DOE SAFETY OVERSIGHT MANUAL

Draft 2/15/2006

APPENDIX 1 - Criteria and Review Approach Documents
APPENDIX 2 - Developing an Integrated Safety Oversight Plan
APPENDIX 3 - Developing and Using Criteria and Review Approach Documents

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

1. PURPOSE

To fulfill its nuclear and worker safety regulatory responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act, the Department of Energy (DOE) must establish safety requirements and ensure that activities are conducted consistent with the requirements. As part of a program to ensure that safety requirements are implemented and complied with, DOE conducts different types of oversight at various levels within the DOE organization. While the basic principles of DOE oversight are long established and deeply rooted, DOE recently instituted a more formalized safety oversight program. The requirements of this program are specified in DOE O 226.1, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy.

This manual provides responsibilities and processes to implement the requirements of DOE O 226.1. It contains information needed by DOE Headquarters program offices and field elements to develop and implement a safety oversight program. The manual is consistent with DOE's Integrated Safety Management System as established by DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System, and DOE G 450.4-1B, Integrated Safety Management System Guide.

The manual includes safety oversight tools, such as Criteria and Review Approach Documents (CRADs) and Integrated Safety Oversight Plans (ISOPs). However, it differentiates between the requirement to have an ISOP, for example, and the guidance on how the finished product looks. This built-in flexibility distinguishes and balances the diverse missions and management prerogatives of the sites and facilities to which this manual applies.

The information and processes contained in the manual may be applied to other disciplinary areas where DOE oversight must be conducted and where such a manual does not exist, such as safeguards and security, cyber security, emergency management, business operations, and environmental management.

2. APPLICABILITY

This manual is applicable to all DOE elements with responsibility for oversight of DOE activities and to DOE activities managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

3. EXCLUSIONS

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Power Marketing Administration
DOE activities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

4. DEFINITIONS

Assurance Systems - All aspects of the activities designed to identify deficiencies and opportunities for improvement, report deficiencies to the responsible managers, and complete corrective actions effectively.
Concern - A programmatic breakdown or widespread problem supported by on or more violations or observations.
Corrective Action Program - Formalized method to document, resolve, and manage DOE safety oversight-identified deficiencies.
Criteria and Review Approach Document - Standardized written procedures, consisting of performance objectives, criteria, and lines of inquiry, used to perform DOE safety oversight.
DOE Safety Oversight - Activities performed by DOE organizations to determine the effectiveness of Federal and contractor programs and management systems, including assurance and oversight systems.
Deficiency - Generic term for violation, concern, or observation.
Good Practice - An item or activity that is particularly noteworthy.
Integrated Safety Oversight Plan - Formalized method to document and coordinate DOE safety oversight activity.
Lesson Learned - A good work practice or innovative approach that is captured and shared to promote its repeated application. A lesson learned may also be an adverse work practice or experience that is captured and shared to avoid recurrence.
Observation - A condition or practice that does not provide or promote effective protection of the health and safety of the public, workers, or the environment, but is not directly linked to either a requirement or established performance criterion. Sometimes referred to as an "opportunity for improvement."
Operational Awareness - Activities conducted by the field element and DOE Headquarters program offices, including walkthroughs, work observation, document reviews, meeting attendance and participation, and routine interaction with DOE contractor workers and management. The purpose of operational awareness is to improve the field element's knowledge of what work the contractor is performing, the progress the contractor is making in performing work, the effectiveness of the contractor's internal oversight program, and whether the contractor is performing work safely.
Reactive Oversight - Activities and processes, such as accident investigation, employee concerns investigation, allegation follow up, operational readiness reviews, and analysis of performance measurement and event reporting data carried out by DOE field elements and DOE Headquarters program offices (line management) in response to a specific event, condition, or special request.
Routine Oversight - Any planned activity, including independent assessment, management assessments, worker self-assessments, self-assessments, reviews, evaluations, inspections, tests, checks, surveillances, appraisals, audits, and walkthroughs whose purpose it is to determine an document whether items, processes, systems, or services meet specified requirements and perform effectively.
Safety Information Program - Formalized system used to collect, analyze, and categorize safety/performance-related information thereby providing the basis for management action.
Validation - Confirmation that corrective actions have been completed and the deficiency corrected.
Verification - Review and approval of proposed corrective actions to ensure they are likely to correct the identified deficiency and prevent recurrence.
Violation - Failure to meet requirements or established performance criteria or both.

