing a
subsurface utility engineering (SUE) program that would
ensure accurate, comprehensive, and timely utility data
delivery to the planning, design, and construction
professionals on specific projects. SUE is a process that
integrates the design and construction phases of projects
through comprehensive and accurate utility data
collection and management in a phased "utility quality
level" approach. Significant safety and cost enhancements
from using SUE have been reported by other agencies, such
as the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT)/Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) and the National
Transportation Safety Board.17 More data on available
sources of information regarding SUE can be obtained by
calling USDOT/FHWA at 202-366-4204.
- One of the primary objectives of an underground
utility detection program should be to identify,
implement, and maintain barriers that effectively prevent
personnel injury, equipment damage, and degradation of
nuclear and other safety margins during excavation
activities. The recently published Hazard and Barrier
Analysis Guide18 is an excellent tool for conducting such
barrier analysis. The guide assists in the following
areas: (1) identification of hazards associated with a
particular activity; (2) identification, evaluation, and
implementation of a set of effective barriers to protect
workers from these hazards; and (3) estimation of barrier
failure likelihoods to arrive at an estimate of the risk
of injury, fatality, environmental release, or property
damage. For more information on the guide, or to obtain a
copy, contact Richard Trevillian, EH-33, at (301)
903-3074.
- State-of-the-art detection equipment should be
obtained and operators should be trained in its proper
use. The equipment must be properly calibrated, and
equipment limitations must be fully understood.
- Excavation equipment should be used properly and
cautiously, and it should never be used in place of
hand-digging in the vicinity of identified utility lines.
- As-built drawings should be kept up to date to the
extent possible. Because of the lack of configuration
control at many facilities, as-built drawings should not
be relied upon as the only source for the accurate
location of underground utility systems. Local public
utility companies should be contacted and information
should be shared. Many localities have comprehensive
programs in place that require calling a single point of
contact for any utility excavation, such as "One Call"
and "Miss Utility." Such programs can be used as models
for site/local programs.
- Successes at other DOE facilities should be
publicized and made available throughout the DOE complex.
Managers should identify and review lessons learned and
apply them where applicable. The Society for Effective
Lessons-Learned Sharing (SELLS) can be used to collect or
disseminate success stories. For more information on
SELLS, contact Richard Trevillian, EH-33, at
301-903-3074.
- Commercial and industrial knowledge and experience
should be obtained from available sources. One excellent
source is the Internet site for Underground Focus The
Magazine of Below-Ground Damage Prevention (URL: www.
underspace.com). This site provides extensive information
on recent accidents, accident bulletins, and accident
photos. It also includes a call- before-you-dig
directory, descriptions of detection instruments, a
network of damage prevention professionals, and links to
other relevant sites. Other sources include the
USDOT/FHWA Office of Engineering, Utility section;
Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions,
Network Reliability Steering Committee; NTSB, Office of
Pipeline Safety (OPS); and various industry sources.
- Another way to use commercial knowledge and
experience is to become associated with industry trade
groups such as the Center for Subsurface Strategic Action
(CSSA) and the National Utility Locating Contractors
Association (NULCA). More information on these
organizations can be obtained from the Underground Focus
web site or by calling 800-435-4869 or 715-635-6004.
Finally, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
has formed a national standards group titled "Collection and
Depiction of Existing Utility Data on Design and
Construction Documents."
Regulations and Guidelines
The following documents apply to underground utility
detection and excavation programs used at DOE facilities:
- DOE Order 440.1, "Worker Protection Management for
DOE Federal and Contractor Employees,"20 establishes
procedures and provides guidance for protection of DOE
and DOE contractor employees engaged in construction
activities. The Order requires compliance with 29 CFR
1926, "Safety and Health Requirements for Construction."
- Section 651 of 29 CFR 1926, "Excavations General
Requirements,"21 establishes the minimum requirements for
locating utility underground installations before
starting actual excavation and requires determining the
exact location of installations by safe and acceptable
means.
References
1. Underground Focus, (Canterbury Communications, P.O.
Box 638, Spooner, WI 54801. Internet-http://www.
underspace.com)
2. DOE-STD-7501-95, Development of Lessons Learned
Programs, May 1995.
3. DOE Occurrence Report ALO-LA-LANL-TSF- 1996-0001, "A
mason tender was severely injured when he hit a 13,200 volt
buried electrical power line with a jack hammer while
performing excavation," January 17, 1996.
4. DOE Operating Experience Weekly Summary 96-04,
"Laborer Severely Injured When Jackhammer Hits Buried 13,200
Volt Line."
5. DOE Operating Experience Weekly Summary 96-05,
"Electrical Shock Accident at Los Alamos."
6. DOE Operating Experience Weekly Summary 96-32,
"Energized Cable Severed During Excavation."
7. Type A Accident Investigation Report on the January
17, 1996, Electrical Accident with Injury in Building 209,
Technical Area 21, Los Alamos National Laboratory, April
1996.
8. DOE Occurrence Report ALO-KO-SNL- NMFAC-1995-0003,
"Backhoe Bucket Cuts Into Gas Line Causing Discharge of
Natural Gas and Evacuation of Several Buildings," April 5,
1995.
9. DOE Operating Experience Weekly Summary 96-04, "Final
Report Gas Line Ruptures at Sandia National Lab."
