

QUALITY ASSURANCE EXCHANGE

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U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Quality Assurance Policy and Assistance



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QA Quote of the Day

"When everything else fails, follow the instructions."

-- Unknown

IN THE SPOTLIGHT: Larry Newman, Director of the Office of Quality Assurance, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

Mr. Larry Newman has broad experience in managing nuclear reactors and power plants, both in the government and the private sector. He has over 20 years' experience in the civilian nuclear field. He has worked at numerous civilian nuclear power reactors, where he has twice been a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-licensed senior reactor operator, and a manager, supervisor, or team lead for nuclear reactor shift crews, reactor operations, nuclear plant licensing, quality assurance, training and mentoring of reactor operators, and corporate operations.

Currently, Mr. Newman is the Director of the Office of Quality Assurance (OQA) in the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM). In this role, he is responsible for managing and coordinating the efforts of OCRWM's own quality assurance staff and initiatives, as well as those of OCRWM's contractors for the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP).

Having been in this position for over a year now, Mr. Newman has significantly improved the performance of this organization since 2006, according to an independent assessment conducted by Quality Assurance Management Assessment (QAMA). Due to the efforts of Mr. Newman and his organization, the OQA is now performing at a level equal to oversight groups in mature nuclear operating organizations. These outstanding contributions have provided a model for direct oversight of license applications submitted to the NRC.

Recently, we had the opportunity to talk to Mr. Newman about his QA program at Yucca Mountain. Mr. Newman discussed the challenges, organizational milestones, lessons learned, and the next phase of the Yucca Mountain Project.

(Continued on page 2)

Background: Yucca Mountain Repository

DOE began studying Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in 1978 to determine whether it would be suitable for the nation's first long-term geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Currently stored at 126 sites around the nation, these materials are a result of nuclear power generation and national defense programs.

On July 23, 2002, President Bush signed legislation allowing the DOE to take the next step in establishing a safe repository in which to store our nation's nuclear waste. In June 2008, DOE submitted a license application for a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain to the NRC. Recently, the NRC staff has accepted the application for review and formally docketed the application on September 8, 2008. A notice* of docketing will soon be published in the *Federal Register*. The Notice will announce that the staff's independent safety review will begin. A subsequent Hearing Notice will also include the staff's position on whether it is practicable to adopt DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement without further supplementation.



Yucca Mountain is the nation's planned repository for spent nuclear fuel.

Yucca Mountain is located in a remote desert on federally protected land within the secure boundaries of the Nevada Test Site in Nye County, Nevada. It is approximately 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. More information is available on the web at:

ocrwm.doe.gov/ym_repository/index.shtml

* Since this interview, the NRC has published this notice in the *Federal Register* (Sept. 15, 2008). For up-to-date documentation visit [Docket Details](#). For further information on the entire YMP application process go to: nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app.html

(“In the Spotlight” ...continued from page 1)

Q: *As Director of OCRWM Office of Quality Assurance for over a year now, can you share with our readers the three primary challenges your organization has encountered/overcome?*

A: Good Question! First OCRWM QA had not kept pace with standards and expectations of oversight organizations in the nuclear industry. OCRWM QA had to change first before we could expect the line managers to change. Over the years, OQA had in essence tried to manage the site through continually increasing the requirements in our Quality Assurance Requirements Document (QARD). This essentially diluted the line managers sustaining sponsors role. This mind set change required a new way of thinking about the line as our customer, rather than folks that we had to police into proper performance.

In the new reality of budget constraints, OQA will have to prove its value just like the rest of the line departments wrestling for funding. OCRWM QA had to transition to provide value added oversight. OQA proves the value of independent oversight by pinpointing for line manager’s performance issues they themselves cannot see. This value added, customer focus flies in the face of the more traditional compliance-oriented QA/Quality Control (QC) approach first used in the nuclear industry. Oversight organizations in the nuclear industry evolved to focus on identifying broader organizational performance gaps, rather than being satisfied with just checking procedure compliance.

Externally, OQA had to reestablish its reputation with the stakeholders outside of the project. Given the long time view of QA not being effective by these external entities, the office continues to be challenged to demonstrate its capability as a tough, invasive, and effective QA organization. We have to establish and maintain credibility with the NRC, Government Accountability Office, and others that we are effective and an integral component to a fully functional OCRWM/DOE team.

