[SOE LETTERHEAD]
July 11, 2005
The Honorable Richard B. Cheney
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. President:
We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South Carolina. This report
was mandated by Congress
in Section 3183
of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314). Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Board)
conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah River Site for the storage of plutonium, and
that it submit to
Congress and the
Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress
further mandated
in Section 3183 that
not later than six months after the
Board’s report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the Secretary and
the Board
each submit to Congress,
a report on the actions taken by the Secretary in
response to
proposals in the report.
The Board submitted its report, “Plutonium Storage
at the
Department of Energy’s
Savannah River
Site,” both
to Congress and the Secretary of Energy
by letters dated December 1, 2003.
Our first report on the actions being taken
by the Department of Energy in response to the eight proposals contained in the
report was submitted
to Congress by letters dated June 16, 2004.
Our second report is enclosed. Since
submission of our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for disposition of
excess plutonium at the
Savannah River Site;
(2) completed a revised
study of
plutonium storage options at the site; (3) determined
that unnecessary combustibles
will be removed
from the K-Area Material Storage facility, and (4) decided
not to utilize Building
235-F
for extended storage of plutonium
or for future
stabilization and packaging operations.
If you need additional
information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L. Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
at (202) 586-5450.
Sincerely,
Samuel W. Bodman
Enclosure
[SOE LETTERHEAD]
July 11, 2005
The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert
Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South Carolina. This report
was mandated by Congress
in Section 3183
of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314). Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Board)
conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah River Site for the storage of plutonium, and
that it submit to
Congress and the
Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress
further mandated
in Section 3183 that
not later than six months after the
Board’s report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the Secretary and
the Board
each submit to Congress,
a report on the actions taken by the Secretary in
response to
proposals in the report.
The Board submitted its report, “Plutonium Storage
at the
Department of Energy’s
Savannah River
Site,” both
to Congress and the Secretary of Energy
by letters dated December 1, 2003.
Our first report on the actions being taken
by the Department of Energy in response to the eight proposals contained in the
report was submitted
to Congress by letters dated June 16, 2004.
Our second report is enclosed. Since
submission of our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for disposition of
excess plutonium at the
Savannah River Site;
(2) completed a revised
study of
plutonium storage options at the site; (3) determined
that unnecessary combustibles
will be removed
from the K-Area Material Storage facility, and (4) decided
not to utilize Building
235-F
for extended storage of plutonium
or for future
stabilization and packaging operations.
If you need additional
information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L. Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
at (202) 586-5450.
Sincerely,
Samuel W. Bodman
Enclosure
[SOE LETTERHEAD]
July 11, 2005
The Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South Carolina. This report
was mandated by Congress
in Section 3183
of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314). Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Board)
conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah River Site for the storage of plutonium, and
that it submit to
Congress and the
Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress
further mandated
in Section 3183 that
not later than six months after the
Board’s report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the Secretary and
the Board
each submit to Congress,
a report on the actions taken by the Secretary in
response to
proposals in the report.
The Board submitted its report, “Plutonium Storage
at the
Department of Energy’s
Savannah River
Site,” both
to Congress and the Secretary of Energy
by letters dated December 1, 2003.
Our first report on the actions being taken
by the Department of Energy in response to the eight proposals contained in the
report was submitted
to Congress by letters dated June 16, 2004.
Our second report is enclosed. Since
submission of our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for disposition of
excess plutonium at the
Savannah River Site;
(2) completed a revised
study of
plutonium storage options at the site; (3) determined
that unnecessary combustibles
will be removed
from the K-Area Material Storage facility, and (4) decided
not to utilize Building
235-F
for extended storage of plutonium
or for future
stabilization and packaging operations.
If you need additional
information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L. Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
at (202) 586-5450.
Sincerely,
Samuel W. Bodman
Enclosure
cc w/enclosure: The Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Minority Member
[SOE LETTERHEAD]
July 11, 2005
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South Carolina. This report
was mandated by Congress
in Section 3183
of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314). Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Board)
conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah River Site for the storage of plutonium, and
that it submit to
Congress and the
Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress
further mandated
in Section 3183 that
not later than six months after the
Board’s report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the Secretary and
the Board
each submit to Congress,
a report on the actions taken by the Secretary in
response to
proposals in the report.