CHAPTER II - DOE OVERSIGHT OVERVIEW

Safety oversight at DOE is multi-faceted. Its basic framework consists of three internal tiers and two overlaying components. Each of the three tiers consists of oversight and oversight-related sub-parts. Independent Oversight overlays the three tiers and probes all three to verify that performance criteria are met and to determine the effectiveness of program implementation. Similarly, but with line management responsibility for assuring adequate and proper implementation of Departmental nuclear safety policy and requirements, the Central Technical Authorities also overlay the three tiers.

Tier 1-DOE Contractor Safety Oversight

DOE contractors conduct oversight of the sites, facilities, and activities which they operate on behalf of DOE. Contractor oversight is the primary line of defense to ensure implementation of DOE safety requirements and related contract provisions. Typical DOE contractor safety oversight consists of:

Verifying that work is performed in accordance with DOE requirements, applicable contract provisions, DOE approved safety bases, approved safety management programs and processes, and work control processes and procedures.
Evaluating the effectiveness of safety management system implementation.
Observing hands-on work and implementation of procedures and processes at the worker level.
Implementing a contractor self-assessment program.
Implementing a comprehensive and integrated contractor assurance system in accordance with DOE 0 226.1, Appendix A.

Tier 2-DOE Field Element Safety Oversight

DOE field elements conduct oversight of DOE contractor activities. DOE field element oversight ensures that field element management maintains operational safety awareness and confirms contractor implementation of DOE safety requirements, related contract provisions, approved safety bases, approved safety management programs, work controls and procedures, and mission objectives. Typical DOE field element safety oversight includes:

Implementing a routine safety oversight program consisting of planned and scheduled assessments, reviews, evaluations, inspections, tests, checks, surveillances, appraisals, and audits. The routine oversight program also looks at the contractor assurance system’s implementation, and monitors day-to-day contractor work performance through operational awareness activities (e.g., walkthroughs, work observation, document reviews, meeting attendance and participation, and routine interaction with DOE contractor workers and management).
Carrying out reactive safety oversight activities, such as accident investigation, employee concerns investigation, allegation follow up, operational readiness reviews, and analysis of operational performance measurement and event reporting data.
Conducting for-cause reviews.

Tier 3-DOE Headquarters Safety Oversight

DOE Headquarters performs oversight of DOE field element and DOE contractor
activities. Oversight of the field element is conducted to maintain confidence that the field element is carrying out its responsibilities in regards to safety management and oversight of the contractor’s work, and to ensure systemic safety issues affecting the DOE complex are identified and addressed. Oversight of contractors (in complement to the field element’s work) looks at areas where the field element has not looked or where performance indicates the need for additional oversight beyond the scope being provided by the field element.
Typical DOE Headquarters safety oversight includes:

Implementing a routine safety oversight program that complements the field element’s routine safety oversight program to provide added confidence that critical field element and contractor work is performed in accordance with DOE requirements and contract provisions.
Carrying out reactive safety oversight activities, such as accident investigation, employee concerns investigation, allegation follow up, operational readiness reviews, and analysis of operational performance measurement and event reporting data, that complement reactive oversight activities carried out by the field element.
Conducting for-cause reviews.

Overlay-Independent Oversight

Independent oversight is conducted under the direct authority of the Secretary of Energy. Independent oversight encompasses the activities of DOE contractors, DOE field elements, and DOE Headquarters program offices. DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance (SP) provides an independent look at the effectiveness of policies and programs in safeguards and security; cyber security; emergency management; environment, safety and health (ES&H); and other critical functions of immediate interest to the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, or the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

Overlay-Central Technical Authorities

There are two DOE Central Technical Authorities (CTA’s), one in NNSA and one in Energy, Science and Environment (ESE). Part of DOE line management, the two CTAs provide centralized technical expertise and operational awareness to assure adequate and proper implementation of nuclear safety policy, requirements, and standards.

