[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]

SUMMARY

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2.1&= nbsp; &nbs= p; GENERAL

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The Board = and DOE have continued discussions aimed at improving the timeliness of issue resolution and have begun preparation of the requested joint report. The Board and DOE have explored case studies of both good and bad interactions during the design and constructio= n of defense nuclear facilities. In particular, the Board and DOE are examining the elements that contribute to= or impede the identification, communication, management, and resolution of saf= ety issues related to the design and construction of defense nuclear facilities. Through these efforts, the Board an= d DOE are identifying actions that will improve issue resolution. Some of these actions are already b= eing implemented, such as- project letters issued by the Board early in the desi= gn process and updated, as necessary, as the design, construction, testing and startup proceeds to apprise DOE, where appropriate, of the status of Board issues, and periodic reviews with DOE of the status of open Board issues. <= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Other actions are still being explo= red, such as the need for additional changes in DOE's critical decision process.= These discussions, together with in= formation gleaned during the Board's third public meeting conducted on March 22, 2007= , on the integration of safety into design, will serve as input to the joint rep= ort.

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The Board's public meetings in 2005, 2006, and 2007 concerning the integration of safety into design stimulated actions by DOE to improve the early integration of safety into the design of new defense nuclear facilities. As a result, DOE is making progress towards completing revisions of its relevant directives. DOE Order 413.3A, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Asset= s, was issued in July 2006, and DOE is working to revise DOE Manual 413.3-1, Project Management for the Acquisition= of Capital As= sets. A new standard, DOE-STD-1189, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, is in the final stages of development and should be issued in = the summer of 2007. These directi= ves are expected to mandate an appropriate set of requirements intended to bett= er integrate safety early into the design of new defense nuclear facilities. <= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The status of these directives is discussed further in Section 3. The implementation of these directives in a cohesive, integrated manner is crit= ical if DOE is to effectively integrate safety early in the design process.=

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The Board = has met with DOE headquarters personnel, federal project personnel, and contrac= tor personnel to discuss several key projects, intended to demonstrate the earl= y integration of safety into design, including the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex and the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit at Idaho National Laboratory. These me= etings have been aimed at developing a mutual understanding of the safety, require= ments for these new facilities and establishing common expectations for early des= ign maturity and early identification of safety issues and their resolution.

2.2 &nbs= p; ISSUES REGARDING DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES IDENTIFIED BY

THE BOARD<= o:p>

There are currently 25 defense nuclear facility design activities being undertaken by= DOE that are within the Board's jurisdiction. These activities have a total proje= ct cost of about $20 billion, which includes $12.2 billion for the Hanford Was= te Treatment Plant. The Board ut= ilizes its technical staff of approximately 60 engineers in fulfilling its obligat= ions established by its enabling legislation. The review of facility design and construction is but one of four major functions assigned to the Board in Section 2286a of its enabling legislation, Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec= tion 2286.

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These func= tions include the review and evaluation of DOE directives and standards, the inve= stigation of events or practices at defense nuclear facilities, the systematic analys= is of design and operational data, and the review of facility design and construction. Although the Bo= ard's technical staff are highly matrixed, currently about 12 engineers are specifically assigned to follow DOE's defense nuclear facility design activities. In addition, these engineers are su= pported by various expertise within the technical staff, as well as by a handful of highly specialized outside experts.

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To improve= the efficiency of its reviews, the Board has also assigned resident site repres= entatives to certain sites. These site representatives provide the Board with a continuous onsite presence to facilitate all of the Board's review efforts. The Board currently has a total of = 11 site representatives assigned to six DOE sites (Los Alamos National Laborat= ory, the Hanford Site, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Pantex Site, = the Savannah River Site, and the Y-12 National Security Complex).

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The Board's concerns with defense nuclear facilities, historically fall into several general areas:

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Safety basis strategy and control= s. Issues in this area typically = result from one or a combination of the following: less than adequate analysis of facility hazards, poorly developed accident scenarios, less than rigor= ous assessment of the quantity and form of radioactive materials released following a hypothesized accident, and poorly developed safety-related controls resulting from a lack of process knowledge.

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Structural design.= Issues in this area are freque= ntly due to less than rigorous geotechnical investigations, inadequate specification of requirements, shortcomings in the layout of a facility that unnecessarily complicate the design process, and inadequacies in structural modeling and analysis.

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Application of codes and standard= s. Issues in this area commonly r= esult from the inappropriate selection or application of codes and standards= and the inadequate flow of these requirements down to subtier vendors.

The DOE de= sign process is an iterative process from identification of the mission need thr= ough design, construction, and startup of the facility. There are several defined key miles= tones (Critical Decisions) throughout the process which are intended to provide formal DOE decisions to assess the need for a design, progress of the desig= n, schedule fog completion, likelihood of success, and cost . The project phases represent a logi= cal maturing of the project design. Each critical decision point marks = an increased DOE commitment to the project and, correspondingly, the necessary resources to complete the next phase of the project. The critical decisions are:

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Approve Mission Need (Critical Decision-0),

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Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range (Critical Decision-1),

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Approve Performance Baseline (Critical Decision-2),

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Approve Start of Construction (Critical Decision-3), and

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Approve Start of Operations or Project Completion (Critical Decision-4).

Many DOE projects have a reasonable path forward for achieving safety in the design.= For other projects, the Board and D= OE will have to arrive at an agreed-upon path forward to develop the needed de= sign details early in the next stage of the design. The goal is to resolve outstanding = issues with defense nuclear projects as early during the design phase of the proje= ct as logically possible. The recen= t changes to DOE Order 413.3A require earlier development of important safety decisio= ns that are formally approved by DOE. The Order now requires preparation = of a Conceptual Safety Design Report and a Preliminary Safety Validation Report = to support Critical Decision-1. DOE Orde= r 413.3A has been issued but is not required to be implemented until 6 months after DOE-STD-1189 has been issued.

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DOE is cur= rently preparing DOE-STD-1189 which provides the details of the expectations for implementing the requirements of the revised DOE Order 413.3A. Many current DOE projects are in transition between the existing design approach and the new approach that emphasizes earlier identification of safety-related systems. These projects will meet existing d= esign expectations, but may not develop the design early enough to identify safety-related syst= ems by the completion of the conceptual design, which is DOE's current goal. Some ongoing projects are attemptin= g to address these new expectations but lack the necessary design maturity. This situation results from an inco= mplete understanding of the new expectations, insufficient design detail to fully = address safety-in-design objectives in the early design phases, inability to advance the design prior to a scheduled critical decision, overly aggressive schedu= les, or a lack of funding to advance the design.

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The 25 fac= ility design activities that the Board is following fall into three broad categor= ies:

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Those facilities with the most significant issues,

Those facilities with lesser issu= es, and

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Those facilities that currently h= ave no issues or have not been reviewed by the Board in any detail

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The defense nuclear facilities in the first of these categories are discussed in Sectio= n 2.3 below.

More detai= led discussion of these facilities, as well as discussion of those facilities in the latter two categories, is provided in Section 4.

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2.3&= nbsp; &nbs= p; FACILITIES WITH THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ISSUES

Significant progress has been made toward resolving issues associated with several of t= hese facilities since the Board's first quarterly report. The status of these issues is summa= rized below.

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Savannah River Site, Salt Waste Processing Facility. This facility has b= een of particular concern to the Board because of technical shortcomings in the de= sign process-a lack of geotechnical requirements, structural issues, and issues related to structural modeling. A Board letter dated January 13, 2007, summarized these concerns and encouraged the= ir prompt resolution to improve nuclear safety and to avoid adverse schedule a= nd cost impacts. The Board is satisfied with the actions taken by DOE and its contractor to resolve issues associated with the design of the Salt Waste Processing Facility. Appropriate structural design exper= tise and DOE oversight have been brought to bear on the project. Geotechnical requirements are being= finalized, and changes to the structural design methodology and the structural design = have been made. While significant = design work remains to be completed, the path forward to continue the design proce= ss is acceptable. DOE is taking = action to address these issues and the Board is working closely with DOE to minimize impacts on the high-level was= te program at the Savannah River Site.

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Hanford, Waste Treatment Plant. This complex plant includes four ma= jor facilities. The Board has identified issues in the areas of seismic ground motion, structural engineering, chemical processing safety, and fire protection. DOE is making progress toward resol= ving these issues. The Board belie= ves the path forward identified by DOE and its contractor for addressing these issu= es should achieve an acceptably safe design.

