

16319

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS

404216

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
JOINT TASK FORCE 132
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

UNIQUE DOCUMENT # SA 200006571A001

Date 10/18/94

AG 322

NMB-U
26 MAY 1952

051 R
Castle
1/1991

Dr. Alvin C. Graves
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
P.O. 1663
Los Alamos, New Mexico

Dear Dr. Graves:

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 2 PAGES
NO. 1 OF 1 COPIES, SERIES 132

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW	
1ST REVIEW DATE: 6-30-94	1. DETERMINATION (URGE NUMBER)
AUTHORITY: E.O. 11652	2. CLASSIFICATION RELIANCE
NAME: Lt. Col. [illegible]	3. RECLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: S-1
2ND REVIEW DATE: 4/20/94	4. COMMENTS TO BE CLASSIFIED INTO
AUTHORITY: ADD	5. COMPROMISE TO BE CANCELLED
NAME: [illegible]	6. CLASSIFICATION TO BE BRACKETED
7. OTHER (GHI):	

In reference to our letter to the Executive Agent regarding Operation CASTLE, a copy of which I sent you last week, the problem has been discussed in more detail with Stan Burriss who has been with us this week. He was very helpful in clarifying several aspects of CASTLE. I was informed yesterday that the JCS decided the Army will continue as Executive Agent for CASTLE, and that I will remain as Task Force Commander for that operation.

I consider the major problem (from the standpoint of Service support) is whether Eniwetok must again be evacuated. This determines the plan for basing major elements of the Task Force, particularly the Air Force Task Group with their test aircraft. It is necessary to resolve this problem at the earliest practicable date.

As you know, the problem of basing substantial numbers of aircraft on Kwajalein has caused a major readjustment in the construction program at that station, which the Navy expects will be relieved when we leave the latter part of December 1952. They plan to tear down the buildings we are to occupy during IVY, reorient the runway, and in general proceed with their construction program. Should we find it necessary to request facilities on Kwajalein for CASTLE similar to those furnished for IVY, a major disruption of their construction program would result. I feel certain we would meet with strenuous objections from the Navy.

Aside from the probable non-availability of Kwajalein, the advantages of basing the entire task force on Eniwetok are numerous. For Operation IVY, the requirements for basing nearly six hundred personnel over the maximum that Kwajalein can accommodate has already necessitated planning for the basing of some aircraft at Hickam which is not the best procedure. The Hickam plan, if feasible, will accommodate only a small portion of the "overage." Unless we can further disperse our personnel and airplanes to other localities we may be forced to cut down on the scope of the scientific effort. This is an example of the problem that can be overcome for CASTLE by basing the entire task force on ENIWETOK, where we have adequate space and facilities.

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Unauthorized disclosure is prohibited and subject to administrative and criminal sanctions.

~~NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION~~
Unauth... to
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

LOS ALAMOS
01761823

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
This document contains Restricted data Admin... to
his docu... in the Atomic Energy Act of
defined... disclosure subject to
4. Unauth... and Criminal Sanctions.

at 41

(1)

44SA203000041

~~SECRET~~

Evacuation of Eniwetok is heavily expensive in Service support in that we require a sizable number of ships for this purpose. In addition to the operational considerations, further damage to the Eniwetok installations as may be indicated by the "MIKE" results will have to be considered.

I believe the most serious consideration should be given to detonating CASTLE on UJELANG Atoll, BIKINI, or elsewhere. The problem at UJELANG involves the relocation of 158 natives, but I do not believe this to be an insurmountable obstacle. There is a possible rad-safe hazard to the following inhabited civilian communities in the vicinity of BIKINI: Rongelap 112 inhabitants, Utirik 178, Wotho 30. However we can no doubt arrange for an evacuation capability in each case. Incidentally, the attitude of CINCPAC has been that he will provide evacuation capabilities at those inhabited atolls where IVY might cause a rad-safe hazard. CINCPAC will have to do the same for CASTLE.

The inclosed chart gives native population strengths at the critical points, and may be helpful to you.

Sincerely yours,



P. W. CLARKSON
Major General, USA
Commander


1 Incl:
Chart - Forward Area Native
Population

~~SECRET~~

1299

Headquarters, Joint Task Force 132
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
10 May 1952, 1800 H

Appendix II to Annex A
Concept of Operations, CJTF 132 Operation Plan No. 2-52



FORWARD AREA NATIVE POPULATION

Declassified by DNA, Chief, ISTS
Date 10/18/94