The budget situation within DOE has caused us to refocus on mission critical oversight. How we accomplished the task of overseeing a license application that is more complex than anything the NRC has ever seen, was essential to the project’s success. I brought in four or five of the industry’s top QA experts to help us navigate our way out of the past. OQA’s support contractor played a critical role in quickly locating and recruiting scarce top QA talent. Without this ability to bring in the talent, OQA would have had a difficult time showing a demonstrable step change in QA performance.

Q: *The YMP has achieved a major milestone in the submittal of the License Application (LA). What role did the QA organization play in the timely development and submittal*

of the LA? Was the QARD a key component of the LA? Do you see other applications that can benefit from the approach and methodology used for the YMP License Application?

A: Unlike some of the other License Applicants in the nuclear industry who have recently had their applications challenged by the NRC, OQA over a year ago put together an oversight plan. By sitting down with the line management and determining how QA can add value to the process, OQA strategically determined the outcome (successful license application) and the steps it would take to achieve that goal from a QA perspective. We conducted over fifty assessments and invested over 5,000 man hours in the independent oversight of the License Application.

Comments from the line managers at the exit meetings attested to the value the line management placed on the work the OQA was doing. With the focus and amount of effort that it took to produce an application of this magnitude the independent look added to the assurance needed for DOE to submit the license as promised.

OQA assessment teams utilized subject matter experts from all over the country, our own highly experienced QA staff, and some line members, to add the technical credibility to our assessments. This type of technical capability falls right in line with our future goal of rotations with the line organization to keep our technical capability fresh. This also helps with spreading the QA expertise to the line organization.

The QARD was a subset and key part of the LA. It had to be updated to include all the items necessary to carry the project into the construction phase (e.g., construction standards). By working with the line management owners of the QARD, we were able to assemble a QARD that reflected the projects needs, was acceptable to the NRC, and was a step toward moving the QARD towards the industry standard Nuclear Energy Institute simplified QA plan model.

I see this approach as a valuable tool that some new construction projects should implement to ensure they achieve mission critical attributes.

Q: *Your organization has garnered major successes in the last year. What, in your opinion, are the key factors for this success? To what degree were your commercial QA experience and the level and quality of resources dedicated to QA contributors to this success?*

A: It’s true. We have gotten independent validation that the turnaround in the performance of the organization has been dramatic. An assessment just done by a team of nuclear quality professionals provided feedback that the difference seen from 2006 to now was “like night and day.” The team

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("In the Spotlight" ...continued from page 2)

evaluated OQA against the same standards used for measuring mature commercial nuclear organizations. Measured against those standards, an assessment done in 2006 found OQA to be effective in only 2 of 8 areas reviewed. This time, OQA was found to be effective in 7 of 8 areas. The team recognized that the 8th area was not an area of focus for commercial utilities applying for a license with the NRC. It also noted that while assessments of these types conducted in the industry typically identify at least one significant deficiency, the team found none on this assessment. One team member is taking our plan for oversight of the Corrective Action Program back to his utility for implementation. I think it's fair to say OQA is now performing at a level on par with oversight groups in mature nuclear operating organizations. I believe we've actually provided the model for direct oversight of license applications submitted to the NRC.

With regard to the key factors for our success, first and foremost in my mind will always be the people. As a positive, OQA was already staffed with people with extensive project quality experience, and in a number of cases people who had performed at executive levels, including vice-presidents, in other organizations. We added to this foundation by bringing into the organization people with line and regulatory (NRC) experience, and people with a proven track record of success leading QA organizations in a nuclear-regulated environment. In this way, we created a diverse talent pool allowing us to take full advantage of the mix of people with extensive project quality, industry quality, regulatory, and line experience. I truly believe we assembled the most talented group of people of any nuclear quality group formed in any organization at any time. Of course, I could be wrong in this regard, but this is my belief.

Given this talent, we next needed to establish an identity and a shared vision for the organization. As a group, we committed to transitioning from an emphasis on compliance monitoring, to an emphasis on focusing on standards of excellence in project performance. In addition, we worked hard to partner with the line by emphasizing those standards of excellence.

Q: *Now that YMP has achieved this major milestone, the mission is changing. What do you anticipate will be the new mission, drivers, and challenges in the next phase of the project?*

A: The recent industry experience with new licensees suggest that the next two to three years will be more challenging than had been previously thought, due to the large number of Requests for Additional Information (RAI's) from the NRC. Additionally, the design process continues, and procurement of long lead items needs QA's attention. Additionally, in this resource constrained environment, funding from Congress will continue to be a challenge.

