



# SELLS



Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing

## Selected Review of Priority Descriptors Within the SELLS Database {Lessons That Were Listed *Blue* That Should Be *Yellow*}

Revised on 3/19/04

Item	Date	ID	Issue	Comments
1.	10/28/03	<a href="#">2004-NV-NTSBN-003</a>	Worker left behind	Near Miss
2.	11/13/03	<a href="#">L-2003-OR-BJCX10-1104</a>	Storage of unapproved materials	Near Miss
3.	11/11/03	<a href="#">L-2003-OR-BJCPORTS-1102</a>	Collision with Golf Cart	Two people taken to hospital for examination
4.	11/19/03	<a href="#">L-2003-OR-BJCX10-1101</a>	Contamination brought onto site	Personal Exposure
5.	12/03/03	<a href="#">L-2003-OR-BJCETTP-1201</a>	Improper work initiation process	Near Miss
6.	12/09/03	<a href="#">2003-SR-WSRC-0020</a>	Exposure to unknown VOCs	Personal Exposure
7.	12/10/03	<a href="#">2003-RL-HNF-0037</a>	Potential release of beryllium	Near Miss
8.	12/17/03	<a href="#">2003-RL-HNF-0040</a>	Burst water heater	Near Miss
9.	12/29/03	<a href="#">2004-NV-NTSBN-007</a>	Contact with stored energy	Near Miss
10.	01/05/04	<a href="#">RFETS-04-0002</a>	Worker's hood caught fire	Near Miss
11.	01/12/04	<a href="#">RFETS-04-0003</a>	Battery charger short circuit	Near Miss
12.	01/14/04	<a href="#">2004-SR-WSRC-0001</a>	Release of uranyl nitrate	Release
13.	01/15/04	<a href="#">2004-RL-HNF-0002</a>	LCD Projector melts plastic case	Near Miss
14.	01/16/04	<a href="#">2004-SR-WSRC-0002</a>	Wrong value isolated	Release of stored energy
15.	01/19/04	<a href="#">2004-ORO-TWP-0001</a>	Improper size of evaporator filter caps	NCR failure
16.	01/30/04	<a href="#">2004-SR-WSRC-0003</a>	Escape of steam / contact with insulator	Release of stored energy
17.	01/30/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCBOP-0101</a>	Failure to perform S&M checks	Negative impact to safety basis
18.	02/09/04	<a href="#">2004-SR-WSRC-0004</a>	Acid burn from nitric acid	Personal Exposure
19.	02/10/04	<a href="#">2004-SR-WSRC-0005</a>	Light fixture fails	Near Miss
20.	02/10/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCMVCP-0102</a>	Wrong location of flags	Near Miss
21.	02/13/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCPAD-0201</a>	Leaking acetylene connection	Near Miss
22.	02/18/04	<a href="#">2004-SR-WSRC-0005</a>	Truck – flatbed truck collision	Damage to property
23.	02/19/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCPAD-0202</a>	Impact to Safety Authorization Basis	Procedure failure
24.	02/24/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCK25/k27-0201</a>	Contact with 480V	Near Miss
25.	02/26/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCBOP-0202</a>	Issues with Critical Lift planning	Near Miss
26.	03/04/04	<a href="#">2004-SR-WSRC-0010</a>	Slip and fall	First aid case
27.	03/08/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCPORTS-0301</a>	Inadequate Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation	Near Miss
28.	03/09/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCPORTS-0303</a>	Damage to Bobcat windshield	Damage to property
29.	03/18/04	<a href="#">B-2004-OR-BJCPORTS-0302</a>	Multiple slips & falls due to inclement weather	Injuries and near misses

## Priority Descriptor Analysis

**Table A.1 – Priority Descriptors**

<b>GENERAL SUBJECT AREA</b>	<b>RED/ URGENT</b>	<b>YELLOW/ CAUTION</b>	<b>BLUE/ INFORMATION</b>	<b>GREEN/ GOOD WORK PRACTICE</b>
<i>Public Safety</i>	Event related to operation that has affected or threatened public safety and health	Potential event related to operation which may have affected public safety and health	Information to protect public safety and health including cumulative findings from trending	Action, activity, or practice which improves public safety and health
<i>Worker Safety</i>	Fatality, near fatality, serious injury, or permanent/ total disability	Conditions which resulted in: - Injury - Temporary/ partial disability or - Significant loss of work time or productivity	Information to protect worker health and safety including, but not limited to, cumulative findings from trending	Action, activity, or practice which promotes: - Safe work practices or - Healthful work practices
<i>Environmental Protection</i>	Unconfined hazardous release beyond facility boundary. Significant unconfined hazardous release requiring cleanup	Condition which may have resulted in an unconfined release to the environment or a moderate on-site hazardous release	Information to protect the environment including: - Measurable, but minor, hazardous releases or - Cumulative findings from trending	Action, activity, or practice which: - Prevents environmental degradation or - Will limit or reduce releases to the environment
<i>Compliance</i>	Violations of Federal or State law with significant penalties	Violations of Federal or State law with minor penalties. Significant non-compliance with technical requirements	Information which may improve compliance performance	Action, activity, or practice which improves the compliance performance of the organization

