Annual Report to the Secretary of Energy on the Status of Federal Technical Capability Related to the Safe Operation of Defense Nuclear Facilities

U. S. Department of Energy

Federal Technical Capability Panel

Annual Report to the

Secretary of Energy on the Status of Federal Technical Capability Related to the Safe Operation of Defense Nuclear Facilities

(DOE Seal)

Washington, D.C. 20585

May 3, 2001

DRAFT

FEDERAL TECHNICAL CAPABILITY PANEL

ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF FEDERAL TECHNICAL CAPABILITY RELATED TO THE SAFE OPERATIONS OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Federal Technical Capability Program (FTCP) was established in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board=s (DNFSB) Recommendation 93-3. The FTCP represents a significant effort aimed at improving the Department's overall technical capability. The Deputy Secretary established a Federal Technical Capability Panel (Panel) to oversee the implementation of the FTCP. The Panel consists of senior line managers who have been designated as Agents to represent Headquarters and Field Offices with defense nuclear facility responsibilities. The Panel is also responsible for submitting an annual report to the Secretary of Energy that summarizes the actions taken to ensure that organizations maintain the critical technical capabilities that must be preserved to ensure safe operations at defense nuclear facilities.

This is the third Annual Report issued by the Panel. This report covers the period from May 31, 2000, to May 31, 2001, and summarizes the status of the federal technical capability program in the Department. It identifies accomplishments, issues, and provides recommendations as appropriate.

STATUS OF CRITICAL TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES AND STAFFING RELATED TO SAFE OPERATIONS OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

A workforce analysis and staffing plan are maintained by organizations with defense nuclear facilities safety responsibility. The analyses identify critical technical skills that must be maintained to assure safe operations of those facilities. Existing shortages and plans to deal with the shortages in the near-term are also identified. The analyses are being used as part of the strategy to insure that the Department has the critical technical skills necessary to carry out its missions, and as a basis for recruitment and development programs.

As of January 1, 2001, there was a total of 736 positions identified as critical technical capabilities across the Department. Of those positions, 58 were identified as vacant at the time of the analyses. The Albuquerque Operations Office identified the largest number of critical technical capabilities at 303. Albuquerque also reported the largest number of vacancies at 32. The organizations that identified vacancies also identified actions to fill those vacancies over time. Since January, these actions have resulted in XX of these positions being filled or addressed through other means, such as reassignment of existing personnel, or redistribution of critical technical responsibilities.

Attachment One provides a summary of the results of the workforce analyses and resulting identification of critical technical capabilities for safe operations of defense nuclear facilities.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS RELATED TO IMPROVING TECHNICAL CAPABILITY

The accomplishments described below were based upon Action Items from the Panel's FY 2000 Annual Plan, which was prepared based upon recommendations forwarded to the Secretary in the Panel's 2001 Annual Report to the Secretary.

1. The Panel continued its support of the Technical Leadership Development Program (TLDP).

The Panel closely followed the progress of the first class of the reestablished TLDP. The FY2000 Class of 2000, 16 in number, representing six Headquarters and Field Offices, are the first technical Interns hired since 1995. The Panel ensured that sufficient local resources were made available to support the Interns' corporate technical training. Three sessions of two weeks each were conducted at Savannah River, Nevada, and Albuquerque. Recruitment is underway for a 2001 TLDP class targeted to recruit 25 to 30 Interns.

The Panel also recommended Department institutionalization of the TLDP to include: additional positions (FTE's) for offices hiring Interns; exemptions to the hiring freeze; corporate funding for recruitment and training; and issuance of a policy statement establishing the continued operation of the TLDP as a Department priority.

2. The Panel continued development of an integrated workforce plan to preserve critical technical capabilities at closure sites.

Maintaining critical technical capabilities at closure sites is essential to ensure that the sites can be closed safely and efficiently. The Panel continued working with the Office of Environmental Management (EM) working group on site closure. The working group will identify technical needs and address how they might be met. Some may be met through the use of existing administrative flexibilities; others may require special initiatives such as legislative authority. EM is working with Human Resource professionals at EM closure sites and the Panel in identifying its closure needs and developing remedies.

The Panel also developed a model memorandum of agreement that offices may use to address retention of individuals possessing critical technical capabilities currently employed at closure sites.

3. Conducted Briefings for TDMC, FMC, COO.

The Panel provided briefings to the Training & Development Management Council, the Field Management Council, and the Chief Operating Officers. Such briefings are intended to define the level of interface with these corporate groups, and aid in developing strategies that will result in their ownership of, commitment to, and involvement with FTCP activities.

