[DNFSB
LETTERHEAD]
February 14, 2005
Mr. Paul M. Golan
Acting Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-0113
Dear Mr. Golan:
In November 2004, the staff of
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) reviewed procedures for
responding to fires at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) at the Hanford Site.
PFP is in transition from nuclear
materials stabilization operations to deactivation and decommissioning
(D&D), although packaged plutonium metal and oxide remain stored in its vaults.
The Board’s staff reviewed PFP
procedures for fire response to determine whether they would adequately address
a scenario similar to the May 2003 fire in Glovebox 8 in Building 371 at the
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). The staff’s conclusions are summarized in the
enclosed report. Based upon the staffs
review, the Board concludes that PFP’s procedures for fire response do not
reflect the lessons learned from the fire at RFETS and are not optimized for
the conditions likely to be encountered in a D&D environment.
The Board’s staff also found
that the Department of Energy (DOE) has promulgated guidance that could help
ensure a safe and effective response to a fire during D&D work, but that this
guidance does not appear to have been implemented effectively at PFP. The Board notes that DOE’s letter of February
3, 2004, which provided an interim response to the Board’s letter on the
Glovebox 8 fire at RFETS, committed to conducting an independent study of fires
involving radioactive materials across the defense nuclear complex. The Board understands that this effort was not
successful. The Board believes it would
be worthwhile to renew this initiative, with a focus on evaluating prefire
planning and fire response procedures/training for facilities that are either
transitioning to or undergoing D&D. It would also be advisable for DOE to consider
whether improved guidance or a technical standard is needed to better address
fire protection in such facilities.
The Board requests, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286b(d), that DOE brief the
Board within 60 days of receipt of this letter on its response to the issues
and suggestions raised herein and in the enclosed staff report. This briefing should also address the failings
in feedback and improvement which led to the incomplete implementation of
lessons learned from the RFETS fire.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c: Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
Mr.
Keith A. Klein
Enclosure
DEFENSE
NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Staff
Issue Report
February
2, 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: H. W. Massie
SUBJECT: Fire Response Procedures,
Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant
This report summarizes a review
by members of the staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board)
of procedures for responding to fires at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) at
the Hanford Site. This review was
performed during a visit to the Hanford Site in November 2004. PFP is in transition from nuclear materials
stabilization operations to deactivation and decommissioning (D&D),
although packaged plutonium metal and oxide remain stored in its vaults. This report also summarizes a review of
Department of Energy (DOE) directives and standards relevant to fire response
for facilities in transition to or undergoing D&D, performed subsequent to
the staffs visit to the Hanford Site.
Background. On December 2, 2003, the Board issued a letter to the
Secretary of Energy summarizing issues associated with the May 2003 fire in
Glovebox 8 in Building 371 at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS).
In addition to identifying broad deficiencies
in the implementation of Integrated Safety Management for D&D work at RFETS,
the Board’s letter and the enclosed staff reports noted deficiencies regarding
preparedness for the fire and the D&D workers’ response to the fire. The prefire plan for a glovebox fire focused
on such hazards as burning plutonium metal instead of the potential for a
significant fire involving combustible wastes from glovebox decontamination
work. The D&D workers engaged in a concerted
effort to extinguish the fire, in violation of site procedures and training
dictating that workers in air-fed anticontamination suits (“bubble suits”) must
evacuate the scene of a fire. In response
to the Board’s letter, the DOE pursued extensive corrective actions at RFETS, including
improvements in prefire planning and retraining of D&D workers in the
proper response to fires.