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Los Alamos National Laboratory, Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project. Early in this project, the Board no= ted its concern regarding the acquisition strategy being employed. Additionally, the Board was concern= ed about the need to establish conservative design criteria for several safety-related systems-ventilation, fire suppression, and container design.= An additional issue is the lack of = final site characterization and seismic design criteria. The preliminary design is expected = to be complete in fiscal year 2007. Since the Board's first quarterly report, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has directed the project to revise its Acquisition Execution Plan. According to = the revised plan, the final design will be completed and approved before the performance baseline (Critical Decision-2) for the project, which will not occur earlier than fiscal year 2009. Based on this revised direction, an approved final design and preliminary documented safety analysis will be established before the performance baseline. This action resolves the Board's is= sue with the previous acquisition strategy. Issues related to the ventilation s= ystem design have been resolved. Si= te characterization and development of the final seismic design criteria are under way. Conservative seismic design criteri= a have been established to allow the design process to proceed in light of an expe= cted 50 percent increase in the seismic criteria for this facility. DOE and its contractor are working = to resolve the remaining issues; however, the details remain to be developed.<= o:p>

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Y-12 National Security Complex, Uranium Processing Facility. This project is very early in the design phase; the conceptual design has not be= en approved by NNSA. This projec= t was selected by the Board and NNSA to help establish a mutual understanding of safety expectations under the new DOE Order 413.3A and to demonstrate early incorporation of safety into the design of this complex facility. In light of progress made in the pa= st several months, the Board believes the safety basis controls identified for= the facility at the conceptual level of design provide an adequate basis for continuing the design process into the preliminary design phase. This project will be removed from t= he Board's listing of facilities of greatest concern.

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Hanford, K-Basin Closure Sludge Treatment Project. The design of this project is almost complete, and the project is approaching the start of construction. The Board is co= ncerned that the safety basis document submitted to DOE for approval was not based = on the current design of the system and does not ensure that safety systems wi= ll perform credited safety functions. Consistent with the Board's concern= , DOE evaluated the safety basis document and issued its safety evaluation report with conditions of approval that halted procurement activity until the desi= gn could be assured of performing credited safety functions. Design issues associated with the s= afety systems that were raised by the Board have been formally documented for resolution by the project. The baseline schedule for the project is being reevaluated. Resolution of safety and operational issues will likely result in delaying the start of operations.

4. STATUS OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES

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The Board's reviews of the design and construction of major facilities and projects are= resource-intensive and time-consuming. Therefore= , the Board's review efforts are generally subject to prioritization. The Board prioritizes its review ef= forts based on an informal rating of three characteristics: risk (assessment of both safety and programmatic risks for the facility), complexity (assessment of the relative difficulty of successfully implementing the design), and significance (over= all importance of the facility to the mission of the complex).

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Many curre= nt DOE projects are in transition between the existing design approach and one that meets the new DOE Order 413.3A expectation that emphasizes earlier identifi= cation of safety-related systems. Th= ese projects will meet existing design expectations, but will not develop the design early enough to identify safety-related systems by the completion of= the conceptual design, which is DOE's current goal. Some ongoing projects are attemptin= g to address these new expectations, but lack the necessary design maturity. This lack of design maturity result= s from an incomplete understanding of the new DOE Order 413.3A expectations, insuf= ficient design detail to fully address safety-in-design objectives in the early des= ign phases, the inability to advance the design prior to a <= span style=3D'mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier'>scheduled critical decision, an overly aggressive schedule, or a lack of funding for = the advancement of the design.

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In its fir= st quarterly report, the Board identified 25 defense nuclear facilities being = constructed or having major modifications performed for which it has jurisdiction. Significant progress has been made = toward resolving issues associated with several of these facilities. This section provides a brief revie= w of the status of significant issues associated with these facilities that rema= in unresolved. For each facility= , the following information is provided: <= /span>(1) a short description of the project, (2) status of the facility, (3) status = of significant issues identified by the Board, which includes the status provi= ded in the Board's first quarterly report, followed by an updated status. As used here, the term "unreso= lved issues" does not necessarily imply that the Board has a disagreement w= ith DOE or believes DOE's path forward is not appropriate. Some of the issues addressed here s= imply await final resolution through further development of the facility design. = All of the significant unresolved i= ssues discussed here have been communicated to DOE personnel. Minor issues that the Board believe= s can be easily resolved and have an agreed-upon path forward are not included; s= uch issues will be followed as part of the Board's normal design review process= . It is important to note that this s= ummary represents current status; additional issues may be identified as the Board conducts its continuing design reviews. No new issues have been identified = by the Board during the period of this report. The appendix to this report provide= s a summary of the Board's issues by project.

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4.1 HANFO= RD

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4.1.1 Waste Trea= tment Plant

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The Waste Treatment Plant comprises four major facilities (Pretreatment, High Level W= aste, Low Activity Waste, and Analytical Laboratory) and numerous support facilit= ies (Balance of Facilities) that will treat and immobilize high-level waste currently in= 177 underground storage tanks at the Hanford Site.

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The Board = was not initially involved in the review of the Waste Treatment Plant, which be= gan in 1995 as a privatization program not under the Board's jurisdiction. Starting in 1997, and for about thr= ee and a half years, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission assisted DOE in performing reviews consistent with its regulatory approach.

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In mid-200= 0, DOE abandoned this privatization approach, and by the end of that year awarded a contract to Bechtel National Incorporated to complete the project as a DOE-= owned facility. For about a year, B= echtel National Incorporated was engaged in various activities such as validation = of the baseline, hiring and training, due diligence review of the previous des= ign, and safety basis certification as contractually required by DOE.=

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Significant design activity recommenced toward the end of 2001, at which time the Board began to exercise safety oversight of the project. During March 2002, the Board commen= ced detailed review of the Waste Treatment Plant site characterization and grou= nd motion. Four months later, in= July 2002, the Board provided formal correspondence to the Assistant Secretary f= or Environmental Management documenting its concern that the seismic design criteria being used for the Waste Treatment Plant underestimated the seismic loads. During the ensuing yea= rs, the Board has communicated other safety-related issues to DOE concerning structural design, chemical process safety, fire protection, electrical distribution, confinement ventilation and development of the safety basis. = The Board's reviews were purposeful= ly aggressive to permit early identification of issues and to accommodate DOE's desire to= pursue an aggressive design and construction schedule.

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In October= 2005, the Board transmitted a letter to DOE that summarized the safety issues ide= ntified by the Board that remained unresolved. The Board believed this summary wou= ld be useful to DOE in understanding the state of the Board's nuclear safety revi= ews at the Waste Treatment Plant. The Board continued to advise DOE to focus on providing and preserving adequate margins using conservative assumptions to ensure that the design and construction of the Waste Treatment Plant would result in a safe, robust, a= nd successful facility. DOE has made progre= ss in addressing the Board's concerns but several issues as noted in the following pages still remain. The Board expects that each issue can be resolved in a satisfactory manner.

4.1.1.1[1]—The= field work for the deep drilling program has been completed. Analyses are under way to assess the impact of the new soil and rock properties on the ground motion for the des= ign basis earthquake.

Structural Engineering

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Issue—The Board raised several issues regarding the structural design—inadequate modeling, no clear seismic load transfer capability in the structure, and an inadequate finite element analysis. DOE developed new structural design criteria that address the issues raised by the Board. The details of the application of t= hese criteria are still being developed by the contractor and thus have not been evaluated by the Board.

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Safety Significance—The Pretreatment Facility structure and a significant amount of processing equipment are classified as safety-class to protect the public. A technically defensible structural analysis will ensure that the facility is designed properly to resist unacceptable degradation and that safety-class components would continue to perform their safety function following a design basis earthquake.

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Expectation—Details and results of analyses will be provided in revised structural summary reports requested by the Boa= rd for the Pretreatment Facility. These results should show that the facility meets structural design requirements.

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When—DOE has not provided a completi= on date for the summary structural report for the Pretreatment Facility. Issuance of the report is dependent= on completion of the Pretreatment Facility reanalysis.

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Updated St= atus (2)—DOE provided an outline of the summary structural report an= d committed to completing the report by the end of 2007.

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Chemical P= rocess Safety

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Issue—The issue relates to hydrogen accumulation in plant equipment. Some of the equipment is in black c= ells that are not intended to be accessible for the life of Waste Treatment Plant operations.

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Safety Significance—Hyd= rogen explosions could damage safety-class and safety-significant systems or components that protect the public and, workers from radioactive exposure. = Additionally, repair following an e= xplosion would result in increased exposure to workers, and interrupting Pretreatment Facility operations would impact overall risk reduction efforts for the sit= e.

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Expectation—DOE will implement engineered a= nd administrative controls to protect the public and workers. Where hydrogen explosions could dam= age equipment, DOE must develop and implement engineered or administrative cont= rols. The administrative controls, = if properly implemented, will be adequate to reduce the likelihood and impact = of an explosion. DOE has develop= ed a conservative design criterion, but the contractor is still attempting to demonstrate that failure of process components is unlikely and that the consequences of such failure are adequately mitigated. The approach for in-line components= has not yet been demonstrated.

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When—The contractor has not yet completed all calculations and related engineering work, including determination of the impact of a hydrogen detonation on process components. The remaining work is scheduled for completion by March 2007.

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Updated St= atus (2)—The contractor has made significant progress toward complet= ion of calculations and related engineering work, including the impact of a hydrog= en detonation on process components. DOE is evaluating the supporting documentation. The Board expects to review DOE's findings and issue resolution by the end of 2007.