Q: *Going forward as the QA oversight organization, what are the key lessons learned that you would carry forth to the next phase of the project?*

A: The key message, that we continue to reinforce with our folks, is to constantly seek ways to add value through our independent oversight. Ultimately, we support the line managers and they speak to the value of a great QA organization. If we highlight the issues for the line managers that they just can't see themselves, then we add value. If the external agencies can't identify any issues that we haven't found through our self-assessments or QA audits and surveillances, then we are doing well.

Q: *How do you see your organization interacting with the various stakeholders like the generators, and how can they contribute to the success of the project?*

A: The waste generators have a huge stake in the processing of waste packages. OCRWM has a QA plan that we implement as well as all of the waste generators. OCRWM's QA job, as a licensee, is to ensure the continuity of quality through packaging and delivery to burial. The resurgence of nuclear energy has caused the NRC to refocus its efforts on vendors and suppliers to prevent some of the issues that we saw in the early days of nuclear power. Our experience from the commercial industry can be directly applied to the vendor and supplier area within the rest of DOE.

One important area is the implementation of our QA plan that is due to be implemented October 1, 2008. This is the plan that should carry us through construction, and was submitted with the License Application this spring. By providing QA as a consulting resource to the waste generators outside of OCRWM, I believe we can assist the waste generators in meeting the requirements of the License Application and QA plan.

SQA FAQ

How were the 10 SQA work activities in DOE O 414.1C determined?

Industry consensus standards, DOE rules and directives and other pertinent documents for software quality assurance, software engineering, and safety software were reviewed for commonality of recommended SQA practices. The 10 SQA work activities were found to be common practices in many of these documents. The documents reviewed included: ASME NQA-1-2000, IEEE Software Engineering Series, IEEE Std 7-4.3.2, ANS 10.4, NUREG 6263, NASA 8719.13B, RW 0333P, QC-1 Rev 10, WSRC Manual 20-1 Rev 8, and Pantex Std-1875 Issue 9.

SQA WORK ACTIVITY: Personnel Training in Design, Development, Use & Evaluation of Safety Software

(This article is the eighth in the series that will address how the software quality assurance 10 work activities in the DOE O 414.1C relate to ASME NQA-1-2000 and other consensus standards. DOE G 414.1-4 provides details for implementing the 10 work activities to meet the SQA requirements in the DOE O 414.1C.)

As is necessary for most human activities, appropriate training is key for success, especially with staff involved in the high risk activities such as the design, development, use and evaluation of software employed in safety applications.¹ As stated within Section 5.2.10 in the DOE Guide 414.1-4.²

“Although other software quality assurance activities may indicate that the software satisfies its operational objective, improper or invalid use of the software may negate the safety mitigation strategies included within the software.”

Both ASME NQA-1-2000³ and DOE STD 1172-2003⁴ discuss the importance and necessity for appropriate training commensurate with the complexity of the application and the potential consequences if the safety software application fails. DOE STD 1172 further emphasizes that the recommended training is just the minimal requirement for technical competency. Indeed a robust safety software application should be the product of several subject matter experts in several safety-related disciplines.

When evaluating an application for use in a safety software environment, consideration must be given to how the above safety software concepts were applied and how well the safety software development process was implemented and how well verification and validation can occur. For example, if the software application is commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software, analysis must be done and documented regarding the potential risks of using COTS versus a customized internally designed and built safety software application.

Since the number of safety software applications are increasing and mastery, or at least sufficient training and knowledge, of the key safety software topics does not occur quickly, completion and review of the safety software topics must be periodically reviewed to assure competency to develop, use or evaluate safety software applications. Insufficient or incomplete safety software training for all staff associated with the development, testing, use and evaluation of configurable software graded as Level A, B or C is vital and key to the development and assignment of DOE personnel responsible for ensuring the safe operation of defense nuclear facilities.

This article was submitted by Scott Matthews, sxm2@lanl.gov

**Footnotes**

¹ See Section 7, Definitions of DOE O 414.1C, *Quality Assurance*

² DOE G 414.1-4, *Safety Software Guide for Use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements*, and DOE O 414.1C, *Quality Assurance*

³ Part I, Requirement 2, Section 200, page 10, of ASME NQA-1-2000, *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications*

⁴ *Safety Software Quality Assurance Functional Area Qualification Standard*, dated 12-03 (currently under revision)

⁵ **Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks**

For the design, development and testing of safety software, the analyst will need training and experience in the following topics, including but not limited to:

Fault tolerant methodologies that includes such topics as:

- Exception handling/anomaly management to ensure the trapping and management of faults;
- Fault containment regions; and
- The application of technologies such as RAID.⁵

Safety design methodologies that includes such topics as:

- The application of safety design principles such as *Isolation* and *Independence*;
- Minimal application of language constructs that are difficult to verify and validate such as recursion, pointers, and polymorphic functions;
- The choice of implementation languages; and
- The use of safety programmable logic controllers if applicable.

