



**Department of Energy  
National Nuclear Security Administration**  
Washington, DC 20585



**September 9, 2010**

**The Honorable Peter S. Winokur  
Chairman  
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board  
625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 700  
Washington, D.C. 20004**

**Dear Mr. Chairman:**

**This is in response to your June 14, 2010 letter including a Staff Issues Report to address work planning and control deficiencies at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS), Livermore Site Office (LSO) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have evaluated the process issues identified by your staff.**

**NNSA is committed to ensure an appropriate amount of rigor to the work planning processes and their implementation, given the complexity and hazards of the work involved. As a result, our respective organizations have completed some initial actions and established future actions to improve work planning and control in response to the Board's concerns at LLNL. Enclosures are provided to clearly communicate our actions and accountable organizations.**

**Specifically, LLNS key efforts towards improving work control will be through a more integrated and comprehensive work control process with additional work planner instructions and hazard control training that (1) clarifies expectations and requirements for work scope definition in work control documents, (2) clarifies expectations and requirements for when detailed work instructions are needed to perform laboratory activities, (3) integrates task-based hazard and control tables in Operational Safety Plans using a prioritized schedule, and (4) revises the Superblock Work Control Manual accordingly. See Enclosure 1 for more detail.**

**In addition, LSO has specifically directed LLNS to take immediate actions to (1) ensure currently performed work using current LLNS work control processes have adequate work scope definitions and controls, (2) institute an interim work control review and approval process until LLNS work control processes have been appropriately revised and implemented, and (3) incorporate lessons learned from an analysis of recent site events. See Enclosure 2 for more detail.**



LSO improvements will focus on implementing an integrated oversight approach that involves an overall technical lead with day-to-day support at the activity level from facility representative, safety system oversight staff, and subject matter experts. LSO will institutionalize the criteria, review, and approach documents (CRADS) found in the NNSA guidance document on activity level work planning and control, and provide additional staff training on oversight of work planning and control. See Enclosure 3 for more detail.

As discussed in a March 29, 2010, letter to you on activity-level work planning and work control at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Office of Defense Programs (NA-10) remains committed to an established partnership with the Energy Facilities Contractors Group and the Office of Environmental Management to pursue long-term improvements in work planning and work control within the National Security Enterprise.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or have your staff contact Mr. James McConnell at (202) 586-4379. I look forward to open and frank discussions on ways NNSA can improve the safety of its operations through proper work planning and control.

Sincerely,



DONALD L. COOK  
Deputy Administrator  
for Defense Programs

Enclosures

cc w/enclosures:  
T. D'Agostino, NA-1  
M. Campagnone, HS-1.1  
A. Williams, LSO  
G. Miller, LLNL