CHAPTER III - RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

1. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Administrator, NNSA, and the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment
1. Serve as the Central Technical Authority (CTA) and maintain a cadre of supporting technical staff that will maintain operational awareness, especially with respect to complex, high-consequence nuclear operations, to ensure that the Department’s safety policies and requirements, including oversight policies and requirements, are adequate and properly implemented.
Program Secretarial Officers/ Heads of Headquarters Organizations
1. Establish oversight programs and processes to implement DOE P 226.1 and DOE O 226.1 at Headquarters and across field elements.
2. Develop line management oversight programs for DOE Headquarters that are integrated with the field elements.
3. Ensure program office-specific policies and directives conform to DOE P 226.1 and DOE O 226.1
4. Provide unfettered access to information and facilities to conduct an effective oversight program, consistent with applicable laws and requirements.
5. Establish and maintain appropriate qualification standards for personnel with Headquarters and field oversight responsibilities and clear, unambiguous lines of authority and responsibility for oversight.
6. Establish and implement an effective site assurance system for activities and programs at Government-owned and Government-operated facilities/activities and DOE sites that are not under the cognizance of a DOE field element.
7. Initially approve and thereafter annually review and approve contractor assurance system program descriptions updates unless approval authority is delegated to the DOE field element.
8. Assess periodically contractor assurance system programs and processes for consistency across the complex and ensure they reflect industry best practices.
9. Assist the field elements in developing and implementing DOE Integrated Oversight Plans and periodically assess them for consistency.
10. Make established safety goals part of award fee determinations for DOE contractors.
Heads of Field Organizations
1. Incorporate the Contractor Requirements Document (CRD) from DOE O 226.1 into all DOE contracts pursuant to 48 CFR 970.5204-2, “Laws, regulations, and DOE directives,” by notifying contracting officers of affected contracts.
2. Maintain appropriate qualification standards for personnel with oversight responsibilities and clear, unambiguous lines of authority and responsibility for oversight.
3. Establish and implement line management oversight programs and processes consistent with the requirements of DOE O 226.1.
4. Provide unfettered access to information and facilities to conduct an effective oversight program, consistent with applicable laws and requirements.
5. Review, concur, and forward contractor assurance system program descriptions for Headquarters line management approval. If approval authority is delegated by the Headquarters organization, approve contractor assurance system program descriptions. If existing processes (e.g., quality assurance program or integrated safety management description documents) provide adequate descriptions of the contractor assurance programs, or if such processes can be modified to provide adequate descriptions, submittals under these processes can be used to meet this requirement.
6. Develop and implement DOE Integrated Safety Oversight Plans with input and assistance from Program Secretarial Officers, appropriate Heads of Headquarters Organizations, and the CTA.
7. Establish and implement Safety Information Programs.
8. Use the results of DOE line and independent oversight and contractor assurance systems to make informed decisions about corrective actions and the acceptability of risks and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of programs and site operations.
Secretarial Staff Offices
1. DOE organizations performing independent oversight under the direct authority of the Secretary of Energy shall conduct their work in accordance with the requirements of DOE O 226.1 or comparably effective criteria established by the director of the independent oversight program.
2. DOE policy organizations will revise or develop and maintain the necessary directives to effectively implement DOE O 226.1.
Central Technical Authorities (The CTA for NNSA is the Principal Deputy Administrator and the CTA for ESE is the Under Secretary)
1. Maintains operational awareness of the application, implementation and maintenance of nuclear safety requirements and guidance, and assists field and headquarter elements in developing line management oversight programs, policies and processes.
  Periodically, in concert with field and headquarter elements, reviews and evaluates the effectiveness of contractor assurance systems.
  Assists, in concert with DOE Headquarters and field elements, in developing and implementing DOE Integrated Oversight Plans.
Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health
1. Serves as a member of the Oversight Policy Committee as required by DOE O 226.1.
2. Serves as the Office of Primary Interest (OPI) for DOE M 226.1 and, upon request from line management, provides technical interpretations to the Manual and acts on exemptions from the Manual.
3. Ensures that safety rules and DOE Directives that are assigned to EH as the OPI are consistent with DOE P 226.1 and DOE O 226.1.
4. Provides technical assistance to DOE field or Headquarters elements on line management oversight activities upon request.

