



Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585

September 2, 2009

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

The Honorable John E. Mansfield
Vice Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

On July 12, 2006, Secretary Bodman submitted the Department of Energy's (DOE) revised Implementation Plan (IP) for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2004-2, *Active Confinement Systems*. Deliverable 8.6.3 of the IP consists of facility-specific confinement ventilation system (CVS) evaluations performed by the site offices in accordance with the Department's Ventilation System Evaluation Guidance. Deliverable 8.6.5 consists of Program Secretarial Office concurrence and approval of the disposition of gaps and upgrades. This letter and its enclosures comprise Deliverables 8.6.3 and 8.6.5 for Waste Solidification Building (WSB) at Savannah River Site (SRS).

In accordance with the IP and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) guidance dated December 6, 2006, the DOE Independent Review Panel (IRP) and the NNSA Central Technical Authority's Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety (CDNS) have performed separate reviews of the evaluation and its conclusions. The CVS evaluation report for WSB and the IRP report are enclosed.

One performance gap was identified. SRS evaluated the cost of a redesign of the Active Confinement Ventilation System (ACVS) and supporting electrical distribution system to safety class requirements. SRS's rough order of magnitude estimate (pre-conceptual level of detail) for design and construction of this modification was \$35 million to \$50 million, not including additional life-cycle costs associated with operations and testing. SRS concluded that, due to the measures taken to prevent releases of High Activity Waste, there was no discernable benefit from eliminating the identified gap by elevating the functional classification of the WSB ACVS to safety class.

The IRP concluded that SRS's evaluation of physical modifications to close the gap was appropriately performed and agreed with SRS's conclusion that the cost for closing the one gap related to the ACVS not meeting safety class single-failure criterion is not warranted since the ACVS is not required to prevent or mitigate any accidents that impact the public.



The NNSA CDNS and IRP have concluded that the evaluation and its results are technically sound and appropriate, and meet the intent of the IP. Our review concurs with the conclusions reached by the site, IRP, and CDNS.

If you have any questions concerning this letter or its enclosures, please contact me or have your staff contact Kim Loll at (202) 586-8955 or Kim.Loll@nnsa.doe.gov.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "T. P. D'Agostino". The signature is stylized with a large initial "T" and "P" and a cursive "D'Agostino".

Thomas P. D'Agostino
Administrator

Enclosures

cc: M. Whitaker, Jr., HS-1.1