The Board submitted its report, “Plutonium Storage
at the
Department of Energy’s
Savannah River
Site,” both
to Congress and the Secretary of Energy
by letters dated December 1, 2003.
Our first report on the actions being taken
by the Department of Energy in response to the eight proposals contained in the
report was submitted
to Congress by letters dated June 16, 2004.
Our second report is enclosed. Since
submission of our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for disposition of
excess plutonium at the
Savannah River Site;
(2) completed a revised
study of
plutonium storage options at the site; (3) determined
that unnecessary combustibles
will be removed
from the K-Area Material Storage facility, and (4) decided
not to utilize Building
235-F
for extended storage of plutonium
or for future
stabilization and packaging operations.
If you need additional
information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L. Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs,
at (202) 586-5450.
Sincerely,
Samuel W. Bodman
Enclosure
cc w/enclosure: The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Minority Member
Second Report to Congress
On Actions
Taken by the Department of Energy
In Response
to the
Proposals in the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s
December 2003
Report to Congress on
Plutonium Storage at the
Savannah River Site
Department of Energy
June 2005
Report
to Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of Energy in Response to
the Proposals in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board’s December 2003
Report
to Congress on Plutonium Storage at the Savannah River Site
Introduction
Section 3183 of the Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314) directed that the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) conduct a study of the adequacy of the
K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility and related support facilities at the
Savannah River Site (SRS), such as Building 235-F, for the storage of defense
plutonium and defense plutonium materials. That statute also required that the Board
submit to Congress and the Secretary of Energy a report on that study,
including any proposals the Board considers appropriate to enhance the safety,
reliability, and functionality of KAMS. Congress further mandated in Section 3 183
that not later than six months after the Board’s report is submitted to Congress,
and every year thereafter, the Secretary and the Board each submit to Congress
a report on the actions taken by the Secretary in response to the proposals, if
any, included in the report.
The Board submitted its report,
“Plutonium Storage at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site,” both to
Congress and the Secretary by letters dated December 1, 2003. That report presented conclusions of the
Board’s study, and identified several proposals for enhancing the safety,
reliability, and functionality of plutonium storage facilities at SRS.
This report is the second one
submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Energy on the actions being taken by
the Department of Energy (DOE) in response to the proposals contained in the
Board’s December 2003 report on plutonium storage at SRS.
Board’s Proposals
The Board’s December 2003 report
contains eight proposals; two on the plutonium disposition program, five on the
suitability of facilities (one on KAMS and four on Building 235-F), and one on
remote monitoring and retrieval of material. Those proposals are listed below.
Plutonium Disposition
Program
- Expedite the development of a complete, well-considered plan for the disposition of all excess plutonium to preclude unnecessary extended storage of plutonium at SRS.
- Conduct a new study of available options for the storage of plutonium at SRS.
Suitability of Facilities
KAMS
- Install fire protection systems and eliminate unnecessary combustibles in KAMS.
Building
235-F
- Establish an acceptable safety basis for stabilization and packaging of plutonium and extended storage of plutonium in the facility.
- Conduct a systematic evaluation of the safety systems to determine needed upgrades.
- Perform a structural analysis assessing seismic adequacy measured by current acceptance criteria. Since the facility has a new extended mission, the structural analysis should be based on ground motion equivalent to that used in the analysis for a new facility at SRS.
- Decontaminate unused process cells.
Remote Monitoring and
Retrieval of Material
- Develop and implement validated procedures for the handling and intrasite shipment of plutonium containers, including damaged containers.
Status of Actions Taken by DOE
in Response to the Board’s Proposals
Plutonium Disposition
Program
Board Proposal: Expedite
the development of a complete, well-considered plan for the disposition of all
excess plutonium to preclude unnecessary extended storage of plutonium at SRS.
DOE Actions: In
order to preclude unnecessary extended storage of plutonium at SRS, DOE plans
to establish a disposition path for all plutonium at the site. A Critical Decision-0 (CD-0) package for a
plutonium vitrification project at SRS has been prepared, pursuant to DOE Order
413.3, “Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets.” This Order describes the normal process that
DOE uses for managing capital projects, and an appropriate National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review would be performed as part of the
project.