2. REQUIREMENTS

DOE Order 226.1, Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, together with long-established DOE management programs, such as quality assurance and integrated safety management, govern DOE safety oversight. They require, for example, that DOE safety oversight be managed and performed by personnel specifically trained and certified against established standards to do such work. And they require that DOE safety oversight be based on defined performance objectives, derived from the applicable laws, regulations, and national standards, to include DOE Directives, DOE-approved plans and program documents (e.g., authorization basis documents and quality assurance plans), site-specific procedures/manuals, contractually mandated requirements (e.g., S/RIDs), and contractual performance objectives.

This manual reinforces these well-established programs, building on their long-standing requirements and guidance. The manual links four important tools and concepts from established DOE programs that were previously isolated, if not wholly unconnected from each other. By connecting and integrating the four, this manual strives to 1) drive DOE management's operational understanding and awareness, 2) heighten their recognition of corporate risk and vulnerabilities, 3) instill managerial and technical inquisitiveness and professional accountability, and 4) guarantee safe and reliable execution of DOE's mission. The four oversight-related tools and concepts are as follows:

First. DOE's Safety Oversight Program is formally structured, officially documented, and implemented using standardized written procedures, or Criteria and Review Approach Documents (CRADs).

Second. Integrated Safety Oversight Plans (ISOPs) document and coordinate all DOE routine safety oversight activity.

Third. Corrective Action Programs (CAPs) document, resolve, and manage all DOE safety oversight-identified deficiencies.

Fourth. Safety Information Programs (SIPs) collect, analyze, and categorize safety/performance-related information

DOE Safety Oversight Program and CRADs

DOE safety oversight is performed to understand the state of safety at DOE facilities, identify shortcomings, and ensure their appropriate resolution. There are two types of DOE safety oversight: routine and reactive.

Routine Safety Oversight

General

Routine safety oversight is planned, systematic, and scheduled, being characterized by repetitive cyclic oversight activity.
Routine safety oversight is performance-oriented first and compliance-oriented second.
Routine safety oversight maintains ongoing assurance of the adequacy and effectiveness of contractor and field element performance with respect to safe operation and adherence to DOE requirements and contract provisions.
DOE’s routine safety oversight program consists of baseline and supplemental components.

Baseline Safety Oversight

Baseline safety oversight is conducted in specified functional areas (e.g., vital safety systems) and at specified frequencies even when performance meets requirements.
The overall objective of baseline oversight is to monitor performance to ensure safe operation and adherence to DOE’s most important safety requirements and contract provisions.
Grading is a major factor in determining the breadth, depth, and scope with which baseline safety oversight CRADs are implemented.
Appendix 1 specifies baseline safety oversight CRADs.

Supplemental Safety Oversight

All routine safety oversight performed beyond the baseline in terms of the activity’s breadth, depth, and subject matter is supplemental.
Supplemental safety oversight is conducted in response to declining performance and focuses on topics of safety significance as supported by data from the contractor’s and DOE’s SIPs.
As the need is identified, supplemental safety oversight is added to the ISOP during its periodic update.
Supplemental safety oversight makes use of the Appendix 1 CRADs complemented with other more specialized in-depth oversight procedures developed on a site-by-site or program-by-program basis.

Reactive Safety Oversight

General

Like routine safety oversight, reactive safety oversight measures the adequacy and effectiveness of contractor and field element performance.
Reactive oversight, though, is purposely conducted in singular response to a specific event, condition, special request, or emerging safety issue.
Examples of a reactive safety oversight activity include follow-up on allegations; response to incidents, accidents, or any unusual event impacting safety; special follow-ups on corrective actions not covered by the routine oversight program; and technical assistance (in response to a particular event, condition, or request) by a subject matter expert or experts.

