

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Files

DATE: January 5, 1953

FROM : Howard Brown *HB**459*

SUBJECT: POLICY WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDING WEAPONS EFFECTS DATA TO FCDA

The FCDA, in a letter of December 18, 1952, has indicated a need for "fuller access within the AEC to information necessary to civil defense planning." The letter is not specific as to the type of information desired. By implication it would appear that FCDA planning has been handicapped due to lack of vital information which AEC could have supplied.

Before replying to FCDA's letter the AEC should very carefully examine its position on the matter. In the first place, we do not admit that the FCDA has not been given all information which they need and which the AEC could supply within the categories of data previously agreed upon. In the second place, there is an obvious practical and legal limit to the stage to which any outside agency can be taken into the confidence of the AEC on weapons developments. On the other hand, I question whether the AEC could take the position that no information with respect to potential weapons effects would be made available except as the result of actual tests. In other words, I do not believe it would be a very tenable or defensible policy to state that we will provide no weapons effects information prior to a test detonation, and together with the Military we will screen for transmittal all effects data occurring after tests. It seems to me that it is within the realm of theoretical possibility that there now exists or may exist a situation in which information in our possession with respect to potential weapons effects would greatly benefit the civil defense program of the nation even though the effects are estimated and are not the result of actual test detonations.

Accordingly, I would think that we ought to have a clearly defined and generally understood policy within the AEC with respect to how much and how soon weapons effects data should be provided FCDA. It seems to me that serious consideration should be given to a policy which would make available to the FCDA weapons effects data within the agreed upon categories when it appears that such data would significantly affect or modify civil defense planning. Data would not be limited to that resulting from test detonations but would include effects capable of estimation with reasonable accuracy provided:

<p>US DOE ARCHIVES 326 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION</p> <p>RG <u>DOE HISTORIAN (DBM)</u></p> <p>Collection <u>1132</u></p> <p>Box <u>3362</u></p> <p>Folder <u>#1</u></p>
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DOE ARCHIVES

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- (1) Development, production, and delivery appear possible and practicable; and
- (2) The concurrence of the DOD in accordance with existing agreement be forthcoming.

The FCDA would undoubtedly prefer an arrangement in which weapons development and planning data is routinely available to them in order that they could make their own determinations and predictions as to the effects on civil defense planning. Such an arrangement would be impractical in my opinion, and I believe it not at all unreasonable to expect FCDA to rely on AEC's judgment as to that information which would significantly affect or modify civil defense planning. We have a Civil Defense Liaison Branch not simply to transmit to FCDA information which they request, but rather to be familiar with civil defense needs and to anticipate their requirements for data, and be able to recognize information available within the AEC of use to FCDA.

cc: Dr. Bugher ✓