The proposed project would
establish the capability in the 105-K facility to prepare for disposition of
the plutonium at SRS that is not suitable for use in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel (and,
if necessary or desired, plutonium that is MOXable)
by vitrifying it in lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glass. In addition, this project is being sized to
vitrify additional plutonium in the event that further plutonium consolidation
occurs. The small containers of LaBS
glass would then be placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canisters
and filled with high-level waste glass in a manner that would permit disposal
at the geologic repository planned for construction at Yucca Mountain. The Department is also working to include LaBS
glass in the license application it is currently developing for Yucca Mountain.
The proposed plutonium vitrification
process includes the activities described below.
Oxidation: Oxidation receives DOE-STD-3013 containers
with plutonium metal from storage. The
plutonium metal is converted to an oxide in Direct Metal Oxidation Furnaces and
the resultant oxide is packaged in convenience cans. The output from Oxidation is transport cans of
oxide that are sent to Feed Preparation.
Feed Preparation: Feed Preparation receives 3013 containers of
oxide from storage and transport cans of oxide from Oxidization. The output from Feed Preparation is batching cans
with 2 kg of
crushed/screened oxide, with a particle diameter less than 1 mm, that are sent
to Milling/Mixing.
Milling/Mixing: The Milling/Mixing process step combines the
plutonium feed with LaBS glass frit. Milling/Mixing is accomplished using an
attritor mill to produce the necessary particle size to ensure dissolution and
incorporation of the plutonium into the glass and a homogenous mixture. The resulting mix is loaded into melter batch
cans and sent to Vitrification. Plutonium oxide feed is received into the
Milling/Mix glovebox from the Feed Preparation glovebox.
Vitrification: In Vitrification the Plutonium feed/LaBS frit
mixture is vitrified into glass cans using a Cylindrical Induction Melter (CIM).
The CIM is a compact, high temperature
(1600°C capability)
melter. A Platinum/Rhodium (Pt/Rh) vessel
is used to contain the melt and a Pt/Rh drain tube is used to discharge the
molten glass. The resultant glass cans
are transported to Bagless Transfer.
Bagless Transfer: The Bagless Transfer allows the glass can to
be removed from the glovebox in a non-contaminated state by emplacing the glass
can in a bagless transfer can. The
bagless transfer system previously utilized in FB-line is expected to be the
basis for the bagless transfer system for the plutonium vitrification effort. The bagless transfer cans are transported to
Magazine/Loading/Storage, Canister Load/Ship.
Magazine Loading/Storage,
Canister Load/Ship:
The Magazine Loading/Storage, Canister
Load/Ship receives bagless transfer cans, assembles
cans into magazines, stores magazines, and assembles can-in-canister assemblies
that are suitable for filling with high-level waste (HLW) glass in DWPF.
DWPF Modifications: Specific modifications to DWPF will be
required to allow for receipt and handling of can-in-canister assemblies. The can-in-canister assemblies differ from
typical DWPF canisters in that they contain significant quantities of special
nuclear
material, emit a significant amount of
radiation, and weigh significantly more.
Safeguards measures, including the potential use of a protective force,
will be necessary for receipt and movement of the can-in-canister assemblies. Specific shielding and/or remote operation
measures will be required to handle the canisters. Due to the weight of the can-in-canister
assembly, modifications to existing canister handling equipment (loading dock,
forklift, crane, etc.) will likely be required.
Non-Nuclear Material Handling: Non-Nuclear Material Handling provides for the
receipt and storage of non-radioactive materials and containers used in the
process. A storage building outside of
the Security Area will be provided to facilitate off-site vendor receipts. This building will supply approximately a one
month supply of materials, and will provide the space needs as well as storage
level requirements for the materials.
Waste Handling/Loading: The Waste Handling/Loading handles waste
generated from this process. This
activity removes waste from the generation point, performs the appropriate
measurements, packages waste, and prepares waste for shipment to the disposal
location.
Balance of Plant: The Balance of Plant makes up the support
functions required by the plutonium vitrification process and administrative
support.
