[DNFSB
LETTERHEAD]
March 27, 2006
The Honorable Linton Brooks
Administrator
National Nuclear Security
Administration
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-0701
Dear Ambassador Brooks:
In response to a series of incidents
related to conduct of operations at the Pantex Plant last year, the Pantex Site
Office (PXSO) requested that BWXT-Pantex (BWXT) develop a path forward for
improving conduct of operations at the site. The Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) is encouraged to learn that BWXT senior
management has indeed been heavily involved in developing and implementing
improvements in conduct of operations at Pantex. Maintaining intense management attention on
formality of operations is an essential element in ensuring safe and successful
operations.
The Board’s staff has reviewed
the progress made toward improving conduct of operations at Pantex. As documented in the enclosed report, which is
provided for your use as appropriate, the Board’s staff observed significant
variation in the formality demonstrated by production technicians while
conducting nuclear explosive operations. It is essential for all production technicians
to have a clear understanding of plant-wide expectations for formality of operations.
Key mechanisms for reinforcing these
expectations are oversight and mentoring by the BWXT nuclear safety officers (NSOs)
and the PXSO facility representatives (FRs). However, the assignment of NSOs to other tasks
during the past several years has significantly reduced their available time
for performing oversight of conduct of operations. The Board’s staff noted that FRs also have
been assigned other responsibilities during the past 2 years, again decreasing
time spent on oversight functions. The reduced
field presence of NSOs and FRs may have contributed to the uneven formality of
operations observed by the Board’s staff and recent deficiencies in conduct of
operations.
The Board believes the
importance of sustaining a consistent, high degree of formality while conducting
nuclear explosive operations at Pantex cannot be overemphasized. The Board expects to see continued
improvements in the formality of nuclear explosive operations at the site as
the proposed corrective actions are implemented and the process matures.
Sincerely,
A. J. Eggenberger
Chairman
c: The Honorable Jerald S.
Paul
Mr.
Thomas P. D’Agostino
Mr.
Daniel E. Glenn
Mr.
Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
Enclosure
DEFENSE
NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Staff
Issue Report
February
3, 2006
MEMORANDUM
FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical
Director
COPIES: Board Members
FROM: M. Moury
SUBJECT: Conduct of Operations at the
Pantex Plant
This report documents a review
by the staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) regarding
the formality of operations at the Pantex Plant. Staff members A. Matteucci, M. Moury, outside
experts D. Boyd and R. Lewis, and site representatives T. Hunt and D. Kupferer
participated in discussions with site personnel and observed nuclear explosive operations
during the week of December 5, 2005. This review was supplemented by a follow-up teleconferences
with representatives of the contractor and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s
(NNSA) Pantex
Site Office (PXSO) on December 14, 2005 and February 17, 2006.
Background. During
the last several years, the Board has been closely following the formality with
which operations are performed in defense nuclear facilities at the site. In a May 2, 2005, letter to NNSA,
the Board described
continuing deficiencies with conduct of operations at Pantex. At that time, the Board noted that evaluations
conducted after the Board’s October 2001 letter raising these issues indicated
improvements had been made, particularly with respect to procedural compliance.
However, numerous events during the
March-April 2005 time frame renewed the Board’s concern.
During summer 2005, in response
to issues raised by the Board and similar issues identified by PXSO,
BWXT-Pantex (BWXT) developed an improvement plan (IP) for conduct of operations
and completed a causal analysis. The IP
included the following corrective actions:
Manufacturing Division management changes; redefinition of critique
leadership and timeliness; more consistency in log book entries; revision of
the Conduct of Operations Manual; and reemphasizing of management's
expectations of production section managers (PSMs), the first-line supervisors.
Conduct
of Operations Continuous Improvement Plan (CIP). The
Manufacturing Division Manager and Deputy Division Manager demonstrated clear
support for improving conduct of operations and presented a number of
initiatives, under development or in the early stages of implementation,
designed to address identified weaknesses. In September 2005, BWXT claimed completion of
a number of the planned actions from the IP for conduct of operations and
submitted the first iteration of the enduring CIP. The CIP captured remaining open items from the
superseded IP and several corrective actions resulting from the causal analysis.
Key initiatives include the
following:
·
Establishment
of a conduct-of-operations improvement team comprising various subject matter
experts, and including participation by the production technicians (PTs).
·
Assignment
of roles and responsibilities to PSMs for overseeing the safety and quality of
the PTs’ work.
·
Re-emphasis
of the responsibility of nuclear safety officers (NSOs) for routine surveillance
and coaching of PTs in conduct of operations.
·
Implementation
of an event fact sheet process to provide a first report of Manufacturing
Division events within 2 hours of discovery, and subsequently to be shared with
other Manufacturing Division personnel.
·
Implementation
of an operational concerns program to solicit reporting of issues, problems,
suggestions, and concerns that affect production processes recently implemented.