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4.1.1.2

Updated St= atus (2)—The= field work for the deep drilling program has been completed.   Analyses are under way to assess the impact of the new soil and rock properties on the ground motion for the des= ign basis earthquake.

Structural Engineering

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Issue—The Board raised several issues regarding = the structural design—inadequate modeling, no clear seismic load transfer capability in the structure, and an inadequate finite element analysis. DOE developed new structural design criteria that address the issues raised by the Board. The details of the application of t= hose criteria are still being developed by the contractor and thus have not been evaluated by the Board.

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Safety Significance—The= High Level= Waste Facility structure and a significant amount of processing equipment are classified as safety-class to protect the public. A technically defensible structural analysis will ensure that the facility is designed properly to resist unacceptable degradation and that safety-class components would continue to perform their safety function following a design basis earthquake.

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Expectation—Details and results of analyses will be provided in revised structural summary reports requested by the Boa= rd for the High Level Waste Facility. These results should show that the facility meets structural design requirements.

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When—A revised draft summary structu= ral report for the High-Level Waste Facility was forwarded to the Board in Dece= mber 2006. Comment resolution and issuance of the report is dependent on completion of the High Level Waste f= acility re-analysis.

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Updated St= atus (2)—The Board provided comments to DOE on a draft summary struc= tural report. DOE agreed with these comments and committed to issuing the revised report by end of 2007.

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Fire Prote= ction

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Issue—Typical construction practices provide fireproof coatings on structural steel members that may be subjecte= d to fire . DOE and the contractor= have proposed not providing a fireproof coating if it is determined that the facility would not be adversely affected should a steel member fail in a fi= re.

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Safety Significance—The= High Level Waste Facility structure is classified as safety-class to protect the public. Heating of the steel members weakens them, potentially to the point that they would be unable to carry any load. This could ultimately lead to building collapse and loss of confinement.

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Expectation—The contractor will develop a technically sound methodology for identifying structural steel members that= do not require a fireproof coating. Structural analyses should support = the conclusion that such a structural steel member could fail without impacting= the structure or adjacent safety systems.

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When—The methodology for identifying structural steel members that could fail without jeopardizing the High Level Waste Facility is scheduled for completion by February 2007. The contractor has not identified a= date for completion of the supporting structural analyses using this methodology= .

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Updated St= atus (2)—The methodology for identifying structural steel members th= at could fail without jeopardizing the facility was presented to the Board in March = 2007 and was found acceptable. The analytical work is now scheduled for completion in the summer of 2007.

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4.1.1.3

Updated St= atus (2)—The methodology for identifying structural steel members th= at could fail without jeopardizing the facility was presented to the Board in March = 2007 and was found acceptable. The analytical work is now scheduled for completion in the summer of 2007.

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4.1.1.4

4.1.2        Demonstrat= ion Bulk Vitrification System Project

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Descriptio= n: The Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System project consists of research, development, and demonstration of a vitrification process for high-level waste that will supplement processing = done by the Waste Treatment Plant. Research and development of the pro= cess involves laboratory, engineering, and full-scale testing. The process is being evaluated to s= upport a decision regarding supplemental treatment of low-activity waste from the high-level waste tanks at Hanford.

Status of Facility: Critical Decision-1= has been approved. The facility is expected to be operational in 2011. The design is about 90 percent comp= lete. Some initial ground work and concre= te foundation work have been completed, but construction of the facility has n= ot started.

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Status of = Significant Board Issues:

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Confinement Strategy

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Issue—The early design had a number of major vulnerabilities with respect to the overall confinement of the hazard= ous wastes to be processed. The confinement strategy has been evolving. The Board is now satisfied with the general confinement strategy presented by project personnel. However, neither the technical anal= ysis confirming the adequacy of the confinement barriers and the magnitude of the radiologi= cal source term nor the technical rationale for discounting certain major accid= ent scenarios is yet available.

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Safety Significance—To protect workers and the public, hazardous waste in portions of the system m= ust be appropriately confined.

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Expectation—The technical justification for= the confinement barriers, source term, and accident scenarios being considered = will be provided.

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When—A revised Preliminary' Document= ed Safety Analysis should be available in late 2007. This analysis should allow evaluati= on of the adequacy of the confinement barriers.

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Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes.

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4.1.3        K-Basin Cl= osure Project Sludge Treatment Project

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Descriptio= n: Sludge Treatment is a subproject of= the overall K-Basin Closure Project that involves a major modification of two operating facilities to provide a capability to treat waste sludge from corroded spent uranium fuel and package it for disposal. The sludge will be treated at moder= ately high temperature and pressure to ensure full oxidation of remaining metallic spent uranium prior to disposal.

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Status of Project: The design is about= 90 percent complete, and the project is approaching what would be Critical Decision-3, Start of Construction. However, this subproject is not implementing critical decision points and is not formally implementing DOE Order 413.3.

Status of = Significant Board Issues:

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Completene= ss of Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis

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Issue—The contractor submitted a Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis to DOE for approval; however, it is = not based on the current design of the system. In addition, several safety-related systems, structures, and components are still being designed and need furth= er analysis (e.g., single-point failure, redundancy, separation) to determine whether they can adequately perform their safety functions.

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Safety Significance—The Sludge Treatment process has the potential for significant safety consequen= ces to workers and the public. The approval of a Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis based on incomplete information fails to ensure that the safety equipment being fabricated and installed provides adequate protection for workers and the public.

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Expectation—The Preliminary Documented Safe= ty Analysis will be based on the current design and will provide assurance that the safety systems can adequately perform their credited safety functions.<= o:p>

When—The Preliminary Documented Safe= ty Analysis is expected to be approved in early 2007.

Updated St= atus (2)—DOE has recently decided to formally implement the requirem= ents of Order 413.3 for this subproject. Consistent with the Board's concern= , DOE issued conditions of approval in its safety evaluation report for the Preli= minary Documented Safety Analysis that halted procurement activity until the design has matured sufficiently to assure that safety systems will be capable of p= erforming credited safety functions. DOE terminated review of an updated Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis until the design issues are resolved and final design information is incorporated= . Approval of the Preliminary Documen= ted Safety Analysis is now expected in the summer of 2008. Design issues related to the safety systems that were raised by the Board have been formally documented for res= olution by the project. The project is reevaluating the baseline schedule. Resolution of safety and operational issues will result in delaying = the start of operations.

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4.1.4        Tank Retri= eval and Waste Feed Delivery System

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Descriptio= n: This system comprises several subpr= ojects that are being undertaken to provide the capability to mix, retrieve, and transfer high-level waste from individual waste tanks as feed to the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant.

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Status of System: One individual subpro= ject does not appear to be managed with formal critical decision milestones. Some of the work started in the mid-1990s, and the subprojects are at various stages of completion. The individual subprojects are esse= ntially on hold because of the delay in the schedule for the Waste Treatment Plant = or reduced funding.

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Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board is not currently reviewing these subprojects because of higher priorities and the delay in the schedule for the Waste Treatment Plant. The Board did previously identify i= ssues regarding the design pressure rating of the waste transfer system.

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Design Pre= ssure Rating of Waste Transfer System

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Issue—The Board found that the analys= is performed to determine the minimum design pressure rating of the waste feed delivery transfer system was not technically defensible because of the many uncertainties in the assumptions made. DOE formed an expert panel that con= cluded that these uncertainties are accommodated by using conservative values. However, the panel noted the need f= or an improved understanding of process variations, additional testing, and model revisions. Recently, the cont= ractor noted that work to close several recommendations made by the expert panel h= ad never been completed. DOE and= its contractors are working to address the technical issues associated with was= te transfer.

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Safety Significance—Pro= per system design and operations are needed for adequate flow during waste tran= sfer to prevent the settling of solid material and plugging. Plugging of the transfer line could impact waste feed delivery. L= ine blockages that could not be cleared by flushing would require manual repair, which poses the potential for radiation exposure to workers.

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Expectation—DOE will disposition the recommendations of its expert panel.

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When—Recommendations of the expert p= anel need to be dispositioned in time to support any needed improvements in the system before waste is transferred to the Waste Treatment Plant. A firm schedule for accomplishing t= his has not been developed.

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Updated St= atus (2)—An action plan and revised, updated status is now expected = to be provided to DOE and the Board by the contractor in June 2007.

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4.1.5        Immobilized High-Level Waste Interim Storage Facility Project

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Descriptio= n: This project will provide interim s= torage of immobilized high-level waste from the Waste Treatment Plant. The interim storage facility will s= tore vitrified waste until it can be sent to a national repository for final disposition.

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Status of Facility: Critical Decision-3= has been approved. Further work o= n the project has been deferred until fiscal year 2010 because of delays in the schedule for the Waste Treatment Plant, and a schedule for the start of operations has not been established.