Details

Reactive safety oversight activities, because of their unanticipated nature, are not included in the approved ISOP.
The results of reactive safety oversight are reported and tracked in the CAP and included in the SIP.
Standardized written guidance (e.g., CRADs) for conducting reactive safety oversight is limited, usually requiring development of one-of-a-kind plans and procedures based on the specific issue at hand.
Due to its highly focused technical nature and short response time, reactive oversight relies heavily on the competence and expertise of the staff performing the oversight.

Integrated Safety Oversight Plan

DOE field elements, in concert with Headquarters elements, must develop and implement an Integrated Safety Oversight Plan.

General

The ISOP is the central repository and coordination point for all routine DOE safety oversight.
Developing the ISOP is a collaborative process between DOE Headquarters and field elements.

Details

DOE Headquarters and field elements use an agreed-to standardized process to mutually develop site-wide ISOPs.
DOE ISOPs are based on:

The required baseline oversight CRADs in Appendix 1
Contractual/legal requirements.
Significant changes in a system, program, facility, or activity (for example, change of site/facility managing contractor, transfer of site/facility ownership from one DOE Headquarters or field element to another, or permanent cessation of operations).
Individual and systemic problem areas identified by DOE or contractor oversight activities and determined by the SIP to be of sufficient import to warrant additional oversight.
Inadequate corrective actions identified during the CAP process that require additional follow-up.
Areas for which little information is available or documented.
Areas of special DOE management interest or priority.

DOE ISOPs are formally documented and approved for use by the DOE field element with DOE Headquarters involvement.
DOE ISOP development is coordinated with the CTAs.
The field element maintains the ISOP and manages the ISOP process in most cases.
The ISOP process includes input, as needed, from field safety specialists, facility representatives, safety engineers, program managers, maintenance personnel, training personnel, and financial personnel.
The DOE ISOP is coordinated with the contractor’s oversight activities to search out more potential efficiencies through coordination and collaboration.
DOE ISOPs are updated at least semi-annually.

Corrective Action Management Plan
DOE field elements must develop and implement a Corrective Action Program (CAP).
1. General
  1. CAPs document, evaluate, verify, validate, track, and close DOE safety oversight violations, concerns, and observations (i.e., deficiencies)
  2. CAPs are developed and implemented consistent with DOE Quality Assurance Criterion 3 - Quality Improvement (10 CFR 830.120 and DOE Order 414.1C) and DOE Integrated Safety Management Core Function 5 - Feedback and Improvement (DOE Guide 450.4-1B).
  3. DOE-identified oversight deficiencies and corrective actions should be coordinated and may be integrated with contractor-identified deficiencies and corrective actions to create a site-wide CAP.
2. Details
  1. For each DOE-identified safety oversight deficiency, the organization against whose work the deficiency was identified develops a written plan to resolve it. At a minimum, the following actions are taken and documented in the written plan:
    1. Investigate, to the extent necessary, to demonstrate and document a complete understanding of the deficiency or deficiencies. This includes a determination if the deficiency is isolated or represents a systemic program-related or crosscutting issue.
    2. Identify a root cause and associated causal factors for each deficiency. The causal analysis methodology used to determine the root cause or causes must be identified and justified using a graded approach, and it must be developed and used in a manner to determine programmatic or generic deficiencies.
    3. Develop corrective actions that are clear and concise, executable, have a measure of performance to demonstrate the outcome, can be verified and validated as complete, and address the root cause and contributing causes, as applicable, to prevent recurrence.
    4. Identify the organizations and managers responsible for carrying out the corrective action.
    5. Ensure completion dates are established for each corrective action.
    6. Identify and explain how corrective actions will be tracked to closure.
    7. Identify mechanisms to validate closure and provide assurance that corrective actions were appropriate to prevent recurrence.
3. Verification
  1. Corrective actions for deficiencies identified at DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities are reviewed and approved before they are implemented.
  2. For DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities, this review and approval process involves verifying the completeness of the proposed actions to gauge whether their implementation will likely correct the identified deficiencies and prevent their recurrence.
  3. For DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities, verification is typically performed by some combination of individuals representing the applicable DOE Program Secretarial Officer, Head of the Field Organization, and the organization that identified the deficiency.
  4. At DOE non-nuclear and nuclear facilities not categorized as Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3, verification is implemented using a graded approach, depending on the significance of the deficiency to be corrected.
4. Validation
  1. All actions taken to resolve the deficiency are validated at DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities. This involves making sure that corrective actions are completed as planned, and that the actions resolved the deficiency and will prevent its recurrence.
  2. For DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities, validation is typically performed by the organization that formulated the corrective action and is confirmed by a representative from the applicable DOE field element.
  3. At DOE non-nuclear and nuclear facilities not categorized as Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3, validation is implemented using a graded approach, depending on the significance of the deficiency being corrected. In a graded application, the person or persons verifying the corrective action plan’s implementation may sample the completed actions. The sample size depends on the number of corrective actions and the significance of the deficiency.
5. Documentation
  1. In both graded and non-graded applications, closures packages are generated that specify what measures were completed to address the deficiency.
  2. Most times, the closure package includes objective evidence that the actions taken to resolve the deficiency have been completed. When this is not the case, the person or persons validating implementation may need to visit the facility to verify objective evidence of corrective action completion.
  3. The person or persons validating implementation must document the activities he or she performed.
  4. All documentation is included with the final documentation package that closes the deficiency.
  5. If it is found during follow-up that corrective actions are inadequate in any way (they have not prevented recurrence of the deficiency, for example), the written plan will be rejected and the matter re-input into the CAP. The basis for this action will be clearly documented and included in the closure package.
Safety Information Program

