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Nuclear Material Control and Accountability: DOE M 470.4-6, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, was issued on August 26, 2005, and page changes were issued to that manual as Change 1 on August 8, 2006. The most frequently asked questions concern credible roll-up and tritium, which are answered briefly below.

Q: What are Technical Standards?

A: Technical standards are developed and adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities as determined by the agencies and departments.

Q: Why are we making a technical standard for MC&A?

A: This technical standard on Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) is being developed to provide site facilities with an accepted means of meeting the performance objectives and metrics specified in the policy requirements for MC&A.

Q: What is the purpose of an MC&A plan?

A: MC&A plans can serve as a planning document for the facility to use in carrying out its MC&A program and budgeting for its operations. Additionally, MC&A plans have several purposes:

1) Providing documentation to DOE/NNSA about how facilities will operate their MC&A programs, MC&A plans are required by DOE M 470.4-6, Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability, for all facilities possessing nuclear materials, and represent commitments by the facility to DOE/NNSA to operate their MC&A program as described in the plans or to standards exceeding the requirements of the plans. As such, facilities can be audited or inspected by DOE offices or programs against the plans;

2) Establishing specific authorities and responsibilities for MC&A functions (e.g. accounting systems, measurements, measurement control, inventories, internal reviews, access controls, and material surveillance.);

3) Describing local implementation of DOE 470.4-6, at the facility, and how facility MC&A programs meet the requirements of that directive; and

4) Documenting facility specific requirements approved by the DOE cognizant security authority, including but not limited to the scope and extent of performance testing, measurement requirements for internal transfers, parameters for statistical sampling plans for physical inventories, frequency and scope of internal reviews of MC&A programs, and extensions to inventory frequencies. Ideally, all locally approved requirements will be addressed in the MC&A plan.

Q: Who approves MC&A plans?

A: DOE M 470.4-6 requires that a specific DOE cognizant security authority (which could be the site security director, site manager or MC&A program manager depending on formal delegation) be designated as the DOE approving authority for MC&A plans, activities, and documents - including the MC&A plan, but does not specify who the approving authority should be. Program and site offices decide at what level of their organization MC&A approval authorities should reside based upon their resources and management structure. More generally, DOE O 470.4A designates the Departmental Under Secretaries as the overall cognizant security authorities for their organizations, and allows them to delegate those authorities to lower level DOE/NNSA officials. The delegations of authority are required to be in writing, and should be addressed in documents describing program functions, responsibilities, and authorities.

Q: What are Reporting Identification Symbols (RISs) and how are they used?

A: RISs are three or four letter codes assigned to DOE offices and contractors that possess nuclear materials, as well as NRC office and licensees that possess these materials. RISs for DOE offices and contractors are assigned by the Office of Information Management, HS-1.22. RISs for NRC offices and Licensees are assigned by the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Security. They are used for reporting nuclear materials inventories and transactions to the NMMSS. All DOE offices and contractors possessing reportable quantities of nuclear materials are required to have an RIS. They are also required to have a nuclear materials representative (NMR) for the RIS; the NMR is responsible for submitting site/facility data to NMMSS.

There is a rough correspondence between DOE sites and RISs, but the correspondence is not exact for several reasons: Different RISs are required for each DOE contractor possessing nuclear materials, and sites can have more than one contractor that possesses materials. Different RISs are used for waste areas than for processing and storage areas on the same site. Materials under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are reported to NMMSS using a different RIS from other site RISs. Many DOE site offices have their own RIS separate from contractor RISs. For these reasons, most major DOE sites have more than one RIS. Additionally, some offsite materials may be included in the DOE office's or contractor's RIS.

Q: What nuclear materials does DOE M 470.4-6 address?

A: These nuclear materials include: Americium-241, americium-243, berkelium, californium-252, curium, deuterium, depleted uranium, normal uranium, enriched uranium, uranium-233, enriched lithium, plutonium, neptunium-237, thorium, and tritium.

DOE M 470.4-6 focuses on plutonium, enriched uranium, uranium-233, separated americium, and separated neptunium-237, because of their proliferation potential, but requires MC&A programs for all these materials.

Plutonium, enriched uranium, and uranium-233 are defined or designated as special nuclear material (SNM) by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and have long been considered material of concern for nuclear proliferation. More recently the International Atomic Energy Agency recommended that separated americium and separated neptunium-237 be treated the same as SNM for safeguards purposes, and DOE has adopted this recommendation into its regulations.

Q: What are the MC&A requirements for non-SNM?

A: Requirements for tritium, separated americium, and separated neptunium, are based on those for SNM. Requirements and graded safeguards thresholds for separated neptunium-237 and separated americium are identical to those for U-235. Tritium is treated as either Category III or IV SNM depending on its form, quantity, and isotopic purity.