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Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board has ident= ified no issues regarding this project. The Board is not currently reviewin= g this project because of higher priorities and the delay in the schedule for the Waste Treatment Plant.

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Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes.

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4.2       IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY

4.2.1        Integrated= Waste Treatment Unit Project

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Descriptio= n: The Integrated Waste Treatment Unit= will use steam reforming technology to convert approximately 900,000 gallons of sodium-bearing waste at the Idaho National Laboratory to a solid carbonate = or mineralized product for permanent disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Pla= nt or an offsite monitored geologic repository. The Integrated Waste Treatment Unit= will also stabilize additional wastes generated by continued cleanup efforts at = the site. The facility may have a future mission to support the recovery of high-level waste calcine for offs= ite disposal.

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Status of Facility: Critical Decision-2= /3B was approved in late December 2006. The final design review is schedule= d for March 2007. Construction is p= lanned to begin in March 2007 with concrete foundation placement. The phased Critical Decision-3 appr= oach authorizes procurement of long-lead material and early site preparation wor= k. The facility is expected to be operational in 2009.

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Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board has ident= ified no significant issues regarding this project at this time. However, the Board is following sev= eral matters because of their importance in achieving overall safety in the final design. These matters include= the following:

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Pilot Plant Testing

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Issues—The final disposition location for the was= te has not been established. The= expected disposition path is to send the carbonate waste form to the Waste Isolation= Pilot Plant. If this path is not available, a mineralized waste form may be necessary for disposal at a geological repository. Pilot = plant testing of the carbonate and mineralized waste form has been completed, but= the final mineralized test report will not be available for review until early = 2007.

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An overtemperature condition developed in the charcoal adsorber bed during tes= ting. Investigation of the root cau= se of this event is being finalized.

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Safety Significance—Form= ally documentin= g the mineralized test results will help identify major process issues associated with this waste form, supporting the design of a facility that can provide adequate protection for facility workers should this waste form be required= in the future.

= ;

A completed root-cause investigation into the charcoal adsorber bed overtemperature eve= nt will potentially identify controls needed to prevent recurrence of such an event in the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit. A charcoal adsorber bed overtempera= ture event requires safety-significant controls to protect facility workers from a mer= cury release.

= ;

Expectation—Investigation of the cha= rcoal adsorber bed overtemperature event will be completed, and any needed safety controls will be incorporated into the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit to preclude such an event. Appli= cable lessons learned from mineralized testing will be incorporated into the full-scale facility's design if the mineralized waste form is chosen.<= /o:p>

= ;

When—The adsorber bed investigation should be completed in early 2007. The = final mineralized test report will also be issued in early 2007.

= ;

Updated Sta= tus (2)—No significant changes, reports have not been issued yet.<= /span>

= ;

Waste Characterization

= ;

Issue—Further characterization of the waste or the safety-related control on the feed is needed to ensure that the safety basis assumptions regarding the radionuclide content of the waste are valid. Additional tank sampli= ng began in 2006 but is not yet complete.

= ;

Safety Significance—Char= acterization of the sodium-bearing waste (through either tank sampling or feed qualificatio= n) will ensure that the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit will be operated within the bounds of its safety basis, thereby providing adequate protection of facility workers.

= ;

Expectation—Results will be re= viewed to ensure that existing radionuclide data are conservative. If the data do not support the safe= ty basis, an additional safety-related control on the feed will be incorporated into the design and operation of the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit to ens= ure operation within the bounds of the safety basis.

= ;

When—Sampling results sh= ould be available for review in early 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —No = significant changes, sample results are not yet available.

= ;

Distributed Control System Design

= ;

Issue—The Distributed Control System = is relied upon to place the process in a safe condition should a safety limit = be exceeded or to shut the process down via fail-safe logic if the control sys= tem should fail. However, the fin= al design is not yet complete. F= urther, the ability of the system to monitor process conditions following an earthq= uake is not assured with the current design.

= ;

Safety Significance—Ade= quate design of the Distributed Control System will ensure that the system will perform its safety-significant functio= ns. Design of the fail-safe logic and provision of a limited means of monitoring the process following a seismic = event will provide defense-in-depth assurance of safe shutdown to protect facilit= y workers involved in recovery operations.

= ;

Expectation—The Distributed Control System design will= be demonstrated to be capable of placing the process in a safe configuration if operational safety limits are exceeded or if the system fails (e.g., during= a seismic event). Postseismic monitoring capability will be considered for the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit process to provide assurance that the process is in a safe configurati= on.

= ;

When—The Distributed Control System design shou= ld be finalized by early 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —No significant changes, design has not been finalized.

= ;

= ;

4.3       LOS A= LAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

4.3.1        Chemistry = and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Chemistry and Metallurgy Resear= ch Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory is being planned to relocate and consolidate support capabilities for analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and actinide research and development now house= d in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility. The project consists of three prima= ry elements: the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building, Special Facility Equipment, and the Nuc= lear Facility. The Nuclear Facilit= y will be a Hazard Category 2 facility and poses the greatest hazard because of its substantial inventory of uranium and plutonium, as well as the presence of various hazardous materials. = Only the Nuclear Facility is discussed here.

= ;

Status of = Facility:<= /span> Critical Decision-1 has been approv= ed. The preliminary design of the Nucle= ar Facility is about 70 percent complete. Critical Decision-2/3 is expected t= o be approved in July 2007. The Nuclear Fac= ility is expected to be operational in 2014.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues:

= ;

Design-Bui= ld Acquisition Strategy

= ;

Issue—NNSA acquisition strategy for t= he Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project combines Critical Decision-2 (approval of performance baseline) and Critical Decision-3 (appr= oval to start construction). This strategy essentially eliminates NNSA's formal review of the fi<= span style=3D'mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier'>nal design= prior to construction .

= ;

Safety Significance—As = noted, NNSA's acquisition strategy essentially eliminates the agency's formal revi= ew of the final design prior to construction, raising concern that critical safety-related design issues may be overlooked. NNSA personnel have acknowledged the Board's concern but believe they have a plan to execute the project that includes a rigorous review of the final design of the facility. This plan includes a design accepta= nce review prior to release for construction, but details of that review have n= ot been established.

= ;

Expectation—The preliminary design will be = more developed than is typically expected at Critical Decision-2 to support a combined Critical Decision-2/3 decision. To this end, an essentially final d= esign and a completed Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis with an NNSA safety evaluation report will be required. The details of the planned NNSA des= ign acceptance review will be established, and the resources necessary to condu= ct this review will be available prior to approval of Critical Decision-2/3 authorizing the start of construction. This is critical for design-build p= rojects as the design cannot be changed once construction has started without major= project impacts.

= ;

When—Critical Decision-2/3 is anticipated in July 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—Since the Board's first quarterly report, NNSA has directed= the project to revise its acquisition execution plan. The preliminary design is expected = to be complete in fiscal year 2007. Once the preliminary design has been completed, reviewed, and accepted, the proj= ect will continue into the final design phase. According to the revised plan, the = final design will be completed and approved before the performance baseline (Crit= ical Decision-2) for the project is established. The performance baseline will not be established earlier than fiscal year 2009.

This revis= ed direction essentially modifies the acquisition strategy to a more tradition= al design-bid-build approach, thereby resolving the Board's issue with the pre= vious acquisition strategy. This is= sue is therefore considered closed.

= ;

Site Characterization and Seismic Design

= ;

Issue—The seismic design ground motion criteria have not been finalized. Los Alamos National Laboratory is updating the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis in part to support establishment of the seismic design ground motion for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project. Initial results are available and a= re being used for the project, but the final report has not been published. Initial geotechnical data from the geotechnical exploration program are also available, but the final geotechn= ical report also has not been published. A small exploratory trench at the building site revealed a possible fracture that Los Alamos National Laborat= ory geologists interpreted as a tree root. T= he full excavation will be mapped to assess the presence of faults and the age= of fault movement, if any.

= ;

Safety Significance—The= Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project structure and significant amoun= ts of equipment are classified as safety-class or safety-significant, requiring appropriate seismic design. L= os Alamos National Laboratory personnel are proceeding with the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project design based on initial estimates of seismic design ground motion. A technically defensible seismic design will ensure that facility's safety-related struct= ures, systems, and components could perform their intended safety functions under ground motion for the design basis earthquake.

= ;

Expectation—The final probabilistic seismic hazard analysis report and final geotechnical report will be completed. The structural evaluations will appropriately incorporate the final seismic design ground motion.

= ;

When—The probabilistic seismic hazard analysis report is expected in early 2007. The geotechnical report is anticipa= ted by July 2007. Excavation mapping= is expected to be completed in April 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—A draft of the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis report= was published in March 2007. This report is undergoing final comment resolution and is expected to be issued = in June 2007. Excavation mapping= is currently under way and is now expected to be completed in August 2007.

= ;

Safety-Sig= nificant Active Ventilation System

= ;

Issue—The current active ventilation system is designated as safety-significant and helps confine hazardous mate= rial during accident scenarios, including earthquakes. The current design does not ensure = that the active ventilation system would remain operable following a design basis earthquake and relies on a passive confinement mechanism that the Board has found to be neither conservative nor technically defensible.