4. Expansion of the current Federal Technical Capability Program.

Implementation of the FTCP Expansion Plan began with the Office of Science providing an Agent for the Panel. A briefing was held for the new SC Agent. The Panel is working with the SC Agent on developing and instituting specific activities, as appropriate, leading to the implementation of the FTCP in these offices. The Panel will continue to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of expanding the FTCP based on the experience gained with the Office of Science.

5. Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers Profile

The Panel developed, as part of the Annual Workforce Analysis, a Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers Profile for Defense Nuclear Facilities. This was done in support of the Deputy Secretary's memorandum of September 18, 2000, CONTINUTATION OF NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY INITIATIVES. The profile, Attachment Two, identifies current nuclear criticality safety expertise throughout the defense nuclear complex, projects shortages, and identifies how such shortages will be addressed.

ISSUES RELATED TO IMPROVING TECHNICAL CAPABILITY

Biennial Local Assessments of the FTCP are to be completed in FY2002 by each office with safety responsibilities for defense nuclear facilities. The results of these assessments will be reviewed by the Panel. Based upon its review the Panel will determine the necessity for arranging for an independent assessment should the potential exist for a performance problem in an area of the FTCP. The Panel may also conduct an independent review of an organization or program, should such a need be indicated.

Changing missions at the various sites continue to challenge the ability of managers to ensure that they have the necessary technical resources. Mission changes range from new mission areas to site closure. As site missions change, so must the skill mix of employees at that site. Additionally, as sites move toward closure, managers will struggle to retain those highly competent technical employees who will be concerned with future employment issues. All offices will be required to monitor and update their staffing plans to ensure those existing vacancies are filled quickly and potential candidates are identified for anticipated vacancies.

The Department has redesigned the TLDP into a concentrated two year program, the Technical Intern Program (TIP). There are a number of significant issues that must be resolved to ensure the continuation of this vital technical intern program. These include a continued source of funding, better recruiting to obtain more recent college graduates, allocation of FTE's, protection of interns during downsizing, and overall program management. The Panel will monitor the progress and effectiveness of the TIP. Senior management support of this program, however, is required to ensure its success.

Institutionalization of the FTCP needs to continue through the official publication of important documents. Publication of the Technical Qualification Standards through the EH Technical Standards Program will continue.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAINTAIN OR IMPROVE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY

1. The “aging” of the DOE technical workforce, with a very limited number of entry-level personnel, is affecting the DOE Complex today and could soon severely affect the DOE technical skill-mix. There is an urgent need to actively pursue all avenues and innovations to expand the inflow of entry-level technical personnel to ensure that a technically capable workforce continues into the future consistent with DOE missions.

2. The Department should strongly support the Technical Intern Program, and its institutionalization through commitments to funding and recruitment for classes on an annual basis.

3. The Department should finalize and implement an integrated workforce plan to preserve critical technical capabilities at closure sites as soon as possible. The plan should address the transition of workers as missions are transferred or completed.

4. The Department should reinforce the necessity of using the critical technical capability staffing plans as a basis for meeting the needs of the organization. The staffing plans should include a succession planning element to ensure that critical positions, particularly at the senior level, can be readily filled. They should also be used as a basis for recruiting, hiring, and implementing development plans.

5. It is paramount that the Technical Qualification Program and Senior Technical Safety Manager Programs maintain credibility with sufficient rigor, discipline, and realistic schedules to make them challenging and worthwhile. Specific attention must be paid to provide the qualifying officials consistent and realistic expectations for the administration of qualification and the granting of “equivalencies,” “exemptions,” and “waivers” to the personnel qualification requirements. Senior managers including Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Office Managers in the Headquarters offices, and Operations Office Managers, and Assistant Managers in the field, must get actively involved and be drivers for the implementation of these programs.