Priority Descriptor Analysis  
**Table A.1 – Priority Descriptors**

<b>GENERAL SUBJECT AREA</b>	<b>RED/ URGENT</b>	<b>YELLOW/ CAUTION</b>	<b>BLUE/ INFORMATION</b>	<b>GREEN/ GOOD WORK PRACTICE</b>
<i>Management/ Administration</i>	Significant management violations including fraud, abuse, and discrimination	Identified actions reflecting failure to operate within management imperatives	Information which may improve management performance	Action, activity, or practice which improves management performance
<i>Investment and Investment Protection</i>	Significant loss or damage of major equipment, property or facility	Potential for major equipment, property or facility to be lost, damaged, or degraded	Information which may improve: - Value - Efficiency - Cost	Action, activity, or practice which improves: - Reliability - Efficiency - Credibility
<i>Public Interest</i>	Event that is perceived by the public to have an effect on or threaten public safety and health	A potential event which may have affected the public, excluding safety and health, had the event occurred	Information beneficial to public relations	Action, activity, or practice that promotes benefits to the public

## Priority Descriptor Analysis

2004-NV-NTSBN-003:

Summary: A worker was left behind in a remote area after other workers departed before all workers were accounted for on an assignment. Post-job debriefing needs to include all personnel working on the assignment. In addition, workers in remote areas should have some means of communication if they become separated from their work crew.

---

L-2003-OR-BJCX10-1104:

Summary: Communications with the Facility Manager is essential for compliance with facility safety. Verification of facility safety basis status is necessary prior to the conduct of facility work including storage of non-radiological and non-nuclear materials.

Line management with the Melton Valley Hydrologic Isolation (MVHI) project thought that BJC had transferred 7831C to the project for remediation. The project line management subsequently utilized the facility as an other-industrial storage facility to store hay bales to be used as erosion control on a MVHI project road construction activity. The use of the facility to store other-industrial materials without appropriate analysis of the potential hazards and communication with the current facility manager shows a lack of line management's understanding of the ISMS principles and functions as well as the responsibilities of the facility manager.

---

L-2003-OR-BJCPORTS-1102:

Summary: Even newly trained equipment operators need to be thoroughly familiar with the controls on the equipment they operate. Different operators may need different levels of hands-on experience prior to solo operation.

---

L-2003-OR-BJCX10-1101:

Summary: Personnel should thoroughly survey themselves when exiting radiological contamination areas. Alpha contamination was detected on the sole of the right boot of a visitor from another DOE site

---

L-2003-OR-BJCETTP-1201:

Summary: Prior to initiating hot work activity, all required procedural steps must be fully executed to ensure that potential hazards are identified and controls are in place. Feedback to verify controls are in place must not be assumed prior to work beginning. (Hot work started without operable sprinklers)

---

2003-SR-WSRC-0020: Summary: Even among fully trained and qualified individuals, differences exist in terms of hands-on experience, and the recognition that tools or techniques should be adjusted to deal with evolving conditions. Employees and supervisors should be alert to conditions under which modifications in equipment or technique are needed to ensure that desired results are achieved.

---

## Priority Descriptor Analysis

2003-RL-HNF-0037:

Summary: In August of 2003, the driver of the Hanford Site refuse collection truck noticed bags in the trash dumpster with labels indicating that the contents were contaminated with beryllium. The driver did not empty the dumpster and notified management of the situation. (Placement of beryllium waste in dumpsters for collection with routine trash was the established practice at the time.) The employee expressed concern that the action of the hydraulic ram to compact the trash after being loaded into the vehicles collection tank could result in a release of beryllium and potential exposure to beryllium dust.

---

2003-RL-HNF-0040:

Summary: A water heater under a decontamination hood in an unoccupied building burst allowing water to uncontrollably discharge throughout the first floor and basement of the building, including several radioactive contamination areas. Low levels of contamination were discovered in some standing water.

---

2004-NV-NTSBN-007:

Summary: Two separate blind penetration near miss incidents occurred when contact was made with energized conductors because procedures were inadequate and/or not properly followed. Corrective actions discussed in the recommendation section of this document are being implemented. Evaluation of the effectiveness of implementation will be conducted once corrective action implementation is complete.

---

RFETS-04-0002:

Summary: Flame resistant fabric does not appear to be adequate to protect workers in an environment where extreme localized heat is combined with a significant flow of fresh air.

---

RFETS-04-0003:

Summary: Potential electrical and fire hazard from dust causing a short circuit in radio battery chargers.

---

2004-SR-WSRC-0001:

Summary: It is important to confirm that suitable storage containers are selected for used chemicals. (80 gallons of the uranyl nitrate had leaked from two drums into the spill control pallet.)

---

2004-RL-HNF-0002:

Summary: The light output of modern video projectors is sufficient to burn through some articles in front of the projector in only a few minutes.

---

2004-SR-WSRC-0002:

Summary: It is important to verify adequacy of isolations prior to opening potentially pressurized lines.