User interface design topics such as:

- Careful consideration of word and phrase choices and the placement of the input and output fields;
- The complexity of user interfaces;
- The font type, size and color;
- Ambient lighting conditions in the target environment; and
- The system responses to user interactions.

Testing methodologies such as:

- Bounds and array checking;
- User profile testing;
- Assurance of thorough testing of all the safety functions with the verification and validation logged in a requirements traceability matrix; and
- Coverage analysis for source lines and loop and conditional statements.

Configuration management topics such as:

- How configuration items are identified and controlled;
- The definition and documentation of development and operational baselines;
- How changes are managed and tracked; and
- The frequency and process for configuration status accounting and physical and functional configuration audits are performed.

QUALITY ASSURANCE CONCERN WRIGHT INDUSTRIES, INC.

Reprint of No. 2008-02 August 2008 Safety Bulletin 2008-02 August 2008

(Signed by) Glenn S. Podonsky, Chief Health Safety and Security Officer, HSS

PURPOSE

This Safety Bulletin provides information on potential quality assurance concerns with products furnished by Wright Industries, Inc. (WII) under contracts where conformance to the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 414.1C, *Quality Assurance*, and ASME Standard NQA-1, *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications (QA)*, has been specified.

BACKGROUND

A joint audit recently conducted by the DOE Savannah River Site and the Washington Savannah River Company, LLC concluded that the Wright Industries, Inc. (WII) Quality Assurance (QA) Program is not being implemented effectively [Reference: Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS) Report EM-SR--WSRC-ESH-2008-0003 Supplier QA Program Deficiencies]. This conclusion is based on a total of 18 findings and one observation. The major weaknesses identified by the audit team's findings are summarized below.

1. WII is not adequately documenting or implementing its QA program as defined in its QA Manual.
2. NQA-1 requirements are not adequately being flowed down to its sub-tier suppliers.
3. Management assessments and internal audits were not performed in the last two calendar years. [Note: A subcontractor was hired in April 2008 to focus on internal and external audits; three external audits have been performed. Internal management assessments are scheduled through the rest of this calendar year; none have been performed to date.]
4. WII is purchasing materials from non-qualified suppliers for nuclear/safety related components.
5. WII implementing procedures and instructions do not reflect the current operating organization.
6. Based on the number and nature of the findings for this audit, it is evident the Quality Assurance Department is not adequately staffed. The audit team was presented with a WII QA Department Transition Plan to address staffing issues within the QA Department. WII V.P. of Operations is temporarily assuming the responsibility of QA Manager until a permanent QA Manager is hired. Specific QA Staff assignments are identified in the Transition Plan as well as a transition schedule for hiring a permanent QA Manager (target date for hiring is September 17, 2008).

IMPLICATIONS

Rigorous implementation of an NQA-1 program forms the basis for acceptance of components for a nuclear safety system. Loss of confidence in that program immediately calls into question the ability of the safety component to perform as required under critical conditions. WII is known to have fabricated and/or supplied fabricated items with safety-related functions for at least three DOE projects. WII offers a variety of products which

might be utilized at DOE sites including: vision systems and closed circuit television (CCTV); advanced robotics; software design; process instrumentation; system controllers; mechanical and electrical design and engineering; stainless steel fabrication and manufacture; pressure vessel design-and-build; glove box, hot cell, drum transfer systems; tele-manipulators; double-door sealed transfer systems and additional internal equipment design-and-build.

RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Each DOE site should review its procurement history for the past two years to determine if WII has been used as a supplier on any project or provided maintenance where NQA-1 requirements apply. A complete review of those purchases should be conducted to determine suitability for use of the procured items. Any non-conforming items should be reported through the ORPS.

If you have any questions, please contact Colette Broussard at 301-903-5452 or Colette.Broussard@hq.doe.gov.

PREVENT EVENTS Learning from Industry Experience

Prevent Events is intended for use by personnel during morning meetings, pre-job briefings, and work unit meetings to communicate key industry experience.