= ;

Safety Significance—The= active ventilation system would confine hazardous material during accident scenari= os, including earthquakes. Adequa= te seismic design will ensure that the ventilation system would remain operable following the design basis earthquake.

= ;

Expectation—A comprehensive set of design requiremen= ts for a safety-significant ventilation system, along with the system design implementing those revised requirements, will be completed in time to suppo= rt a combined Critical Decision-2/3. The Board agrees with the revised seismic design expectations for the ventilati= on system.

= ;

When—The preliminary design system description = for the ventilation system is expected by April 2007. Critical Decision-2/3 is expected i= n July 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —The system design description for the ventilation system is now expected by May 2007. The preliminary design = is expected to be completed in fiscal year 2007. The project has committed to design= ing the safety-significant active ventilation system to ensure its operability following a design basis earthquake. On the basis of this commitment, the Board considers this issue closed at the preliminary design stage. Implementation of the final design = will be monitored.

= ;

Safety-Cla= ss Fire Suppression System

= ;

Issue—The fire suppression system has been designated as safety-class. T= his will be the first new fire suppression system in the DOE complex built as safety-class. While the overa= ll design approach appears reasonable, detailed design requirements and a syst= em design implementing these requirements have not been prepared.

= ;

Safety Significance—The= establishm= ent of appropriate design requirements relates directly to the credited safety function for the safety-class fire suppression system. Typical requirements for safety-cl= ass systems, such as redundancy and single-point failure criteria, need to be established . A comprehensive= set of design requirements, along with a system design implementing these requirements, needs to be completed.

= ;

Expectation—A comprehensive set of design requiremen= ts for a safety-class fire suppression system, along with a system design implementing these requirements, will be completed in time to support a combined Critical Decision-2/3. Typical requirements for safety-cla= ss systems, such as redundancy and single-point failure criteria, will be established.

= ;

When—The preliminary fire hazards analysis is expected in spring 2007. The = preliminary system design description for the fire suppression system is expected by Ap= ril 2007. Critical Decision-2/3 is expected in July 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—The preliminary fire hazards analysis is now expected to be= completed along with the preliminary design in fiscal year 2007. The preliminary system design descr= iption for the fire suppression system is to be provided to NNSA in May 2007. A complete preliminary design (incl= uding the system design description, boundaries and interfaces, design requiremen= ts, and necessary safety analyses) is required prior to the start of the final design phase in fiscal year 2008.

= ;

Safety-Cla= ss and Safety-Significant Container Design

= ;

Issue—Containers that will be used in= the Long Term Storage Vault have been designated as safety-class; other contain= ers have been designated as safety-significant. Definitive design requirements and specifications for these containers have not been established. In the Long Term Storage Vault, the= rmal design requirements for given geometry and spacing constraints have not been established. Without design requirements and specifications, there is no information with which to judge the adequacy of the overall safety strategy that currently relies on container = design to prevent the release of large fractions of the material at risk.

= ;

Safety Significance—Des= ign requiremen= ts and specifications provide the basis for a container design adequate to provide containment of stored plutonium.

= ;

Expectation—A comprehensive set of design requirements for these containers, along with a system design implementing those requirements, will be completed in time to support a combined Critical Decision-2/3. The Board agree= s with NNSA's approach of making storage containers safety-related.

= ;

When—The preliminary system design description for the containers is expected by April 2007. Critical Decision-2/3 is expected i= n July 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—The preliminary system design description for the container= s is to be provided to NNSA in May 2007. A complete preliminary design (incl= uding the system design description, design requirements, and necessary safety analyses) is required prior to the start of the final design phase in fiscal year 2008.

= ;

4.3.2        Technical Area-55 Reinvestment Project

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Technical Area (TA)-55 Reinvest= ment Project is a multiyear, multiphased capital investment project intended to improve the safety and compliance posture of Los Alamos National Laboratory= 's TA-55 facility. The phases of= this project include 1A (chiller equipment and cooling towers), 1B (exhaust stack upgrade, uninterruptible power supply, criticality accident alarm systems, confinement doors, air dryers, glovebox stands, and vault water tanks), and= 2 (building fire alarm devices, glovebox fire alarm devices, elevator, roof, = fire water sprinkler piping, fire alarm panel and wiring, industrial waste, and various ventilation system components).

= ;

Status of Project: Execution of Phase 1A, which does n= ot involve credited safety systems, is fully funded and scheduled for completi= on in June 2010. Phase 1B is par= tially funded and targeted for completion in 2014 under optimistic funding assumpt= ions. Phase 2 has yet to be funded = and is nominally scheduled for completion beyond 2014.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board has not y= et performed detailed reviews of this project. The Board notes that the expansion = of TA-55 missions will significantly increase the fissile material operational tempo in the coming years even prior to completion of Phase 1A. The currently envisioned phased app= roach for the TA-55 Reinvestment Project needs to be reviewed to ensure the completeness of identification and analysis of safety issues during both the various project phases and subsequent operations.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes.

4.3.3        Upgrades t= o Pit Manufacturing Capability at Technical Area-55

= ;

Descriptio= n: Upgrades are currently under way to= the pit manufacturing capability at TA-55 through two interrelated programmatic campaigns-the Pit Manufacturing and Pit Manufacturing Capability subprogram= s. Overall, the objective of these eff= orts is to install manufacturing equipment necessary to produce increased number= s of pits and establish the capability to manufacture legacy pit types or, if authorized, a Reliable Replacement Warhead.

= ;

Status of Project: This activity is be= ing managed to meet Defense Programs, Program Management Manual, and not as a formal project under DOE Order 413.3A. Modifications to the pit manufactur= ing capability at TA-55 are ongoing in a piecemeal fashion and are funded on an annual basis.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board recently began reviewing these upgrades and is currently evaluating whether the lack of adherence to DOE Order 413.3A is adversely impacting the integration of safety into the design. This activity will be considered to= gether with the TA-55 Reinvestment Project (see Section 4.3.2).<= /p>
= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes, discussions on= a path forward are continuing.

= ;

4.3.4        Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Upgrade Project

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatm= ent Facility Upgrade Project will modernize the 1960s era radioactive liquid wa= ste system at Los Alamos National Laboratory to remediate the system's signific= ant deficiencies. This upgrade is necessary to support Los Alamos National Laboratory's primary programmatic missions.

= ;

Status of Project: Critical Decision-1 was approved on June 5, 2006. The Critical Decision-1 package pro= posed a single new facility. The contractor is developing a new proposal that would divide functions among <= /span>a <= span style=3D'mso-bidi-font-size:11.5pt;mso-bidi-font-family:Courier'>transuranic processing facility, a transuranic influent facility, a radiological facili= ty for low-level waste processing, and a utility building. This strategy is designed to meet Critical Decision-1 commitments, but will potentially offer significant cost and schedule savings. A decis= ion on this strategy will be made at the Critical Decision-2 stage, which is expec= ted in the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. The facility is expected to be oper= ational in 2011.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board = has not performed a detailed review of this project because of higher prioritie= s.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —On January 25, 2007, NNSA directed the contractor to proceed with the single facility design. NNSA did not believe the potential life cycle cost savings justified the programmatic ri= sk with changing the previously approved approach.

= ;

4.3.5        New Solid Transuranic Waste Facility Project

= ;

Descriptio= n: The State of New Mexico Consent Order requires closure of Area G at TA-54 in 2015. Closure of the existing transuranic= waste management capabilities in Area G will result in the need for new transuranic waste management capabilities. Los = Alamos National Laboratory cannot continue its programmatic activities involving n= uclear materials (e.g., pit manufacturing, stockpile stewardship, and plutonium-23= 8 work) without this capability. The conceptual design envisions four buildings for waste staging, characterizat= ion, repackaging, and shipment loading functions.

= ;

Status of Project: Critical Decision-1 approval is expected in the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. <= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> The facility is expected to be operational in 2011.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board = has not performed a detailed review of this project because of higher prioritie= s.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —No significant changes.

= ;

4.3.6        Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades. Project, Phase 2=

= ;

Descriptio= n: Phase 2 of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades Project addresses the protection strategy = and security requirements necessary to meet DOE's design basis threat. The project involves primarily incr= easing the battlefield space by extending perimeters and isolation zones and inclu= des an aerial threat deterrent system above the Plutonium Facility.<= /span>

= ;

Status of Project: A Safety Evaluation Report on the Preliminary Hazards Analysis was completed in September 2006.= Critical Decision-2/3 is planned for November 2007. The facility is expected to be operational in 2011.

= ;

Status of Significant Board Issues: The Board has not performed a detailed review of this project because of higher priorit= ies. While the direct nuclear safe= ty implications of the project are minimal, the Board's interest in the projec= t is based on the potential for adverse impacts to Plutonium Facility operations, both during and after construction of these upgrades.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes.