DOE field elements must develop and implement a Safety Information Program (SIP).
1. General
  1. DOE safety oversight and oversight-related activities generate safety/performance-related data and information.
  2. This data and information comes from many sources, including the DOE Operating Experience Program, contractor assurance system, operational awareness activities, event reporting, worker feedback, issues management, lessons learned, performance measures/indicators, accident investigations, DOE Inspector General findings, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board reports and recommendations, employee concerns investigations, and allegation follow up.
2. Details
  1. DOE field elements must develop and implement a SIP, or equivalent.
  2. The SIP collects, analyzes, and categorizes historical and real-time safety/performance-related information.
  3. Based on the information’s analysis and categorization, DOE management formulates and carries out actions (e.g., increase supplemental safety oversight, stop work, adjust contract award fee, revise work processes and procedures, or retrain personnel) based on pre-defined site/facility-specific safety and performance criteria.
  4. Regular reports are issued summarizing SIP-generated conclusions and recommendations.
  5. Where feasible and cost-effective, multiple SIPs (maintained separately by DOE contractors and DOE field elements at the same site or facility) are consolidated into a site or facility-wide system.
  6. At sites or facilities where safety information-type programs do not currently exist, comparable programs will be developed and implemented.

CHAPTER IV - REFERENCES

Requirements
- DOE P 226.1, "Department of Energy Oversight Policy"
- DOE O 226.1, "Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy"
- DOE O 210.X, "Corporate Operating Experience Program"
- DOE O 225.1A, "Accident Investigations"
- DOE O 414.1B, "Quality Assurance"
- DOE O 442.1A, "Department of Energy Employee Concerns Program"
- DOE P 450.4, "Safety Management System Policy"
- DOE O 470.2B, "Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance Program"
- 10 CFR 820, 2001, "Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Activities," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.
- 10 CFR 830, 2001, "Nuclear Safety Management," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.
- 10 CFR 835, 2001, "Occupational Radiation Protection," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.
- 10 CFR 850, 2001, "Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.
- DEAR Section 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution, as amended, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.
- Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 651, et seq.