When work activities or response actions have the potential to impact other area facilities (i.e., closing a main cooling water supply header valve), these tasks should first be coordinated with other users. Only in critical emergency situations should such actions be performed without prior consent and immediate notifications should follow in these unique cases.

---

## Priority Descriptor Analysis

2004-ORO-TWP-0001:

SUMMARY: Non-serviceable components and equipment must be segregated from serviceable items to avoid unintended retrieval and use. The person who identifies a deficiency in components or equipment should also initiate the corrective action process to ensure that non-serviceable components are properly controlled.

---

2004-SR-WSRC-0003:

Summary: When working with equipment where hazardous energy may be present, thorough work planning prior to the job, clear communication between work units & disciplines, full use of the Automated Hazards Analysis Program, and thorough Job Status updates are necessary to prevent personnel injury and/or equipment damage.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCBOP-0101:

Routine S&M checks, which were best management practices, were not performed on several radiological facilities as required by Subcontractor procedures. Subcontractor procedures for these activities contained requirements for S&M checks which were not driven by the applicable facility safety authorization basis for these inactive facilities. Additionally, when verbal communications are utilized, personnel should ask questions or provide feedback so that understanding between Contractor and Subcontractor is clear.

---

2004-SR-WSRC-0004:

Summary: Requirements should be followed in the event of any injury which takes place in a Contamination Area, including proper notification of Radiological Control Operations (RCO) personnel and properly utilizing Safety Shower/Eyewash stations.

---

2004-SR-WSRC-0005:

Summary: Personnel should ensure that only the responsible organization (maintenance, in this case) performs work on lights and light covers to ensure that all lighting equipment is secure after work is performed.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCMVCP-0102:

Summary: Hold Points should be understood and used by project and field engineers to preserve historic sites, as well as other important steps in a work process. Responsible personnel need to be aware that existing historical survey information should be used to define hold points. Historical survey information (including the North American Datum and/or Grid) should be conveyed to design and survey personnel to establish adequate location detail. Doing so could prevent the destruction of other historical sites.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCPAD-0201:

Summary: The acetylene and oxygen hoses on torches utilized for welding or cutting operations should be checked and tightened at the beginning of each work shift to ensure there are no leaks present. A wrench of the appropriate size should be used to verify the tightness of the connections. The brass fittings on these hoses are subject to temperature changes, which can cause them to loosen over time. Twisting of the hoses during welding or cutting operations can also contribute to loosening of the hose connections.

---

## Priority Descriptor Analysis

2004-SR-WSRC-0005:

Summary: Personnel should ensure that only the responsible organization (maintenance, in this case) performs work on lights and light covers to ensure that all lighting equipment is secure after work is performed.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCPAD-0202:

Summary: Movement of material between facilities must be coordinated with all affected parties, and reviewed for potential impact to both the sending and receiving facilities, even for temporary or in-and-out type of relocation

---

B-2004-OR-BJCK25/k27-0201:

Summary: Hazards associated with staging of heavy equipment on grassy areas must be evaluated. Heavy equipment operators must be aware of the conditions and obstacles along the course traveled by their equipment. An unloaded trailer being repositioned struck and damaged a pole mounted electrical disconnect. The tractor operator did not adequately identify adverse surface conditions and maintain additional obstacle clearance due to those conditions.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCBOP-0202:

Summary: During future Hoisting and Rigging activities it is recommended that the Subject Matter Expert (SME) sign the Critical Lift Plan (CLP) as the reviewer and that the CLP clearly state the method of communication between the lift supervisor, boom extension sequence and lift radius. The CLP should also contain additional detail to ensure that the shadow of the load path is defined and that all workers are aware of the load path and load shadow and if the use of tag lines is required.

It is also recommended that all cranes have the appropriate maintenance records, including annual inspection certification, load test certification and recent maintenance records available with the crane when it is on-site.

---

2004-SR-WSRC-0010:

Summary: Performing work in unique situations requires attentiveness during performance of work and proper housekeeping/work conditions in order for the job to be done safely.

In this case, sheets of plastic used on the flooring to limit the spread of contamination as well as a 2' X 3' plastic sheet being used to catch small material and decontamination solution as it fell from the trailer during decontamination contributed to an employee slipping and falling during the work activity.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCPORTS-0301:

Summary: Proper review of Fissile Material Operations (FMO) Safety Basis supporting documentation is essential to ensure that all contractual obligations, including leased systems design, operation, surveillance, and maintenance requirements are strictly enforced. Review of safety basis documentation shall include hazard analyses, test and inspection records, and identification of corrective actions in a timely manner.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCPORTS-0303:

Summary: Before handling a piece of scrap material, its geometry, size, weight characteristics and handling method must be evaluated for hazards that could be presented during the activity. It is important that materials are loaded such that if they do shift, they do not become a hazard to the operator or damage equipment. If there is a question or doubt, an alternate safe handling method should be sought.

---

B-2004-OR-BJCPORTS-0302:

Summary: To prevent the hazard of slips and falls, projects must prepare in advance of inclement weather. Multiple slips and falls were documented on the following Fact Sheets between January 27 and 29, 2004.