= ;

4.3.7        Technical Area-55 Radiography Project

= ;

Descriptio= n: The TA-55 Radiography Project is ai= med at reestablishing radiography capability for nuclear weapon components. Currently, components are sent to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for evaluation because Los Alamos National Laboratory's facility at TA-8 is unavailable as a result of numero= us infrastructure and authorization basis issues.

= ;

Status of Project: In September 2006, = Los Alamos National Laboratory requested a revision to the project schedule, including retraction of the Critical Decision-1 package, to ensure that the needs of the Complex 2030 vision would be accurately reflected in the proje= ct. Future action is dependent on decis= ions regarding Complex 2030. The f= acility is expected to be operational in 2010.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board has not performed a detailed review of this project because of higher priorities.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes.

= ;

= ;

4.4       NEVAD= A TEST SITE

4.4.1        Device Ass= embly Facility-Criticality Experiments Facility

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Criticality Experiments Facility project will establish the unique capability within DOE to perform critical= ity experiments. This capability = is being achieved by modifying the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada Test Site. The criticality experim= ent assemblies are being relocated from outdated facilities at Los Alamos Natio= nal Laboratory.

= ;

Status of Facility: Critical Decision-2= has been approved. The design of facility modifications is about 90 percent complete. Construction renovation activities = have not started. Prior to the mov= e to the Nevada Test Site, the criticality experiment assembly controls are being updated at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The facility is expected to be oper= ational in 2009.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues:

= ;

Structural Cracks

= ;

Issue—The Device Assembly Facility structure has numerous cracks that are considered abnormal for a nuclear facility. The Board's basic concern is that p= oor construction practices may have adversely affected the concrete's in situ strength a= nd contributed to the unprecedented level of cracking.

Safety Significance—Deg= raded concrete strength could potentially result in failure of the structure following a design basis event.

= ;

Expectation—A quantitative assessment of the concrete's present strength will ensure that low-strength concrete did not contribute to the cracking. T= he Board has suggested that NNSA verify the in situ strength of the concrete using an acceptable nondestructive test.

When—NNSA has disagreed with the need for this testing. The Board is considering further actions. = No schedule for addressing this issue exists.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes.

4.5       OAK R= IDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY

4.5.1.Building 3019-Uranium-233 Downblending and Disposition Project=

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Uranium-233 Downblending and Disposition Project will give DOE the capability to process the inventory of Uranium-233 stored in Building 3019 at Oak Ridge National Laboratory into a disposable form without safeguard requirements. The project will include dissolutio= n of Uranium-233 materials, followed by blending to 0.96 percent equivalent Uranium-235 enrichment, then a denitration step to produce a final uranium oxide product for packaging and disposition. Current plans call for most of the = downblended material to be disposed of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, with the rem= ainder going to the Nevada Test Site.

= ;

Status of Project: Critical Decision-1= has been approved. The project is awaiting Critical Decision-2/3A approval, expected in early 2007. The blenddown design is about 90 pe= rcent complete. Removal of Building= 3019 equipment and facility modifications required prior to blenddown (construct= ion) will not begin until Critical Decision-3A has been approved. The facility is expected to be operational in 2012.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues:

= ;

Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis

= ;

Issue—A revised Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis to support Critical Decision-2/3A has been prepared and submitted to DOE for comment. The revised document lacks detail on safety-related controls. A revision of the document to incor= porate these items for DOE approval is not planned until after Critical Decision-2= /3A has been approved.

= ;

Safety Significance—The process used for the Uranium-233 Downblending and Disposition Project has t= he potential for significant consequences to workers. The approval of a Preliminary Docum= ented Safety Analysis based on incomplete information fails to ensure that the sa= fety equipment being fabricated and installed will provide adequate protection f= or workers.

= ;

Expectation—A revised Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis will be prepared that provides sufficient detail on the project's safety-related controls to allow an evaluation of the adequacy of those controls.

= ;

When—According to current plans, a revised Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis will not be provided until after Critical Decision-2/3A has been approved, expected in early 200= 7.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —No = significant changes.

= ;

= ;

4.6       PANTEX PLANT

= ;

4.6.1        Component Evaluation Facility

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Component Evaluation Facility is a= new seven-bay complex that will increase the Pantex Plant's existing capacity a= nd provide new capabilities for the surveillance and requalification of weapons and weapon components.

= ;

Status of Facility: Critical Decision-0 has been approved. However, the project is on hold and awaiting guidance for reconsideration of the mission need.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board = has identified no outstanding issues with this project at this time.=

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —No significant changes.

= ;

= ;

4.7       SAVAN= NAH RIVER SITE

4.7.1        Pit Disass= embly and Conversion Facility

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility is one of two plutonium disposition facilities to be constructed at the Savannah River Site. It i= s part of a joint U.S.-Russian agreement under which each country = will dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium. The mission of the Pit Disassembly = and Conversion Facility is to process excess plutonium pits and metal into oxide feed for the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility.

Status of Facility: Critical Decision-1= has been approved. Critical Decis= ion-2 is expected to be approved in late 2007. This project is on hold.=

= ;

Status of Significant Board Issues:

= ;

Assumption Regarding Combustible Loading for Seismically Induced Fire

= ;

Issue—The Board previously agreed with the proje= ct's approach for evaluation of seismically induced facility fire as a design ba= sis accident contingent on finalization and review of combustible loading and o= ther assumptions. Recent rebaselin= ing reports for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility indicate that the combustib= le loading may be higher than assumed in the safety analysis.

= ;

Safety Significance—The= controls required for the design basis accident—a seismically induced facility fire-protect the public and collocated workers. A significant increase in combustib= le loading would directly increase the safety risk to the public and collocated workers.

Expectation—The assumptions in the safety analysis wil= l be validated to support the facility safety control strategy and to determine whether facility design changes are needed.

= ;

When—This issue is expected to be addressed in 2= 007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—No significant changes.

= ;

4.7.2        Salt Waste Processing Facility

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Salt Waste Processing Facility is a new facility that will treat salt waste from high-level waste tanks at the Savannah River Site. It will extract and concentrate strontium, cesium, and actinides from the waste. The concentrated waste will be sent= to the Defense Waste Processing Facility for vitrification, and the decontamin= ated salt solution will be sent to the Saltstone Facility for disposal in grout vault= s. The Salt Waste Processing Facility comprises several buildings. = Most of the hazardous waste will be confined in the Central Process Area buildin= g.

= ;

Status of Facility: Critical Decision-I= has been approved. Critical Decision-2/3A was planned for February 2007, but the schedule is being reviewed, and this critical decision will likely be delayed. Critical Decision-3A would allow si= te excavation, mud mat placement, and procurement of long-lead material. Construction activities have not st= arted. The facility is expected to be operational in 2011.

= ;

Status of Significant Board Issues:

= ;

Geotechnic= al Investigation

= ;

Issue—The geotechnical investigation reports have not been issued. The field wo= rk was recently completed, but a final determination of the design basis earthquake and the design settlement that could result from an earthquake has not been made. The geotechnical investigation reports are significantly behind schedule for this stage of t= he facility design. The Central Process Area building is sensitive to settlement.

= ;

Safety Significance—The= Central Pr= ocess Area building and a significant number of systems are classified as safety-significant to protect workers. Information from the final geotechn= ical investigation reports is needed to ensure that the facility structure is designed to properly resist natural phenomena design loads and that safety-= significant components would perform their safety function following a design basis eve= nt.

= ;

Expectation—The geotechnical investigation reports will be completed, and a final design basis earthquake and design settlement requirements will be established. The capability of the Central Proce= ss Area building to accommodate the final design basis earthquake and final de= sign settlement load will be evaluated. The Board recognizes that the construction and startup of the Salt Waste Processing Facility are key to t= he Implementation Plan for the Board's Recommendation 2001-1, High-Level Waste Management at the Savannah River Site. Hence, the Board proposes that the = Board and DOE senior management work closely to minimize impacts on the high-level wa= ste program. The Board is committ= ed to rapid evaluation of actions taken by DOE and its contractors to resolve geotechnical and structural issues.

When—The geotechnical investigation reports are expected in early 2007. It is not clear when the revised structural evaluation of the Central Process Area building will be accomplished, but this should be done as soon as possible to minimize the impact of any needed building design changes.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—Field work needed for the geotechnical investigation is com= plete. The design basis earthquake h= as been finalized, but not the design 4-25 settlement requirements. While the final geotechnical report= is not expected until summer 2007, sensitivity studies now under way will prov= ide a reasonable path forward for bounding the design settlement requirements. = There is currently adequate informa= tion available to perform the sensitivity studies.