ATTACHMENT ONE

Office	Critical Technical Capabilities	Vacancies as of 12/2000	Comments
Defense Programs	26	0 Filled perma-nently or with "acting."	DP expects to fill positions and replacements for critical capabilities lost with Program Direction dollars available through the FY2001 budget. Outside recruitment, in a manner to include the widest possible audience, is being used to obtain necessary skills that are not currently available within DP. DP will work to obtain the most diverse, qualified pool of candidates possible. DP has had recent success attracting qualified applicants from industry, the laboratories, plants, the military, and other Federal agencies. DP will make use of the Department's excepted service authorities to fill these positions, as appropriate.
Environment, Safety and Health	0	0	EH does not have any "critical positions" as defined by the criteria issued by the Panel. The EH mission differs from other program offices and field elements that have direct responsibility for safety and mission accomplishment at defense nuclear facilities. EH has determined that they have sufficient principal and backup personnel with technical capabilities needed to perform the safety functions of the office.
Environ-mental Management	19	0
Albuquerque	303	32	The two categories with the largest numbers of vacancies are in the categories of Expert/Unique Technical Expertise category with 13 vacancies, and Program Management category with 8 vacancies. AL is committed to filling these vacancies as a top priority in the FY2001 resource plan.
Idaho	37	0	Idaho anticipates shortages in the following technical areas based on retirements and other form of attrition over the next three years: FY01- Facility Representatives, SME-Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer; FY02-Facility Representatives, SME's-Nuclear Safety Engineer, Health Physics, Industrial Hygiene; FY03- Facility Representatives, SME's-Nuclear Safety Engineer.
Nevada	32	0	NNSA/Nevada conducted a workforce analysis to identify critical technical capabilities. These 32 positions are projected to remain constant over the next three years. Should employees occupying these positions leave federal service as a result of buyouts, early outs or retirement, the effect to NNSA/NV would be minimal. After completing a review of the required expertise for these positions, it was determined that employees occupying other critical positions could absorb the work on a short-term basis until the vacancies could be filled.
Oak Ridge ORO YAO	34 44	1 16	YAO is conducting a focused effort to increase staff levels to those needed as an independent Area Office. ORO is actively recruiting a senior criticality technical staff member to fill its CTC vacancy.
Oakland	59	4	OAK does not anticipate shortages in critical technical positions over the next three years due to retirements. However, the potential for attrition due to losses to the private sector or contractors remains. To date, Oakland has been successful in ensuring the retention of critical technical capabilities by using TQP and Facility Representative training, retention allowances, and the Excepted Service authorities.
Ohio	17	0	Ohio currently has no surpluses or shortages in critical technical position at OH and none are projected. OH's schedules call for a relatively flat organization over the next few years and steps have been taken to protect critical positions during that time. Knowledge on the part of staff that OH sites will close seriously restricts retention as well as the hiring of personnel with the critical skills needed for mission completion. OH has developed and approved an Employee Transition Plan designed to assist OH employees with career development while at OH and with future employment. OH will continue to use cross-training and collateral assignments to offset the loss of certain skills due to attrition. OH has begun discussions with other DOE offices regarding the placement of OH personnel and anticipates signing Memoranda of Agreement in this regard.
Richland River Protection	62 35	2 3	RL critical technical needs should be fairly stable over the next 3 years. RL projects no shortages or surpluses, or losses of key technical personnel, other than those identified in its Workforce Analysis. ORP critical technical needs should be fairly stable over the next 3 years. A definitive hiring plan has been approved by the Deputy Secretary to fill critical technical capabilities for the near-term.
Rocky Flats			Pending reorganization.
Savannah River (DOE-SRS)	68	0	Savannah River implemented a "defense-in-depth" (DID) strategy to assure that more than the minimum required personnel are qualified at all times to ensure no disruptions to operations. Staffing levels to support critical technical capabilities have been projected out five years to establish DOE-SRS's total DID posture.
TOTAL	736	58

Office

Critical Technical Capabilities

Vacancies as of 12/2000

Comments

Defense Programs

Filled perma-nently or with "acting."

DP expects to fill positions and replacements for critical capabilities lost with Program Direction dollars available through the FY2001 budget. Outside recruitment, in a manner to include the widest possible audience, is being used to obtain necessary skills that are not currently available within DP. DP will work to obtain the most diverse, qualified pool of candidates possible. DP has had recent success attracting qualified applicants from industry, the laboratories, plants, the military, and other Federal agencies. DP will make use of the Department's excepted service authorities to fill these positions, as appropriate.

Environment, Safety and Health

EH does not have any "critical positions" as defined by the criteria issued by the Panel. The EH mission differs from other program offices and field elements that have direct responsibility for safety and mission accomplishment at defense nuclear facilities. EH has determined that they have sufficient principal and backup personnel with technical capabilities needed to perform the safety functions of the office.

Environ-mental Management

Albuquerque

303

The two categories with the largest numbers of vacancies are in the categories of Expert/Unique Technical Expertise category with 13 vacancies, and Program Management category with 8 vacancies. AL is committed to filling these vacancies as a top priority in the FY2001 resource plan.

Idaho

Idaho anticipates shortages in the following technical areas based on retirements and other form of attrition over the next three years: FY01- Facility Representatives, SME-Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineer; FY02-Facility Representatives, SME's-Nuclear Safety Engineer, Health Physics, Industrial Hygiene; FY03- Facility Representatives, SME's-Nuclear Safety Engineer.

Nevada

NNSA/Nevada conducted a workforce analysis to identify critical technical capabilities. These 32 positions are projected to remain constant over the next three years. Should employees occupying these positions leave federal service as a result of buyouts, early outs or retirement, the effect to NNSA/NV would be minimal. After completing a review of the required expertise for these positions, it was determined that employees occupying other critical positions could absorb the work on a short-term basis until the vacancies could be filled.