MC&A requirements for non-SNM materials other than tritium, separated neptunium-237, and separated americium, are largely at the discretion of the DOE cognizant security authority responsible for MC&A. The only specific requirements are that

1) An MC&A program be established and maintained for these materials based on the strategic and monetary value of the materials.

2) The data fields for the materials accounting system for these materials be consistent with those required by DOE M 470.4-6.

3) Reporting Identification Symbol (RIS) level transactions and inventories be documented by the system and reported to the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) in accordance with DOE M 470.4-6, Section B. (Berkelium is not required to be reported to NMMSS because the total amount DOE owns is very small, it has a short half-life, and it has been written off DOE's financial records by the Office of Financial Management.)

4) Physical inventories of these materials be conducted on a periodic basis at a frequency and in a manner approved by the DOE cognizant security authority and documented in the MC&A plan.

5) Materials that are collocated with SNM and are credible substitution materials for the SNM be inventoried at the same frequency as the SNM and measurement methods used for inventories are capable of distinguishing between the SNM and the collocated materials.

Q: Are DOE-owned nuclear materials at NRC licensee facilities reported to NMMSS under DOE requirements or NRC requirements?

A: They are reported using DOE requirements. This is based on an agreement between DOE and NRC and is reflected in NRC regulatory documents NUREG/BR-0006, Instructions for Completing Nuclear Material Transaction Reports, and NUREG/BR-0007, Instructions for the Preparation and Distribution of Material Status Reports. Additionally, the requirement to report pursuant to DOE instructions is usually reflected in contract and lease agreements for use of DOE-owned materials by NRC licensees.

Q: What does the term "credible roll-up" mean with regard to MC&A?

A: Roll-up is the accumulation to a higher safeguards category of special nuclear material (SNM) from lower category locations. Roll-up is credible if the materials can be accumulated and removed from the site prior to interruption and defeat by site personnel, including protective forces.

Q: I'm confused by tritium "reportable quantity" vs. "reporting unit." Table I-2 of Section A of DOE M 470.4-6, Chg 1, lists the "reportable quantity" for tritium as 1 gram, but Table XV-1 of Section B of same manual lists the "reporting unit" for tritium as 1/100 of a gram. Why are these two quantities different?

A: Reporting unit and reportable quantity are different concepts. Reporting unit is the mass unit that facility/site nuclear material accounting systems use for recording and reporting inventories and transactions. Reportable quantity is the minimum amount of a material that a facility must have to be subject to requirements of DOE M 470.4-6 for that material. Except for tritium, the reporting units and reportable quantity for nuclear materials are same. Historically, a hundredth of a gram was both the reporting unit and the reportable quantity for tritium. In 2003, the reportable quantity of tritium was changed to a gram in order to exempt facilities with less than that amount (primarily research facilities) from the MC&A requirements for tritium. The reporting unit was being maintained at 1/100 of a gram at the request of our larger tritium facilities and to maintain compatibility with historical MC&A record-keeping systems. Facilities with more than a gram of tritium are still required to report transactions of 1/100 of gram or more.

Q: On December 3, 2007, the DOE Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer signed out a memorandum establishing policy panels to increase feedback from the implementers of DOE policy. How will the MC&A policy panel be organized?

A: The MC&A policy panel will be a continuation of the current MC&A quality panel with emphasis on creating new opportunities for communications between the HS-71 MC&A policy development team and end users of MC&A policy. Face-to-face meetings will be organized similarly to current quality panel meetings, but there will be greater use of alternative means of conducting meetings. The goals of the panel include identification of MC&A policy issues and increasing the effectiveness of the MC&A policy development process. The results of all teleconferences and meetings will be compiled and appropriately distributed. The policy panel's activities will be centrally monitored to assure continued relevance and utility.

Q: What is a material balance?

A: A material balance is a calculation evaluating the physical inventory of nuclear material actually present in an area or a facility using beginning and ending inventories after considering transfers of nuclear material into and out of the area or facility. The material balance results in a quantity called the inventory difference (ID) which is defined by the following equation, commonly known as the material balance equation:

ID = BI + A - R - EI

(BI=beginning inventory; EI=ending physical inventory; A=additions to inventory; R=removal from inventory.)

For material in process, a non-zero ID is expected because of measurement uncertainties and the nature of processing. For items in storage, a non-zero ID indicates that either material is missing or an item has been misplaced.

Q: What is a material balance area (MBA)?