Quality Assurance

1. How are we ensuring that the suppliers on our Approved Suppliers List are maintaining their QA Program?
2. Are we conducting random surveillances of approved suppliers?
3. Are we monitoring Lesson Learned, Suspect Counterfeit and Defective Items databases for information related to our approved suppliers?
4. Are we documenting concerns with our supplier?
5. Are observed quality issues being reported to the procurement organization for follow-up and performance monitoring reporting?

Engineering

1. Are we specifying effective inspection and testing for our nuclear quality assurance items? Will the test specified reveal defects that will cause the safety function to be impaired?
2. Are we supporting QA and Procurement in defining critical process and inspection hold points?
3. Are we fully engaged in review of vendor data and QA inspection and surveillance reports?
4. Are we documenting quality concerns and providing supplier performance feedback to the procurement organization?
5. Are we specifying the correct quality and technical requirements in our procurement documents?
6. Are we engaging QA early in the decision process for input on inspections, surveillance, hold points, etc.?

Procurement

1. Are we monitoring supplier performance reports for suppliers on our Approved Suppliers Lists?
2. Are we providing input for the benefit of the complex to the performance monitoring database on our suppliers' performance, both good and bad?
3. Are we enforcing all of the inspection and testing provisions of our contracts with suppliers?

HSS QA ACTIVITY CORNER

Safety Software Expert Working Group Established

As part of the *Path Forward to Address Gaps in Toolbox Code Gap Analysis Reports* that was submitted to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in February 2008, the Safety Software Expert Working Group (SSEWG) has been convened within DOE. The SSEWG consists of expert users of the Safety Software Central Registry toolbox codes from across the DOE Complex, including contractor representation from NNSA and EM. The first SSEWG conference call was held on September 16th with representatives experienced in the use of the CFAST, GENII, EpiCode, MELCOR, MACCS2, and ALOHA toolbox codes. During the open discussion, SSEWG members were briefed on the proposed approach to review the Gap Analysis Reports for the toolbox codes and address the gaps which will then allow closure of DNFSB Recommendation 2002-1. SSEWG members also expressed interest in adding newer toolbox code versions to the Safety Software Central Registry inventory. The next SSEWG conference call is scheduled for October 22nd. For further information, please contact Subir Sen at (301) 903-6571 or subir.sen@hq.doe.gov.

Communication Portal under Development

To allow the DOE safety and hazard analysis software and design software code users to effectively communicate with one another and share experiences or to obtain information on the use of the codes, HSS, EM and NNSA are developing a web-based Communication Portal (also known as the Communication Forum).

The Communication Forum will be used to promote continuous improvement and sharing of information and knowledge of safety and hazard analysis software and design software among interested parties across the DOE complex. The Communication Forum is an access-restricted (password-protected) system that consolidates usage information and will contain, in part, links to code developers, training information, good practices, lessons learned, etc.

The Communication Forum also provides a platform for obtaining and communicating information about various safety and hazard analysis software and design software codes being used at DOE sites. It will allow users to exchange information about the usage of individual safety and hazard analysis software and design software codes, submit information on an encountered problem, and submit general information or suggestions on the use of individual codes. For further information on the Communication Forum related to this software, please contact Subir Sen at (301) 903-6571 or subir.sen@hq.doe.gov.

Plan of Action to Address Increased HEPA Filter Rejection Rate

DOE is continuing with its efforts to review the actions being taken by its suppliers of High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters to address the increased rejection rate of filters observed since 2007 during testing at the Filter Test Facility (FTF) operated by Air Techniques International, Inc.

In July, DOE submitted a plan of action to the DNFSB to address the increased rejection rate of HEPA filters. The plan outlined several actions that are being taken by DOE and its site contractors in conjunction with the filter manufacturers over the next several months for improving the quality of filters delivered to DOE and reducing the high rejection rate.

Actions taken to date include:

- issuing a Safety Advisory – Quality Assurance to alert the DOE complex of the increased rejection rate and actions being planned to address the problem;
- identifying Federal and contractor site points-of-contact to improve the distribution of HEPA filter testing results; and
- sending letters to the three major suppliers of HEPA filters requesting information on the root cause of the increased rejection rate and what action is being taken to resolve the problem.

This information will aid in the evaluation of manufacturers' QA programs and those processes that are critical for manufacturing filters to DOE quality requirements and specifications. For further information, please contact Subir Sen at (301) 903-6571 or subir.sen@hq.doe.gov.