Oak Ridge

ORO

YAO

YAO is conducting a focused effort to increase staff levels to those needed as an independent Area Office. ORO is actively recruiting a senior criticality technical staff member to fill its CTC vacancy.

Oakland

OAK does not anticipate shortages in critical technical positions over the next three years due to retirements. However, the potential for attrition due to losses to the private sector or contractors remains. To date, Oakland has been successful in ensuring the retention of critical technical capabilities by using TQP and Facility Representative training, retention allowances, and the Excepted Service authorities.

Ohio

Ohio currently has no surpluses or shortages in critical technical position at OH and none are projected. OH's schedules call for a relatively flat organization over the next few years and steps have been taken to protect critical positions during that time. Knowledge on the part of staff that OH sites will close seriously restricts retention as well as the hiring of personnel with the critical skills needed for mission completion. OH has developed and approved an Employee Transition Plan designed to assist OH employees with career development while at OH and with future employment. OH will continue to use cross-training and collateral assignments to offset the loss of certain skills due to attrition. OH has begun discussions with other DOE offices regarding the placement of OH personnel and anticipates signing Memoranda of Agreement in this regard.

Richland

River Protection

RL critical technical needs should be fairly stable over the next 3 years. RL projects no shortages or surpluses, or losses of key technical personnel, other than those identified in its Workforce Analysis.

ORP critical technical needs should be fairly stable over the next 3 years. A definitive hiring plan has been approved by the Deputy Secretary to fill critical technical capabilities for the near-term.

Rocky Flats

Pending reorganization.

Savannah River

(DOE-SRS)

Savannah River implemented a "defense-in-depth" (DID) strategy to assure that more than the minimum required personnel are qualified at all times to ensure no disruptions to operations. Staffing levels to support critical technical capabilities have been projected out five years to establish DOE-SRS's total DID posture.

TOTAL

736

ATTACHMENT TWO

Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers Profile for Defense Nuclear Facilities

Office	Comments
Defense Programs	The need for nuclear criticality safety expertise is being evaluated.
Environment, Safety and Health	4 qualified, 2 of which are oversight.
Environmental Management	None required.
Albuquerque	2 positions, 1 of which is under recruitment. Second position filled by qualified employee who spends 75% of his time on criticality safety. Third employee in training to be qualified and will spend 25% of his time on criticality safety.
Idaho	3 positions, 1 of which is in final stages of recruitment.
Richland River Protection	3 positions filled with 2 qualified. One other senior staff person is qualified. 0 positions. Receive necessary support from Richland.
Nevada	2 positions. Qualification pending completion of Basic & Advanced 5 Day Criticality Safety Courses.
Oak Ridge	2 positions, 1 of which is under recruitment. To be supplemented by designated criticality safety points of contact for each major ORO site. Y-12: 2 positions, 1 of which is under recruitment.
Oakland	1 position; employee in OAK TQP, qualifying under Criticality Safety functional area standard. Second employee being groomed as backup.
Ohio	3 positions filled. 3 employees certified, or pending certification, as fully qualified under Criticality Safety Functional Area Qualification Standard. 2 complete; 3rd awaiting final signature for approval.
Rocky Flats	1 on-board and qualified.
Savannah River DOE-SRS	2 qualified criticality safety experts needed and on-board.

Office

Comments

Defense Programs

The need for nuclear criticality safety expertise is being evaluated.

Environment, Safety and Health

4 qualified, 2 of which are oversight.

Environmental Management

None required.

Albuquerque

2 positions, 1 of which is under recruitment. Second position filled by qualified employee who spends 75% of his time on criticality safety. Third employee in training to be qualified and will spend 25% of his time on criticality safety.

Idaho

3 positions, 1 of which is in final stages of recruitment.

Richland

River Protection

3 positions filled with 2 qualified. One other senior staff person is qualified.

0 positions. Receive necessary support from Richland.

Nevada

2 positions. Qualification pending completion of Basic & Advanced 5 Day Criticality Safety Courses.

Oak Ridge

2 positions, 1 of which is under recruitment. To be supplemented by designated criticality safety points of contact for each major ORO site.

Y-12: 2 positions, 1 of which is under recruitment.

Oakland

1 position; employee in OAK TQP, qualifying under Criticality Safety functional area standard. Second employee being groomed as backup.

Ohio

3 positions filled. 3 employees certified, or pending certification, as fully qualified under Criticality Safety Functional Area Qualification Standard. 2 complete; 3rd awaiting final signature for approval.

Rocky Flats

1 on-board and qualified.

Savannah River

DOE-SRS

2 qualified criticality safety experts needed and on-board.