= ;

Structural Evaluation

= ;

Issue—The Central Process Area building is subje= ct to design loads, including natural phenomena hazards and earthquake-induced differential soil settlement effects. Initial reviews of the structural d= esign documentation for this building revealed several significant errors and deficiencies in the structural analysis. The structural layout of the buildi= ng does not provide good structural load paths to accommodate seismic and settlement-induced design loads. There are unexplained anomalies in = the analysis results that experience suggests may be the result of an inappropriate soil= -structure interaction analysis. The structural analysis is not adequate for assessing the capability of the cur= rent building design to safely resist the DOE-specified design loads. Further, the in-structure response spectra resulting from the analysis, which are used for equipment design, a= re not correct.

= ;

The Board's ongoing evaluations also revealed that the contractor was using a version o= f a structural computer code (software) that had not been properly verified fro= m a quality assurance standpoint for the safety-related Central Process Area building s= tructure.

= ;

Safety Significance—The= Central Pr= ocess Area building and a number of systems are classified as safety-significant = to protect workers. A technically defensible basis for analyzing the Central Process Area building must be established to ensure that the facility structure is designed to resist unacceptable damage and that safety-related components would continue to perform their safety function following a design basis event.

= ;

Expectation—DOE will review the structural analysis of the Central Process Area building in detail using experienced structural engineers to verify that the analysis is technically correct. Appropriate soil properties and settlement values from the geotechnical investigation reports (discussed ab= ove) will be used. The project is = at significant risk of requiring a potentially costly building redesign or requiring that = DOE accept the risk of failure of the building under design basis events should the design effort proceed before this and the above geotechnical issue have been resol= ved.

= ;

When—It is not clear at this time wh= en the structural analysis for the Central Process Area building will be redon= e.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—The Board is satisfied with the actions taken by DOE and it= s contractor to resolve issues associated with the design of the Salt Waste Processing F= acility. Appropriate structural design expertise and DOE oversight have been brought to bear on the project.   Changes to the structural design methodology and the structural design have been made. While significant design work remai= ns, the path forward to continue the design process is acceptable. The structural analysis is now expe= cted to be completed in the summer 2007.

= ;

Quality Assurance

= ;

Issue—Several recent quality assurance issues indicate that quality requirements are not being properly implemente= d. The review of calculations was inadequate, unrealistic results predicted by the software being used were n= ot reported, and unapproved prerelease software was used.

= ;

Safety Significance—Ade= quate facility design relies on validated and verified software and correct design calculations. An inadequately designed facility could fail, with significant consequences to workers. Lacking quality assurance, even an = adequate design becomes suspect.

= ;

Expectation—A detailed corrective action pl= an has been developed. DOE will = review this plan used to confirm that it satisfactorily addresses all of the issues raised. The plan will then be implemented with follow-up assessments to ensure that actions taken have be= en effective.

= ;

When—Implementation of corrective actions is under way and is expected to be completed in early 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—The contractor has completed a corrective action program to= address the quality assurance issues. It remains for DOE to verify that the corrective actions taken have been effec= tive. This issue is considered clos= ed but will continue to be followed under the Board's normal oversight.=

= ;

4.7.3        Container Surveillance and Storage Capability Project

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Container Surveillance and Sto= rage Capability project is a major modification within the K-Area Complex at the Savannah River Site that will provide examination, stabilization, and repackaging capabilities for plutonium-bearing materials. These activities ensure that safe s= torage conditions are maintained for material that has been packaged for long-term storage in accordance with DOE-STD-3013, Stabilization, Packaging, and Storage of Plutonium-Bearing Materials. The Container Surveillance and Stor= age Capability project will also provide rack storage for about 1,900 container= s.

= ;

Status of = Facility: Critical Decision-I has been approv= ed. Critical Decision-2A/3A approval, authorizing dismantlement and removal of unneeded hardware from previous op= erations, is expected in early 2007. The design is about 30 percent complete. The facility is expected to be operational in 2010.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues:

= ;

Fire Prote= ction Strategy

= ;

Issue—Project personnel proposed a safety-class fire detection and gaseous suppression system to prevent a rel= ease of material during a fire. Ma= terial containers need to be protected during the interval between fire initiation= and suppression system actuation. The exact duration of this interval is unknown and depends on many factors (e.g= ., fire intensity, smoke properties, detection sensitivity). Project personnel are considering o= ne proposal that would prevent direct flame impingement on the containers. Design effort is currently under wa= y to implement this criterion.

= ;

Safety Significance—Ade= quate protection of containers from fire will ensure safe storage, which protects= the public and workers.

= ;

Expectation—DOE will demonstrate that its f= ire protection strategy protects material containers during a fire. This strategy will include facility design features that provide for timely detection of a fire and actuation of the suppression system and will protect containers during a fire before the suppression system actuates.

= ;

When—Design of the safety-class fire detection and suppression system and facility features to prevent direct fl= ame impingement is under way. The design should reach an appropriate level of maturity for review in mid-2007= .

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —DOE= has directed that the fire detection and suppression system not be designated a= s a safety-class based on their belief that the hazard presented by the activity did not warrant a higher safety classification. The Board is currently evaluating t= he significance of this change.

Preliminary Hazards Analysis

= ;

Issue—The Preliminary Hazards Analysis was recently revised to support the recommended design of the fire protecti= on and ventilation systems. The = Board identified several deficiencies in this document, including failure to address all fac= ility hazards (e.g., loss of rack storage cooling, toxicological hazards from pro= cess gasses) and failure to incorporate DOE guidance on preliminary consequence = calculations supporting the early identification of safety systems.

Safety Significance—The identification of controls derived from a properly developed hazards analys= is will provide adequate protection for the public and workers.

= ;

Expectation—Project personnel will complete= the next revision of the Preliminary Hazards Analysis, which should correct the= se deficiencies.

= ;

When—The next revision of the Preliminary Hazards Analysis should be available in early 2007.<= /span>

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —No significant changes.

= ;

Criticality Safety

=

Issue—Project personnel are requestin= g an exemption from the requirement to provide nuclear incident monitors for the Container Surveillance and Storage Capability project. The justification is based on implementing criticality safety controls that are believed to make a criticality event incredible. Reliance on administrative controls= as part of the justification for not providing nuclear incident monitors is inconsistent with the specified industry criticality standards. This exemption request has not yet = been approved by DOE.

Safety Significance—A r= obust set of controls are needed to prevent inadvertent criticality, which has the potential to result in worker fatalities. Compliance with established standar= ds is an accepted means of demonstrating that controls are adequate.

= ;

Expectation—Project personnel will demonstr= ate that nuclear criticality is not a significant risk with less reliance on administrative controls or will consider including some type of incident detection system (e.g., portable monitors). Relying on administrative controls = is not considered prudent. Further, = some of the proposed administrative controls would be difficult to implement or = have little value.

= ;

When—The criticality safety evaluati= on will be available for review in early 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —The= Board has been told informally that project personnel have decided to include nuc= lear incident monitors into the design. This action would resolve the Board= 's issue when formally documented.

= ;

Design Pro= cess Control

= ;

Issue—Preliminary design is under way= . Major inputs and assumptions being = made in the preliminary design are included throughout multiple safety and design d= ocuments. There is no systematic progra= m to ensure that these items can be tracked and implemented.
= ;

Safety Significance—App= ropriate tracking of design inputs and assumptions ensures that safety-related syste= ms, structures, and components are designed and fabricated properly and will perform their intended safety functions when required.

= ;

Expectation—DOE will demonstrate that there= is a formal, systematic program in place to maintain inputs and assumptions, document their origin, and track them through completion of the design.

= ;

When—No commitment has been made yet= by DOE to address this issue.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—Pro= ject personnel committed to maintain inputs and assumptions, document their orig= in, and track them through completion of the design in a database as part of the facility design and system design descriptions. This should be adequate. The Board considers this issue clos= ed.

= ;

4.7.4        Plutonium Disposition Project

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Plutonium Disposition Project w= ill dispose of up to 13 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium that does not have a dispositio= n path and is not considered by DOE to be suitable for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. DOE pla= ns to locate the process in the subbasement of the K-Reactor facility and will vitrify the plutonium. The pl= an is to transfer the vitrified plutonium cans to the Defense Waste Processing Facility. There, the plutoniu= m is to be surrounded by high-level waste glass and stored onsite awaiting shipm= ent to a monitored geologic repository for final disposition.=

= ;

Status of Facility: The Critical Decisi= on-0 mission need was approved in September 2005. Critical Decision-1A, approved in A= ugust 2006, authorized moving forward with the conceptual design using the can-in-canister (vitrified) alternative. Critical Decision-1 approval is exp= ected in July 2007. The facility is expected to be operational in 2013.

= ;

Status of = Significant Board Issues: The Board has ident= ified no outstanding issues with this project at this time.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—In mid-April 2007, the contractor informed DOE that as the = conceptual design developed, it became apparent that the current project strategy would result in a substantially higher cost estimate for the project. The contractor proposed deferring Critical Decision-1 approval for the project and developing a new conceptual design plan. The contractor believes a more cost-effective approach can be devised. The date for the new conceptual des= ign report has not yet been determined.

