BBS in the Advanced Photon Source at Argonne National Laboratory

The Advanced Photon Source (APS) facility at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) outside Chicago Illinois is a synchrotron light source funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, (DOE) Energy Research Division and Office of Basic Energy Sciences. APS is a national user facility serving the international x-ray research community from industry, universities, medical schools, federal and international research laboratories. The APS is a source of high-brilliance x-ray beams for basic and applied research in: materials science, biology, medicine, chemistry, physics, & geosciences. APS has a staff of nearly 500 scientists, engineers, technicians and support personnel and hosts over 1500 visiting experimenters annually.

The APS proposed in 1997 to augment the Argonne safety program with a BBS system tailored specifically to the needs of the APS and its staff.

The requirements for the system were:

• Identify Ways to Minimize Safety & Health Risks Before Accidents Occur
• Applicability to a multidiscipline research and academic community
• Quick Startup Time
• Ability to Set Obtainable Goals
• Timely & Meaningful Feedback
• Minimum Formality & Documentation
• Ability to Evolve
• Self Sustaining

The goals of the system would be to:

• Identify Precursors of Safety & Loss Management Performance Measures
• Modify the Existing Corporate Culture to Integrate Safety into all Phases of Doing Business
• Demonstrate Employee, Supervisor and Management Commitment to Safety

Throughout 1997 APS researched existing commercially available BBS systems finally selecting a program based on supervisor observations. The reasons for this selection over other equally successful systems wereEase of implementation

The program was initially integrated into one of the major divisions of APS in 1998.

As a result of this preliminary implementation APS began receiving safety feedback such as on unsafe behaviors, conditions, inadequate procedures, as well as noteworthy practices and exemplary behavior and processes. This influx of information lead to the creation of a web based corrective action tracking system (COATS) to track the progress of identified deficiencies through any final remedial action. This system was opened to all employees.

The attributes of the COATS system are:

• Unrestricted employee access to enter and track noted deficiencies
• Assigns responsibility for corrective action
• Tracks deficiencies through completion
• Automatic E-mail notification of pending action dates
• Automatic E-mail notification to highest management of delinquencies
• Functions as a management performance indicator

The APS safety program at that point consisted of the well defined ANL safety program of policies and procedures and its associated infrastructure of programs, training and subject matter experts, and the APS supervisor behavioral observation process and a corrective action tracking system. Although APS was identifying unsafe behavior and conditions, several integral components of a holistic safety system were missing. Initial feedback concerning this deficiency was voiced during follow-up BBS training. First line supervisors and foreman felt ill prepared to manage safety. They felt that the BBS training while instructing them on observational skills did not address their need for clarification of their safety role as supervisors.

From this feedback APS created the third and fourth facets of their BBS system. These were; First Line Supervisor Safety Training and the Employee Safety Envelope. These systems were created to clarify what was expected of a group leader, supervisor, foreman or general employee in managing safety and performing work in a safe manner. These formal training sessions identify clear roles and responsibilities for supervisors and instruct all employees to ask themselves four simple questions before performing a task.

1. The technicians at APS who are charged with installing and maintaining the accelerator systems envisioned the fifth and final facet of the APS BBS program. These accelerator systems include several electron sources, a 450 Mev Linac, a 31 meter circumference Accumulator Ring A 368 meter circumference 7 GeV Booster Synchrotron a 1,104 meter circumference Storage Ring, over 2000 high voltage power supplies 7 rf stations capable of generating 1 MW of rf power and all of the associated support systems required to operate and maintain the system. The technicians proposed a complete facility hazard analysis. (Not to be confused with a safety assessment document or SAD) This process consisted of:
   • A complete walk down of a facility by management, supervisory personnel and employees. (Tri-annual)
   • List of all equipment and systems to identify Hazards Controls (engineered, administrative, ppe and qualified Personnel)
   • Consolidate all procedures, training, JSAs etc. into one easily accessed web file.

   This final process required over 500 man hours to complete and resulted in a web based library of the equipment, systems and associated safety documentation required to operate and maintain the accelerator systems at APS.

   The one thing missing was a name for the APS safety management system. This time the suggestion came from the MIS group creating our web pages. The term they coined gained quick recognition and has become part of the APS nomenclature. The BBS system at APS is called:

   Safety MARTS.M.A.R.TA work place must constantly reinforce its commitment to safety. While written safety policies identify this commitment, it is through actions that safety is incorporated into a work force culture.

   This integration of safety into all aspects of an organization is achieved to a large measure through open communications between the employee, supervision and management. Clear safety performance indicators must be established that identify line management's ability to institute and nurture the safety initiative. Management must police these indicators to assure a continued commitment to a safe work environment. Every employee must understand their clear roles and responsibilities with regard to safety, quality and productivity.

   Employees must see a commitment to safety by their supervisors. Without supervision's commitment, integrated safety remains a paper policy. Educating supervision on identifying unsafe behavior, reinforcing good behavior and prioritizing safe work practices is the cornerstone of an integrated safety system.

   Safety cannot be separated from any aspect of work planning. Safety must be incorporated into the design, procurement, delivery, installation, testing, operations and maintenance of all goods and services. The failure to design equipment or services with adequate safety features or the inability to deliver devices in a timely manner can result in promoting a hazardous work environment. In which case management's inability to integrate safety into all aspects of a facility’s function is viewed by employees as condoning unsafe behavior.

   The ability of a work force to perform tasks safely is directly related to management’s ability to incorporate safety into work planning. Work Planning must involve management, supervision and the employee. It is the responsibility of management and supervision to address safety in every aspect of work planning.

   Safe performance of work is so closely related to work planning that the two are essentially inseparable. If Management and Supervision have addressed all of the safety aspects of a task, safe work practices by properly trained employees will minimize the risks associated with any job hazards.

   It is during the performance of work that supervision's commitment to safety must be clearly evident and enforced. Failure of supervision to properly identify and eliminate unsafe behavior can result in injuries or an unsafe work environment. What may also occur is an interpretation by employees of this failure as approval for unsafe behavior.

   Employees must perform work in a safe manner. It is management's responsibility to see that employees are trained in safe work practices and in identifying unsafe conditions and behavior. It is supervision's responsibility to identify unsafe conditions in the work place and to see that employees work in a safe manner.

   Employees must feel that their safety input and concerns are properly addressed. Open communication must exist for this to occur. An organization is responsible for having processes in place to respond to employee feedback. Management and the employees must feel that identified unsafe conditions or practices will be addressed in a timely manner for open feedback to exist. By addressing valid concerns of an employee or a group of employees, an organization nurtures buy-in and open communication.

   SMART was built on a behavioral observation process. When properly administered and maintained these processes create feedback that must be addressed. In fact BBS systems are driven by feedback. A BBS system integrates safety into the way work is conceived, performed and evaluated. This becomes a double-edged sword in that the feedback must be addressed in a timely manner for the BBS system to retain integrity and acceptability. Failure to supply feedback and continuing improvement only serves to reinforce the concept that safety is a compliance issue and not an aspect of the corporate culture that places health and safety on a par with cost and schedule.

   
   
   
   This page was last updated on March 25, 2009