Consensus Standards
1. American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Nuclear Society (ANS) 3.2-1994 (R1999), Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants.
2. ANSI/ANS 15.8-1995, Quality Assurance Program Requirements for Research Reactors.
3. ANSI/ASQ (American Society for Quality) Z 1.13-1999, Quality Guidelines for Research.
4. ANSI/ASQC (American Society for Quality Control) E4-1994, Quality Systems Requirements for Environmental Programs, Part A.
5. ANSI/ASQC Q10011-1-1994, Guidelines for Auditing Quality Systems-Auditing, American Society for Quality.
6. ANSI/ASQC Q10011-2-1994, Guidelines for Auditing Quality Systems- Qualification Criteria for Quality Systems Auditors, American Society for Quality.
7. ANSI/ASQC Q10011-3-1994, Guidelines for Auditing Quality Systems-Management of Audit Programs, American Society for Quality.
8. ANSI/ISO (International Organization for Standardization)/ASQ Q9001:2000, Quality Management Systems: Requirements. (Note: ANSI/ISO/ASQ Q9000 series documents are recognized as being identical to their ISO 9000 series counterparts.)
9. ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) NQA-1-2000, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications.
10. DOE-HDBK-1101-96, Process Safety Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals, February 1996.
11. DOE-HDBK-3027-99, Integrated Safety Management Systems (ISMS) Verification; Team Leader's Handbook, June 1999.
12. DOE-EM-STD-5505-96, Operations Assessments, May 1996.
13. DOE-NE-STD-1004-92, Root Cause Analysis Guidance Document, February 1992.
14. DOE-STD-1036-93; Guide to Good Practices for Independent Verification, June 1993 (and Change Notice 1, dated December 1998).
15. DOE-STD-3006-95, Planning and Conduct of Operational Readiness Reviews (ORR), November 1995.
16. ISO 14001.1, Environmental Management Systems Specification with Guidance for Use, 1996.
17. ISO 14010.1, Guidelines for Environmental Auditing General Principles, 1996.
18. ISO 14011/1.1, Guidelines for Environmental Auditing Audit Procedures; Part 1: Auditing of Environmental Management Systems, 1996.
19. ISO 14012.1, Guidelines for Environmental Auditing Qualification Criteria for Environmental Auditors, 1996.
20. ISO CD.3 19011, Guidelines on Quality and/or Environmental Management Systems Auditing.
Other References
1. DOE G 231.1-1, "Occurrence Reporting and Performance Analysis Guide"
2. DOE G 231.1-2, "Occurrence Reporting Causal Analysis Guide"
3. DOE G 414.1-1A, "Management Assessment and Independent Assessment Guide"
4. DOE G 414.1-2, "Quality Assurance Management System Guide for Use with 10 CFR 830.120 and DOE O 414.1"
5. DOE G 450.3-3, "Tailoring for Integrated Safety Management Applications"
6. DOE G 450.4-1B, Volume 1, "Integrated Safety Management System Guide (Volume 1) for use with Safety Management System Policies; The Functions, Responsibilities, Authorities, and Manual; and the DOE Acquisition Regulation"
7. DOE G 450.4-1B, Volume 2, "Integrated Safety Management System Guide (Volume 2) for use with Safety Management System Policies; The Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual; and the DOE Acquisition Regulation"
8. DOE/RW-0333P,Quality Assurance Requirements and Description [for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program], Rev. 10, Section 18.0, "Audits," Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, April 2000 www.ymp.gov/doclist.htm#q
9. DOE P 450.1, Environment, Safety and Health Policy for the Department of Energy Complex, June 1996.
10. DOE G 450.4-1B, Integrated Safety Management System Guide, Volumes: 1 and 2, March 2001.
11. DOE, Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety, and Health Appraisal Process Protocols, July 1999 [http://www.eh.doe.gov/oversight/procedures/9907app/html/toc.htm].
12. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Criteria for Performance Excellence," www.quality.nist.gov

APPENDIX 1 - Criteria and Review Approach Documents
APPENDIX 2 - Developing an Integrated Safety Oversight Plan
APPENDIX 3 - Developing and Using Criteria and Review Approach Documents

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