·
Training
of PSMs on conservative decision making and authorization basis documentation,
as well as hands-on training related to specific weapon programs.
In general, the CIP appears to
be a logical approach to addressing the deficiencies identified by the Board
and NNSA. However; many of the corrective
actions are not yet mature, and their effectiveness remains to be seen.
Observations
and Opportunities for Improvement. Key
observations resulting from the staffs review include the following:
·
BWXT
management is applying appropriate attention and resources to this issue. This focus must continue.
·
Expectations
for conduct of operations are not being consistently communicated or reinforced.
The result is wide variation in the
level of formality of nuclear explosive operations.
·
Contractor
and NNSA oversight of conduct of operations has been significantly reduced
during the last few years because of competing priorities, with no compensatory
measures having been taken.
·
Validation
and closure of corrective actions in the IP lack definition and rigor.
Formality
of Operations―Ensuring a high level of formality
during nuclear explosive operations is probably the single most important
element in improving conduct of operations at Pantex. The staff evaluated the formality of
operations at the site by observing several operations in which PTs utilized
critical-use procedures to perform nuclear explosive disassembly operations
during both day and graveyard shifts. The observed operations varied significantly
in the formality demonstrated by the PTs. W76 day shift operations were characterized by
crisp, formal communications and actions for directing, repeating back, performing,
and reporting completion of each step. These characteristics contrasted with those of
other operations. Expectations for
acceptable conduct, or the desired level of formality, are not being applied
consistently by the PSMs and the PTs throughout all shifts and programs.
BWXT Line
Management and Oversight―BWXT
management has assigned a significant amount of responsibility to the NSOs for
providing oversight and technical support to production personnel in an effort
to improve the formality of nuclear explosive operations. However, assignment of NSOs to other tasks
during the past few years has significantly reduced the time available for them
to observe and identify deficiencies in conduct of operations. According to Manual-00078, Manufacturing
Administrative Manual, the primary role of NSOs is surveillance of conduct of
operations and mentoring or coaching of PSMs and PTs through immediate feedback
on issues or findings. In addition to
their lack of observation time, it is not clear that all the NSOs have the
necessary knowledge and experience to perform effective oversight of conduct of
operations. The staff’s review of NSO
backgrounds indicated a wide variation in education and experience. A gap analysis would identify any additional
training needed for the NSOs to adequately accomplish their responsibilities.
The PSMs monitor operations and
are available to the PTs to resolve operational problems. Training and qualification of the PSMs are
undergoing changes, with the goal of providing the PSMs with more hands-on
experience and training sessions focused specifically on critical decision
making and authorization basis controls. If the PSMs role as line managers is to be
adequately supported, weapon-specific training for PSMs should also be a high
priority.
Trainer
Units―Mock-up weapon trainer units are
used by production technicians during weapon disassembly and assembly training
exercises. In addition, the trainer
units are used to demonstrate proposed operations to both local and external
review teams prior to the authorization of nuclear explosive operations. Poor fidelity of trainer units for several
weapon systems is a long-standing issue at Pantex. BWXT and nuclear explosive safety review teams
have repeatedly identified fidelity problems with trainer units. This weakness was identified again in the
conduct-of-operations causal analysis. In a recent teleconference, BWXT presented the
status of all trainers at Pantex. Some
units are no longer adequate for training and testing of personnel on nuclear
weapon operations. As an example, during
the W87 Nuclear Explosive Safety study, demonstrations were halted several times
due to badly worn and damaged parts that have no replacement spares. Barriers to improving the fidelity of trainer
units include funding shortfalls, nonavailability of
some parts, and unsuitability of some parts for continuous training use. While some actions are being taken to address
this issue, many of the problems appeared to be accepted, with no
identification of meaningful corrective actions being apparent.
PXSO Oversight―During
the past 2 years, the PXSO facility representatives (FRs) have also been
assigned responsibilities associated with verification of the implementation of
authorization basis controls. These
duties have apparently decreased the FRs’ availability for observing operations
in the field to less than 20 percent of their time. There appeared to be no compensatory measures
instituted to offset this reduced presence of the FRs in the field. The reduced oversight presence of both the FRs
and NSOs may have contributed to the observed degradation in formality of
operations at Pantex. PXSO management
committed verbally to developing plans to devote more NNSA
resources to
observing operations in the facilities at the site.
It was apparent during the staff’s
review that PXSO management has not been actively engaged in tracking the
appropriateness or effectiveness of BWXT’s corrective actions for deficiencies
in conduct of operations. Subsequent to
this review, PXSO management discussed with the staff both short- and long-term
plans to resolve these deficiencies. PXSO committed to applying additional NNSA
resources to
evaluation of the effectiveness of the contractor’s actions to improve conduct
of operations.