[DOE
LETTERHEAD]
The Honorable John T. Conway
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The purpose of this letter is to provide an
interim status on the actions taken in response to your letter to Secretary
Abraham of
Specific to your
Kaiser-Hill has also initiated multiple
independent assessments to address technical questions related to the fire
event, and also programmatic issues regarding Integrated Safety Management. Although considerable progress has been made
in sixty days, the full causal analysis and corrective action plan development
process is not complete. Although not
yet complete, I am including the Kaiser-Hill response to the RFPO as part of this
interim response to your letter. Similarly, the RFPO causal analysis and
corrective action plan is included.
Programmatic weaknesses have been identified
that infiltrated the RFPO oversight program and inhibited their ability to
provide an effective and appropriate degree of safety oversight: These
weaknesses were manifest in the form of reduced quantity of technical
assessments, degraded formality of oversight (i.e., modes of communicating
issues, tracking issues and corrective actions, etc.), and the lack of a
comprehensive assessment plan. In
addition, our approach to improving the implementation of the RFETS work
control process was flawed. Although the
site made conscientious efforts to meet the commitment to the Board regarding
work control, the methodology employed proved to be ineffective. The corrective actions delineated in the
enclosure are focused on correcting programmatic issues that have implications
for site activities through closure, rather than the specific symptoms, and
will result in improved RFPO safety oversight. Likewise, the Kaiser-Hill corrective action
plan satisfies the expectations in that it is built from a top-down philosophy
looking ahead to project completion, and firmly commits senior management to
reinforce and strengthen the safety culture at the site.
On a broader level, an independent review
team has been chartered to identify and examine Department of Energy (DOE) wide
events associated with fires involving radioactive materials. The objective is to understand what factors
contribute to the occurrences of these tires as well as the Department’s
performance at taking effective corrective action to prevent these types of
occurrences.
Additionally, based on the very powerful
insights we have already gained from review of the Rocky Flats fire we are
reinforcing our oversight of contractor’s activities. We require significant events to be reported
to the Acting Chief Operation Officer on a real time basis. Each event is discussed with the field manager
to ensure a thorough review and follow up. The Safety Metrics we have identified for
monitoring are tracked and discussed with all the field managers on a weekly
basis. Complex wide trends are reviewed.
Additionally, each DOE field manager
reporting to me has signed up to performance expectations that require and
average of eight hours per week in the facilities. Each field manager has also agreed to safety
improvements tailored to their specific site and performance issues. The recent reorganization has helped to strengthen
the ability of Headquarters to provide oversight.
We will continue to keep the Board staff
informed of progress being made on the actions addressing your concerns. Also, the Department will provide the final response
to your
Sincerely,
Jessie Hill Roberson
Assistant Secretary
for Environmental Management
Enclosures (3)
(1)
Corrective
Action Plan for Self-Assessment and Causal Analysis of Safety Oversight Program
(2)
RFPO
Self-Assessment and Causal Analysis of the Safety Oversight Program
(3)
Kaiser-Hill
Comprehensive Corrective Action Plan
cc:
Mark Whitaker, DR-1
Frazier Lockhart,
RFPO