Quality Council

HSS hosted the first DOE Quality Council meeting in Germantown, MD August 6-7, 2008, and has established a monthly conference call to be held the third Thursday of each month. A couple of the primary goals of the Council are to build and encourage federal-contractor relationships and ensure consistent interpretation and implementation of quality assurance requirements. In addition to other interfaces, the Council plans to establish a strong relationship with the Energy Facility Contractors' Group (EFCOG). The Council plans to work with EFCOG to help meet some of the Council's objectives as well as assist with EFCOG initiatives. The DNFSB is also participating as an interested party to the Council. The Council's Charter has been developed and is expected to be issued by October 2008. For more information, please contact Colette Broussard at (301) 903-5452 or Colette.Broussard@hq.doe.gov

2007 Survey on QA Implementation


The 2007 Survey Report was issued in June 2008 to all Departmental Elements. It can be obtained at the QA Website, address <http://www.hss.energy.gov/CSA/CSP/QA/>. The next Survey is expected to occur in 2009.

DOE G 413.3-2, QA Guide for Project Management

DOE G 413.3-2 was issued in June, 2008 and is now on the Directives System website. The Guide was developed by a team of DOE contractor and Federal persons experienced in QA and project management.

Just for Fun

QA Crossword Puzzle



ACROSS

DOWN

- 3. Daily publication of rules and notices of the Federal Government (2 words)
- 5. A type of study used to compare actual performance with potential performance (2 words)
- 7. A legal document giving permission
- 8. Director of Office of QA, OCRWM
- 9. Geologic Repository (2 words)

- 1. A volunteer organization, directed by senior level executives from DOE contractors (acronym)
- 2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (acronym)
- 4. A Safety Design Principle
- 6. A type of Filter (acronym)

*HINT: All answers are contained within articles of this newsletter.
 Crossword puzzle answers are found at the bottom of page 8.

U.S. Department of Energy

Office of Nuclear Safety, Quality Assurance and Environment (HS-20)

Office of Quality Assurance Policy and Assistance (HS-23)

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EDITORIAL NOTE:

If you are interested in receiving this newsletter electronically, please email your request to be added to the distribution list to qaexchange@hq.doe.gov.

We're on the Web!

See us at:

hss.energy.gov/csa/csp/qa/

QA RELATED MEETINGS & CONFERENCES

NQA-1 Meeting

When: October 13-15

Where: San Diego

For more info: <http://calendar.asme.org/EventDetail.cfm?EventID=7759>

ISM EFCOG Working Group

When: Nov. 18-20

Where: Las Vegas

For more info: <http://www.efcog.org/wg/ism/index.htm>

Newsletter Articles Needed

The *Quality Assurance Exchange* is intended to be a forum for the exchange of ideas and the sharing of experience among DOE field offices, contractors, and DOE headquarters to foster continuous improvement in QA implementation.

Readers are strongly encouraged to contribute articles on the implementation of QA requirements, lessons learned, and other QA-related topics. We welcome your feedback and suggestions.

Please forward your input to:
qaexchange@hq.doe.gov

HAS YOUR CONTACT INFORMATION CHANGED?

If so, please help us maintain the QA Point of Contact database with accurate information by forwarding the following information to:

qaexchange@hq.doe.gov

- name
- phone number
- email address
- Federal or Contractor personnel
- DOE organization or company name
- and site name, if applicable



The Office of Quality Assurance Policy and Assistance (HS-23) was organized in April 2008. Our mission is to develop and maintain the QA/SQA requirements documents for DOE (including associated guidance documents). Our office's role also includes assisting DOE HQ, Field and contractor organizations with interpretation of, implementation of and resolving issues related to QA and SQA requirements. In addition, we oversee the operation of the HEPA filter testing facility.

HS-23 staff includes the following individuals:

Colette Broussard, Director	301-903-5452
Stacey Onley, QA Administrative Assistant	301-903-8019
Duli Agarwal, QA Assessments/Assistance	301-903-3919
Mary Haughey, QA Policy/Directives	301-903-2867
Subir Sen, HEPA Filters/SQA	301-903-6571
Lisa Treichel, QA Communications	301-903-8177

QA Crossword Puzzle Answers: ACROSS: 3. Federal Register; 5. Gap Analysis; 7. License; 8. Newman; 9. Yucca Mountain DOWN: 1. EFCOG; 2. NRC; 4. Isolation; 6. HEPA