10. DOE Occurrence Report RL-WHC- KHCONST-1995-0001,
"Project W-030 Raw Water Line Excavation Exposing
Radioactive Waste Transfer Line," February 7, 1995.
11. DOE Operating Experience Weekly Summary 95-07,
"Excavation Work Exposes an Abandoned Radioactive Waste
Transfer Line at Hanford."
12. Underground Focus, November/December 1995,
(Canterbury Communications, P.O. Box 638, Spooner, WI 54801.
Internet- http://www.underspace.com).
13. DOE Occurrence Report SR-WSRC-LTA-1995 ;0102,
"Electrical Conduit Severed," September 22, 1995.
14. DOE Operating Experience Weekly Summary 95-39,
"Energized Electrical Conduit Severed During Trenching
Activity."
15. Civil Engineering, May 1996, (American Society of
Civil Engineers, 345 East 47th St., New York, NY.
Internet-http://www.asce.org).
16. Pacific Builder and Engineer, "Careful Where You Dig
at Former Nuclear Weapons Site," Daria A. Nawarynsky
(Hanford Site Excavation Coordinator) and David S. Kelly,
July 8,1996, (Vernon Publications Inc., 3000 Northup Way,
Suite 200, P.O. Box 96043, Bellevue, WA 98009).
17. USDOT film, "Subsurface Utility Engineering: A Proven
Solution," 1995.
18. DOE-EH-33, Hazard and Barrier Analysis Guide,
Revision 0, November 1996.
19. Review of and Recommendations for Engineering and
Construction Practices Relative to Utility Damage Prevention
at the Hanford Site, James H. Anspach, So-Deep, Inc., March
23, 1995 (So Deep, Inc., 8397 Euclid Avenue, Manassas Park,
VA 22111, phone-703-361-6005).
20. DOE Order 440.1, Worker Protection Management for DOE
Federal and Contractor Employees, September 1995.
21. OSHA Regulation, 29 CFR 1926.651, "Excavations
General Requirements," July 1994.
Notices Previously Issued
- Technical Notice 94-01, "Guidelines For Valves in
Tritium Service," September 1994.
- Safety Notice 91-1,
"Criticality Safety Moderator Hazards," September 1991.
- Safety Notice 92-1,
"Criticality Safety Hazards Associated With Large
Vessels," February 1992.
- Safety Notice 92-2,
"Radiation Streaming at Hot Cells," August 1992.
- Safety Notice 92-3,
"Explosion Hazards of Uranium-Zirconium Alloys," August
1992.
- Safety Notice 92-4,
"Facility Logs and Records," September 1992.
- Safety Notice 92-5,
"Discharge of Fire Water Into a Critical Mass Lab,"
October 1992.
- Safety Notice 92-6,
"Estimated Critical Positions (ECPs)," November 1992.
- Safety Notice 93-1, "Fire, Explosion, and
High-Pressure Hazards Associated with Drums and
Containers," February 1993.
- Safety Notice 93-02,
"Control of Temporary Modifications," September 1993.
- Safety Notice 94-01,
"Contamination of Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel
Supplies," July 1994.
- Safety Notice 94-02,
"High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filters," August 1994.
- Safety Notice 94-03,
"Events Involving Undetected Spread of Contamination,"
September 1994.
- Safety Notice 94-04,
"Uninterruptible Power Supplies," November 1994.
- Safety Notice 95-01,
"Decision Analysis Techniques," August 1995.
- Safety Notice 95-02,
"Independent Verification and Self- Checking," September
1995.
- Safety Notice 95-03,
"Lessons Learned Programs," October 1995.
- Safety Notice 95-04,
"Post-Maintenance Test Programs," December 1995.
- Safety Notice 95-05,
"Department of Transportation Non- Conformances by Vendor
Shippers," December 1995.
- Safety Notice 96-01,
"Chemical Spills During Loading," April 1996.
- Safety Notice No. 96-02,
"Risk-Based Analysis of Electrical Hazard," May 1996.
- Safety Notice No. 96-03,
"Compressed Gas Cylinder Safety," June 1996.
- Safety Notice No. 96-04,
"Lightning Safety," August 1996
- Safety Notice No. 96-05,
"Lockout/Tagout Programs," December 1996
This Notice is one in a series of publications issued by
the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety to share nuclear
safety information throughout the Department of Energy
complex. For more information, contact Richard Trevillian,
Office of Operating Experience Analysis and Feedback, Office
of Nuclear and Facility Safety, U.S. Department of Energy,
Washington, DC 20585, telephone (301) 903-3074. This Safety
Notice should be processed as an external source of
lessons-learned information as described in DOE-STD-7501-95,
Development of DOE Lessons-Learned Programs.
________________________________________________
Safety Notices are distributed to U.S. Department of
Energy Program Offices, Field Offices, and contractors who
have responsibility for the operation and maintenance of
nuclear and related facilities, and to other organizations
involved in nuclear safety. Written requests to be added to
or deleted from the distribution of Safety Notices should be
sent to Christine Crow, RPI, 20251 Century Blvd.,
Germantown, MD 20874 or faxed to, (301) 540-2499.
The HSS Information Center maintains a file of
Safety Notices and supporting information. Copies can be
obtained by contacting the Info Center, (301) 903-0449, or
by writing to HSS Information Center, U.S. Department
of Energy, EH-72/Suite 100, CXXI/3, Germantown, MD 20874.
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