= ;

= ;

4.8       Y-12 NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

4.8.1        Highly Enr= iched Uranium Materials Facility

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Highly Enriched Uranium Materia= ls Facility is a new uranium storage facility that will replace multiple aging facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The facili= ty will also permit consolidation of storage locations for uranium to reduce t= he safeguards and security footprint at the site.

= ;

Status of = Facility:<= /span>   The facility design is essent= ially complete. Critical Decision-3= has been approved, and construction of the facility is ongoing. Construction is about 40 percent co= mplete. The facility is expected to be operational in 2009.

= ;

Status of Significant Board Issues: Previous i= ssues have been resolved. The Board has = identified no new issues with this project at this time.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)= —No significant changes.

= ;

4.8.2        Uranium Processing Facility

= ;

Descriptio= n: The Uranium Processing Facility is a n= ew facility proposed to replace many of the aging uranium processing facilitie= s at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The facility will also permit consolidation of processing facilities to reduce the safeguards and security footprint at the site.

= ;

Status of Facility: Critical Decision-0= has been approved. Critical Decis= ion-1 approval is expected in mid-2007. The facility is expected to be operational in 2017.

= ;

Status of Significant Board Issues:

= ;

Preliminary Hazards Analysis Development

= ;

Issue—The draft Preliminary Hazards Analysis does not provide the evaluations necessary to develop the more mature design that would normally be expected. T= he Board is encouraging those responsible for this project to satisfy more mature de= sign principles to meet the new expectations for incorporating safety early in t= he design. Unmitigated consequen= ces for identified hazards and the safety controls needed to mitigate those haz= ards have not been specified. Safe= ty controls are not derived from an analysis of the hazards involved. Design requirements have not been established with the completeness or formality necessary to support the new expectations for safety systems.

= ;

Safety Significance—The material at risk in the Uranium Processing Facility has the potential for significant health consequences to workers and the public. The identification of controls deri= ved from a properly developed hazards analysis is necessary to provide adequate protection for workers and the public.

= ;

Expectation—The revised Preliminary Hazards Analysis will adequately derive safety controls for the hazards posed by the facility.

= ;

When—The Preliminary Hazards Analysi= s is expected to be issued in early 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—DOE developed a draft safety evaluation report for approval= of the Preliminary Hazards Analysis. The safety evaluation report contains an analysis that derived safety controls = from the hazards posed by the facility and identified additional safety controls= to be credited for mitigating those hazards. The Board believes the safety contr= ols identified in the safety evaluation report provide an adequate safety contr= ol set for the Uranium Processing Facility at this point in the design process= . This issue is therefore considered = closed.

= ;

Nonconserv= ative Values for Airborne Release Fraction and Respirable Fraction

= ;

Issue—In developing the Preliminary Hazards Analysis, the project is using an airborne release fraction and respirable fraction for bulk uranium metal that are not consistent with DOE-HDBK-3010, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities<= /i>. Use of the DOE-HDBK-3010 valu= es would require additional safety controls not reflected in the safety basis.<= /o:p>

= ;

Safety Significance—The material at risk in the Uranium Processing Facility has the potential for significant health consequences for workers and the public. The identification of controls deri= ved from a properly developed hazards analysis is necessary to provide adequate protection for workers and the public.

= ;

Expectation—The airborne release and respir= able fraction values used in the Preliminary Hazards Analysis will be revised or justified using a methodology commensurate with deviation from a consensus standard.

= ;

When—The Preliminary Hazards Analysi= s is expected to be issued in early 2007.

= ;

Updated St= atus (2)—The Board identified an additional test report that was provided to DOE for further evaluation of the airborne release fraction and respirable fraction values. D= OE has enlisted an outside expert (who is one of the primary authors of DOE-HDBK-3= 010) to evaluate the new test report, review the existing data, and recommend appropriate values to be used in the hazards analysis. The Board has reviewed the bounding accident analysis supporting the Preliminary Hazards Analysis and believes there are sufficient areas of conservatism to account for potential increas= es in the values to be used. Fur= ther, the project has identified this issue in its risk analysis and management p= lan. Accordingly, the Board believ= es the identified safety controls for mitigation of the hazards in the facility are adequate for this phase of the design process.

= ;

= ;

SITE	FACILITY	TOTAL PROJECT COST ($M)	STATUS	ISSUES (See Text, Sectio= n 4)
Critical Decision Approved	Design Completion<= /o:p>	Construction Completion<= /o:p>
Hanford Site<= /o:p>	Waste Treatment Plant	12,200	<= /span>	<= /span>	*(Operational 2019)*	<= /span>
a.= Pretreatment Facil= ity	<= /span>	CD-3	70%	25%	1. Seismic ground mot= ion 2. Structural enginee= ring 3. Chemical process s= afety
b.= High Level Waste Treatment Facility	<= /span>	CD-3	80%	20%	1. Seismic ground mot= ion 2. Structural enginee= ring 3. Fire protection
c.= Low Activity Waste Facility	<= /span>	CD-3	92%	44%	1. Fire protection
d.= Analytical Laborat= ory Facility	<= /span>	CD-3	86%	37%	1. Fire protection
Demonstration Bulk Vitrification System Project	190	CD-1	95%	Some site and foundation work *(Operational FY 2011)*	1. Confinement strate= gy
K-Basin Closure Project Sludge Treatment Project	100	being evaluated	90%	Starting *(Operational 2008)*	1. Completeness of Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
Tank Retrieval and Waste Feed Delivery System<= /b>	250	One subproject is not using the formal critical decision process=	Various degrees of completion.	Various degrees of completion and operation= s	1. Design pressure ra= ting of waste transfer system
Immobilized High-L= evel Waste Interim Storage Facility	100	CD-3	90%	Deferred *(Operational to be determined)*	No issues
Idaho National Laboratory	Integrated Waste Treatment Unit Project	425	CD-2/3B	75%	Not started *(Operational 2009)*	1. Pilot plant testin= g 2. Waste characteriza= tion 3. Distributed control system design
Los Alamos National Laboratory	Chemistry and Meta= llurgy Research Replacement Project	975	CD-1	70% of preliminary design= 30% of final design	Some ground work *(Operational 2014)*	1. ~~Design –build acquisition strategy~~ — resolved (2) 2. Site characterizat= ion and seismic design 3. ~~Safety-significant active~~ ~~ventilation system~~ 4. Safety-class fire suppression system 5. Safety-class and safety-significant container design
Technical Area-55 Reinvestment Project	72	Phase A:&n= bsp; CD-2 Phase B:&n= bsp; CD-0	60%	*(Complete 2010) (Complete 2014)<= /span>*	No detailed review completed
Upgrades to Pit Manufacturing Capability at Technical Area-55	Annual funding	Not formally implementing critical decision process		Work ongoing	1. Lack of adherence = to DOE Order 413.3A
Radioactive Liquid= Waste Treatment Facility Upgrade Project	96	CD-1		*(Operational 2011)*	No detailed review completed
New Solid Transura= nic Waste Facility Project	40	CD-0	60%	*(Operational 2011)*=	No detailed review completed
Nuclear Material S= afeguards and Security Upgrades Project, Phase 2	240	CD-1	30%	*(Operational 2013)*=	No detailed review completed
Technical Area-55 Radiography Project	38	CD-0	90% on hold	*(Operational 2010)*=	No detailed review completed
Nevada Test Site	Device Assembly Facility—Criticality Experiments Facility<= o:p>	150	CD-2	90%	*(Operational 2011)*	1. Structural cracks<= o:p>
Oak Ridge National Laboratory	Building 3019—Uranium-233 Downblending and Disposition Pro= ject	371	CD-1	90%	*(Operational 2012)*	1. Preliminary Docume= nted Safety Analysis
Pantex Plant	Component Evaluati= on Facility	112	CD-0		*(Operational* *on hold)*	No detailed review completed
Savannah River Sit= e	Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility	1,700	CD-1	50%	*(Operational* *on hold)*	1. Assumption on combustible loading for seismically induced fire
Salt Waste Processing Facility	660 being reevaluated	CD-1	35%	*(Operational* *2011)*	1. Geotechnical investigation 2. Structural evaluat= ion 3. ~~Quality assurance<= /span>~~ - *resolved (2)*=
<= /span>	Container Surveillance and Storage Capability Project=	130	CD-1	30%	Building preparations started *(Operational 2010)*	1. Fire protection st= rategy 2. Preliminary hazards analysis 3. Criticality safety= 4. ~~Design process con= trol~~ - *resolved (2)*
	Plutonium Disposition Project	500	CD-0	10%	Not started *(Operational 2013)*	No issues identifi= ed
Y-12 National Secu= rity Complex	Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility=	500	CD-3	100%	40% *(Operational 2009)*	No issues identifi= ed
Uranium Processing Facility	1,500 being reevaluated	CD-0	10%	*(Operational 2017)*	1. ~~Preliminary hazards analysis development~~ - resolved (2)= 2. Nonconservative ai= rborne release fraction and respirable release fraction values=