A: An MBA is both a subsidiary account of the nuclear materials account for a facility and a geographical-bounded location within the facility. MBAs are used to localize nuclear material losses by subdividing the facility nuclear materials account into smaller units and restricting material in these accounts to specific geographically-bounded locations and processes within the facility. Establishing MBAs within the facility allows operations and safeguards personnel to maintain a better idea of the types and quantities of materials present at various locations in the facility and enhances internal control of the materials by establishing where within a facility various types and forms of materials are authorized to be. It also allows for administrative controls to be put in place to govern movement of materials between authorized areas of the facility and for materials balances to be closed around areas smaller than the facility as whole.

MBAs should be defined as geographical areas with defined physical boundaries and under the control of one person, the MBA custodian, for MC&A purposes. Additionally, transfers between MBAs should be based on measured values, and ideally, MBA boundaries will not cross security area boundaries. In fact, DOE M 470.4-6, Chg1, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, requires that MBA boundaries not cross material access areas (MAAs) boundaries.

Q: What is the role of ANSI/ASTM Technical standards in DOE MC&A programs?

A: Public Law (P.L.) 104-113, the National Technology and Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, requires that all Federal agencies and department use technical standards developed and adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities as determined by the agencies and departments. The act further states that Federal agencies and departments shall consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies, and shall participate with such bodies in the development of technical standards. A copy of P.L. 104-113 can be found at www.gpoaccess.gov/plaws/104publ.html.

Consistent with P. L. 104-113, DOE M 470.4-6, Chg 1, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability requires that DOE line management assure that technical standards developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International, are considered in development of MC&A programs under their cognizance. The primary ANSI and ASTM standards of interest to MC&A address measurements, measurement control programs, and SNM portal monitors. Standards addressing these topics are listed in DOE M 470.4-7, Safeguards and Security Program References.

Q: What is graded safeguards for MC&A?

A: Graded safeguards is the concept of providing the greatest relative control, accountability, and protection for the types, quantities, and forms of special nuclear materials that can be most effectively used in a nuclear device or easily converted to such materials. The level of control and protection required is based on safeguards categories and attractiveness levels of the materials, which are described below.

Q: What are MC&A safeguards attractiveness levels?

A: MC&A safeguards attractiveness levels are a ranking of various types and forms of special nuclear materials based on their usefulness in constructing a nuclear weapon or an improvised nuclear device (IND). Generally, the attractiveness of particular physical form is based on two factors (1) the relative ease of either directly using the material in an IND or converting it to a usable form, and (2) any self-protecting properties of the material, such as high levels or radioactivity, that make the material more difficult to handle or process. Attractiveness levels range from "A" to "E," with A being the most attractive and E being the least attractive. Attractiveness level A includes nuclear weapons and test devices. Attractiveness level B consists of pure products (metal and directly convertible material). Attractiveness level C consists of high grade materials that can easily be converted into B materials. Attractiveness level D consists of materials that require greater processing time and complexity to convert to B materials. Attractiveness level E contains other materials not covered by attractiveness levels A through D, such as highly irradiated materials, low-enriched uranium, and highly dilute materials (e.g. solutions less than 1gram per liter).

The Office of Health, Safety and Security in conjunction with NNSA and the weapons laboratories are in the process of reviewing the current attractiveness levels to determine if they need to be updated to address changing technical capabilities and/or to eliminate ambiguities. Possible policy changes based upon this technical review are under HSS review.

Q: What are MC&A safeguards categories?

A: MC&A Safeguard's categories are designations used for ranking of MBAs, facilities, special nuclear material (SNM) items, and other collections of materials in terms of required levels of protection, control, and accounting. Safeguards categories are based on both the amounts of material present and the safeguards attractiveness levels of the materials. Safeguards categories range from Category I to Category IV, with Category I requiring the highest level of protection and Category IV the lowest. MC&A and physical protection requirements for facilities, MBAs, and other collection of materials are based primarily on the safeguards category of the material. In addition to attractiveness level and quantities of material present, safeguards categories also depend on material type (i.e., whether the material is plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 235, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233). For example, 2 kilograms of plutonium metal would be Category I quantity, but the same amount of uranium-235 contained in highly enriched uranium metal would only be a Category II quantity. The upper and lower safeguards category threshold quantities for the various material types and attractiveness are defined in Table 1-4, Graded Safeguards, DOE M 470.4-6, Chg1, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, along with additional instructions for determining safeguards categories.

HSS, in conjunction with NNSA and the weapons laboratories, is in the process of reviewing the current safeguards categories to determine if changes need to be made based on evolving technical capabilities and the need for consistency with policy documents of other agencies. Possible policy changes based upon this technical review are under HSS review.

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This page was last updated on November 06, 2009
 
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