PFP Procedures for Fire
Response. In light of the issues
identified at RFETS, the Board’s staff reviewed the following PFP procedures to
evaluate whether PFP was prepared to respond properly to a fire similar to the
Glovebox 8 fire at RFETS:
The first three procedures
appear to apply primarily to bulk plutonium operations, such as stabilization
of plutonium metal and oxide, and have not been revised to account for the
hazards associated with D&D activities. While the first two of the above procedures
are clear in stating that if personnel see an immediate danger to life or
health, they must evacuate the area and notify the Hanford Fire Department and
the Building Emergency Director, neither encompasses the case of burning
plutonium-contaminated waste materials, such as those involved in the Glovebox 8
fire at RFETS. There are also
discussions of response to burning plutonium metal and use of a “bayonet”-type
fire extinguisher to penetrate a glove of the glovebox to extinguish a
plutonium fire which do not apply to D&D activities. Glovebox procedure ZCR-015 needs to be revised
to address fire scenarios for D&D activities within gloveboxes. This would include topics such as emphasizing
the need for workers to evacuate the immediate area and call the fire
department, before engaging in any other activities, in response to a real or
suspected fire. It should also explain
under what conditions a worker can use a fire extinguisher. The PFP procedures for fire response do not
specifically address the proper response by D&D workers in air-fed
anticontamination suits or other unique personal protective equipment. PFP procedures should explain
that these D&D workers must immediately evacuate the area and may only use
fire extinguishers to extinguish clothing or personal protective equipment, or
to assist in the safe evacuation of the work area.
The fourth procedure above is
for the firefighters and addresses a variety of topics related to fighting
fires in radiological areas. This
procedure, like the others, does not address unique conditions that the fire
department may encounter in a D&D environment, due to the changing
conditions in the facility. Some of the
topics that need to be addressed include details of the incident command
structure (who is in charge) and how information such as the potential for
criticality is communicated to the incident commander. One of the lessons learned at RFETS was that
the use of water by the fire department to extinguish a fire can be expedited
by establishing ahead of time whether criticality is a concern for a particular
area of the building or glovebox, based upon valid estimates of fissile
material loading.
Standards for Fire Response.
The staff reviewed DOE directives and standards to assess
whether they adequately address fire response for facilities in transition to
or undergoing decommissioning. The
introduction to DOE Standard 1120-98,
Integration
of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities, states that it “provides
guidance for integrating and enhancing worker, public, and environmental
protection during facility disposition activities.” There is no specific
discussion of fire protection issues, even though fire remains a significant
hazard through all phases of a facility’s life cycle.
DOE Order 420.1A, Facility Safety, does not directly address
D&D facilities. However, DOE Guide G-420.1/B-0, Implementation Guide for
Use with DOE Orders 420.I and 440.I, Fire Safety Program, provides useful guidance
regarding the need for personnel from the fire department and the fire
protection engineering staff to perform routine inspection of facilities undergoing
D&D, and for fire department personnel to tour D&D facilities to remain
familiar with existing conditions and revalidate prefire plans. The guide also suggests conducting drills and
training exercises at D&D facilities at a frequency commensurate with the
fire risks and complexity of the facility. This guidance appears sound. The staff’s observations at RFETS and PFP,
however, indicate that this guidance is not being implemented effectively. More specific guidance or more prescriptive
requirements may be appropriate to ensure that defense nuclear facilities are
better prepared for the potential of a fire during D&D.
Conclusions. Based upon this review, the Board’s staff concludes that
revising fire response procedures and prefire planning at PFP to reflect the
lessons learned at RFETS would improve the ability of D&D workers and
firefighting personnel to respond safely and effectively to a fire similar to
the Glovebox 8 fire at RFETS.
In a letter dated February 3,
2004, responding to the Board’s letter on the Glovebox 8 fire at RFETS, DOE
discussed interim corrective actions being pursued at RFETS and committed to conducting
an independent study of fires involving radioactive materials across the
defense nuclear complex. The Board’s
staff understands that this effort was not successful. Based on its observations at PFP, the staff
believes it would be worthwhile to renew this initiative, with a focus on
evaluating whether prefire planning, fire response procedures, and training
have been updated to reflect facility conditions and hazards associated with
D&D work for facilities either transitioning to or undergoing D&D. It would also be advisable for DOE to evaluate
the need for improved guidance or a technical standard addressing fire protection
in such facilities.