It is believed this plutonium
vitrification process is very promising, and is estimated that if Conceptual
Design begins in fiscal year 2006 (congressional approval is required, since the
cost of Conceptual Design is estimated to be greater than $3 million), the
capability can be operational in time to complete vitrification of all surplus
non-pit plutonium currently at SRS and placement of the vitrified plutonium into
DWPF canisters consistent with the current schedule to complete operation of
DWPF. The Department’s fiscal year 2006
budget request to Congress includes $10 million to begin Conceptual Design for the
project.
Board Proposal: Conduct
a new study of available options for the storage of plutonium at SRS.
DOE Actions: In
July 2004 the Department completed an update of the previous study of SRS
plutonium storage. Based on the
assumptions used to prepare that study revision, the July 2004 update supported
continued use of KAMS and Building 235-F for plutonium storage, pending
disposition utilizing the vitrification capability described above. However, subsequent to completion of the study
update, Design Basis Threat (DBT) Guidance was again revised in October 2004. As a result of that substantial increase in
security requirements, and based on the potential safety issues associated with
the use of Building 235-F that have been identified by the Defense Board and
its staff, DOE has now decided to utilize only Building 105-K for storage of
plutonium and for future stabilization and packaging operations. Building 235-F will be deinventoried
of all plutonium-239 by the end of 2006 in order to avoid the expenditure of
significant funding to bring the facility’s security into compliance with the
new DBT Guidance and that
would be required to make the safety
upgrades necessary to allow continued use of the facility. Since the Department has no near-term plans to
ship additional plutonium to SRS and the July 2004 update of the SRS plutonium
storage facility study also included an option to consolidate the missions of
KAMS and Building 235-F by modifying the Building 105-K facility to include
functions that were proposed for Building 235-F, there is no need at this time
to further revise the July 2004 update of the SRS plutonium storage study.
Suitability of Facilities
KAMS
Board Proposal: Install
fire protection systems and eliminate unnecessary combustibles in KAMS.
DOE Actions: Given
the currently planned life of KAMS, the cable combustible load in the actuator
tower above the facility will be removed at the earliest opportunity, thus eliminating
unnecessary combustibles. Additionally,
based on ongoing evaluations incorporating the recent change in strategy to
utilize only Building 105-K for plutonium storage, stabilization and packaging,
a determination will be made by the end of August 2005 regarding installation
of fire detection and suppression capability in and around KAMS.
Building 235-F
Board Proposal: Establish
an acceptable safety basis for stabilization and packaging of plutonium and
extended storage of plutonium in the facility.
DOE Actions: As
stated previously, Building 235-F will be deinventoried
by the end of 2006; it will not be used to store plutonium-239 beyond then nor
will it be used for stabilization or packaging of plutonium. Therefore, all proposals related to Building
235- F in the Board’s December 2003 report to Congress on plutonium storage at
SRS are considered closed.
Board Proposal: Conduct
a systematic evaluation of the safety systems to determine needed upgrades.
DOE Actions: All
proposals related to Building 235-F in the Board’s December 2003 report to
Congress on plutonium storage at SRS are considered closed, as stated above.
Board Proposal: Perform
a structural analysis assessing seismic adequacy measured by current acceptance
criteria. Since the facility has a new
extended mission, the structural analysis should be based on ground motion
equivalent to that used in the analysis for a new facility at SRS.
DOE Actions: All
proposals related to Building 235-F in the Board’s December 2003 report to
Congress on plutonium storage at SRS are considered closed, as stated above.
Board Proposal: Decontaminate
unused process cells.
DOE Actions: All
proposals related to Building 235-F in the Board’s December 2003 report to
Congress on plutonium storage at SRS are considered closed, as stated above.
(Note that the holdup material
in the process cells will be removed or immobilized as part of the
decontamination and decommissioning effort that will take place following deinventory
of Building 235-F.)
Remote Monitoring and
Retrieval of Material
Board Proposal: Develop
and implement validated procedures for the handling and intrasite shipment of
plutonium containers, including damaged containers.
DOE Actions: In
its June 2004 first annual report to Congress on SRS plutonium storage, the
Board stated that DOE has completed all necessary actions concerning this proposal
and this action is considered closed.